J Harper wrote:
pointers to documentation on the steps required for government registration
The official site for this is at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/Default.htm
-- sidney
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On Mon, 2003-11-24 at 21:06, J Harper wrote:
...snip...
> We're not looking for official legal advice, just some pointers to
> current online resources of how to go about registering our product
> in the US. I've seen posts that for SSL implementations you "just
> need to send a letter to the go
Ian Grigg wrote:
> (link is very slow:)
> http://theregister.co.uk/content/68/34096.html
>
>
> Cryptophone locks out snoopers
> By electricnews.net
> Posted: 20/11/2003 at 10:16 GMT
I see the source release has been put back... again.
Thanks. Pretty simple for open source code. Single email to two addresses
once we have code available online.
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/pubavailencsourcecodenofify.html
(yes, notify is spelled wrong)
What about the patent/trademark issues?
- Original Message -
From: "Sidney Mark
> We've implemented a small version of SSL that we plan to release as
> open source by year's end.
Great!
> We're not looking for official legal advice, just some pointers to
> current online resources of how to go about registering our product in
> the US.
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption; Goo
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "J Harper" writes:
>SSLv3 protocol implementation
>Simple ASN.1 parsing
>Cipher suites:
>TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
>TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
>TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
I understand the need to conserve space; that said, I strongly urge you
to consid
Bodo Moeller wrote:
> The Pohlig-Hellman cipher is the modular scheme that you describe, but
> observe there is a connection to the protocol above: that protocol
> works only if encryption and decryption has a certain commutativity
> property (decrypting B(A(M)) with key A must leave B(M),
Does anyone know of a trapdoor one-way function whose trapdoor can be locked
after use?
It can be done with secure hardware and/or distributed trust, just delete
the trapdoor key, and prove (somehow?) you've deleted it.
It looks hard to do in "trust-the-math-only" mode...
--
Peter Fairbrother
Great feedback, let me elaborate. I realize that AES is implemented in
hardware for many platforms as well. I'll mention a bit more about our
cryptography architecture below. Do you know why AES is so popular in
embedded? ARC4 is faster in software and extremely small code size. It
seems that
Some notes have been floating around claiming that there are bugs in
GPG's use of El Gamal keys. For example, see:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=E1AOvTM-0001nY-00%40alberti.g10code.de&oe=UTF-8&output=gplain
Can anyone confirm these reports?
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROT
Hi!
Would anybody have a specific patent or patent application reference for
the Sealed Storage component of the "Trusted Computing" initiatives (see
Seth Schoen, Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk, at
http://www.eff.org/Infra/trusted_computing/20031001_tc.php)?
The description of this scheme re
On Wed, Nov 26, 2003 at 02:56:40PM -0800, J Harper wrote:
> Great feedback, let me elaborate. I realize that AES is implemented in
> hardware for many platforms as well. I'll mention a bit more about our
> cryptography architecture below. Do you know why AES is so popular in
> embedded? ARC4 is
As a separate issue from whether you want to implement AES, if you do
decide to implement it look at Brian Gladman's code at
http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/rijndael/
It is the fastest free implementation of AES that I know of, and has a
good history and credentials behind it
I've just taken a look. This OCB mode for AES looks really interesting.
Encryption and MAC in one pass! Wait, OCB is patented. That's not in
the spirit of AES :-) I suppose one could do a user defined cipher
suite for AES OCB, if both client and server knew about it. Anyway...
must focus on cur
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