Diebold Inc.

2003-09-13 Thread R. A. Hettinga
I wonder if there are any mirrors of this out there?

Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text


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Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2003 18:36:13 -0700
From: Elias [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Subject: Diebold Inc.
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Holy election time stories, BatMan! I wonder how/when this will hit major media... 
Hope none of you have stock in this company.

Reeling,
Elias

 Original Message 
[...]

It doesn't matter who votes, it matters who counts the votes- Joe Stalin

DIEBOLD DEMANDS WEB SITES REMOVE SOFTWARE
AND DAMNING EMAILS, CHARGING COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS!

http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/
DIEBOLD ALERT
All files yanked by webhost at request of Diebold, Inc.

A copy of the email is below. I received this 28 hours after the now-vanished files 
went live.

While I am not a legal professional in any way, I firmly believe that these files, 
while copyrighted, carry credible evidence of illegal vote-accessing activity and thus 
are not covered under the DCMA due to the dirty hands defense, which disallows an 
entity seeking damages in cases involving illegal activities connected to that which 
is being protected.

I furthermore adamantly oppose the secrecy and unlawful proliferation of voting 
machines lacking in an auditable, transparent paper backup trail as mandated by law 
via the Helping Americans Vote Act. I refuse to stand by and watch our voting rights 
be subverted, controlled, and ultimately destroyed.

I will post further updates, should they become available.

--Zhade


-- Original message --

September 11, 2003
Jennifer Bryan Dragonwind Internet Services 608 Live Oak Drive Cedar Park, TX 78613
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Ms. Jennifer Bryan,
We represent Diebold, Incorporated and its wholly owned subsidiary Diebold Election 
Systems, Inc. (collectively Diebold). Diebold is the owner of copyrights in certain 
software, documentation, and other works of authorship associated with its proprietary 
electronic voting machines (Diebold Property). It has recently come to our clients' 
attention that you appear to be hosting the following website: 
http://www.smashthetrifecta.comwww.smashthetrifecta.com on one or more of your 
servers, identified as NS1.DRAGONWIND.NET or NS2.DRAGONWIND.NET. This websinte , 
particularly each of the following pages, includes program and/or data files 
containing Diebold Property.:

http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/pimaupgrade.ziphttp://www.smashthetrifecta.com/pimaupgrade.zip
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/GEMSIS-1-17-17.ZIPhttp://www.smashthetrifecta.com/GEMSIS-1-17-17.ZIP
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/GEMSIS-1-17-23.ziphttp://www.smashthetrifecta.com/GEMSIS-1-17-23.zip
http://www.coopster.net/Web%20Shares/GEMSIS-1-18-17.ziphttp://www.coopster.net/Web%20Shares/GEMSIS-1-18-17.zip
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/cobb-corrected-100102-backup.ziphttp://www.smashthetrifecta.com/cobb-corrected-100102-backup.zip
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/sloprimary030502.ziphttp://www.smashthetrifecta.com/sloprimary030502.zip
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/ATL-TSRepair.ziphttp://www.smashthetrifecta.com/ATL-TSRepair.zip

Other information posted on these web pages encourages the downloading of Diebold 
Property from the server and describes how to circumvent passwords and other 
technological measures that are designed to control access to the Diebold property. 
The owner of the smashthetrifecta.com website does not have Diebold's consent to use 
any Diebold Property. These web pages infringe Diebold's copyrights by (1) placing an 
unauthorized copy of the Diebold Property on the server, (2) making the Diebold 
property available to third parties to download from the server and authorizing third 
parties to further infringe our clients' copyrights by downloading and therefore 
copying Diebold Property, and (3) encouraging and assisting in the circumvention of 
copyright protection systems. The purpose of this letter is to advise you of our 
clients' rights and to seek your agreement to the following:

1. To stop using and to immediately delete any Diebold Property from all computer 
systems used by you, or operated under your control, and to confirm having done so in 
writing;

2. To confirm, in writing, that you have no backup copies of any Diebold Property;

3. To cease making Diebold Property available on your server and to cease providing 
the opportunity for any third parties to download, and thereby copy, Diebold Property.

The value of property protected by copyright arises in 

quantum hype

2003-09-13 Thread martin f krafft
Dear Cryptoexperts,

With

  http://www.magiqtech.com/press/navajounveiled.pdf

and the general hype about quantum cryptography, I am bugged by
a question that I can't really solve. I understand the quantum
theory and how it makes it impossible for two parties to read the
same stream. However, what I don't understand is how that adds to
security.

The main problem I have with understanding the technology is in the
fact that any observation of the quantum stream is immediately
detectable -- but at the recipient's side, and only if checksums are
being employed, which are not disturbed by continual or sporadic
photon flips.

So MagiQ and others claim that the technology is theoretically
unbreakable. How so? If I have 20 bytes of data to send, and someone
reads the photon stream before the recipient, that someone will have
access to the 20 bytes before the recipient can look at the 20
bytes, decide they have been tampered with, and alert the sender.
So I use symmetric encryption and quantum cryptography for the key
exchange... the same situation here. Maybe the recipient will be
able to tell the sender about the junk it receives, but Mallory
already has read some of the text being ciphered.

In addition to that, the MITM attack seems to be pertinent, unless
I use public-key encryption and authentication. But then I am back
to cryptography whose strength is based on intractability and not on
a proof. And now I fail to see why quantum crypto is hyped so much.

Maybe I am completely misguided, but I would really appreciate some
explanation or even pointers. Or someone wants to spend a couple of
minutes to explain the process of theoretically unbreakable quantum
cryptography step-by-step.

Note: I am reading MagiQ's press release with the
subtract-marketing-b/s grain of salt. Of course, their technology is
superior to everything. However, most of my information and the food
for my questions stem from the more scientific side, having read
about it in articles in renowned magazines and mailing list posts.

Thanks,

-- 
martin;  (greetings from the heart of the sun.)
  \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver!
 
joan of arc heard voices too.


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Re: quantum hype

2003-09-13 Thread David Wagner
martin f krafft  wrote:
So MagiQ and others claim that the technology is theoretically
unbreakable. How so? If I have 20 bytes of data to send, and someone
reads the photon stream before the recipient, that someone will have
access to the 20 bytes before the recipient can look at the 20
bytes, decide they have been tampered with, and alert the sender.

You're absolutely right.  Quantum cryptography *assumes* that you
have an authentic, untamperable channel between sender and receiver.
The standard quantum key-exchange protocols are only applicable when
there is some other mechanism guaranteeing that the guy at the other end
of the fibre optic cable is the guy you wanted to talk to, and that noone
else can splice into the middle of the cable and mount a MITM attack.

One corollary of this is that, if we want end-to-end security, one can't
stick classical routers or other such equipment in the middle of the
connection between you and I.  If we want to support quantum crypto,
the conventional network architectures just won't work, because any two
endpoints who want to communicate have to have a direct piece of glass.
Quantum crypto might work fine for dedicated point-to-point links,
but it seems to be lousy for large networks.

For these reasons, and other reasons, quantum crypto looks pretty
impractical to me, for most practical purposes.  There is some very
pretty theory behind it, but I predict quantum crypto will never replace
general-purpose network encryption schemes like SSH, SSL, and IPSec.

As you say, there is a lot of hype out there, but as you're discovering,
it has to be read very carefully.

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Re: quantum hype

2003-09-13 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach David Wagner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.09.13.2306 +0200]:
 You're absolutely right.  Quantum cryptography *assumes* that you
 have an authentic, untamperable channel between sender and
 receiver. The standard quantum key-exchange protocols are only
 applicable when there is some other mechanism guaranteeing that
 the guy at the other end of the fibre optic cable is the guy you
 wanted to talk to, and that noone else can splice into the middle
 of the cable and mount a MITM attack.

Uh, so if I have a channel of that sort, why don't I send cleartext?

-- 
martin;  (greetings from the heart of the sun.)
  \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver!
 
the public is wonderfully tolerant.
 it forgives everything except genius.
-- oscar wilde


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Re: quantum hype

2003-09-13 Thread David Wagner
 On 09/13/2003 05:06 PM, David Wagner wrote:
   Quantum cryptography *assumes* that you
   have an authentic, untamperable channel between sender and receiver.
 
 Not true.  The signal is continually checked for
 tampering;  no assumption need be made.

Quantum crypto only helps me exchange a key with whoever
is on the other end of the fibre optic link.  How do I know
that the person I exchanged a key with is the person I wanted
to exchange a key with?  I don't ... unless I can make extra
assumptions (such as that I have a guaranteed-authentic channel
to the party I want to communicate with).

If I can't make any physical assumptions about the authenticity
properties of the underlying channel, I can end up with a scenario
like this: I wanted to exchange a key securely with Bob, but instead,
unbeknownest to me, I ended up securely exchanging key with Mallet.

I believe the following is an accurate characterization:
 Quantum provides confidentiality (protection against eavesdropping),
 but only if you've already established authenticity (protection
 against man-in-the-middle attacks) some other way.
Tell me if I got anything wrong.

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