>On Tue, 30 Dec 2003, Eric S. Johansson wrote:
>
>> But using your spam size, , the slowdown factor becomes roughly
>> 73 times. So they would need 73 machines running full tilt all the time
>> to regain their old throughput.
>
>Believe me, the professionals have enough 0wned machines that this i
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2003 09:30:58 -0600 (CST)
From: InfoSec News <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ISN] Oh Dan Geer, where art thou?
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: InfoSec News <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Status:
http://napps.nwfusion.com/weblogs/security/0
(The use of memory speed leads to an interesting notion: Functions that are
designed to be differentially expensive on different kinds of fielded hardware.
On a theoretical basis, of course, all hardware is interchangeable; but in
practice, something differentially expensive to calculate on an x86
In my opinion, the various hashcash-to-stop-spam style schemes are not
very useful, because spammers now routinely use automation to break
into vast numbers of home computers and use them to send their
spam. They're not paying for CPU time or other resources, so they
won't care if it takes more ef
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=2001825724&zsection_id=268448455&slug=votehere300&date=20031230>
Tuesday, December 30, 2003, 12:00 A.M. Pacific
The Seattle Times:
Electronic-voting firm reveals hacker break-in
By Monica Soto Ouchi
Seattl
| Rick Wash wrote:
| >There are many legitimate uses of remote attestation that I would like to
| >see. For example, as a sysadmin, I'd love to be able to verify that my
| >servers are running the appropriate software before I trust them to access
| >my files for me. Remote attestation is a good
On Tue, 30 Dec 2003, Eric S. Johansson wrote:
> But using your spam size, , the slowdown factor becomes roughly
> 73 times. So they would need 73 machines running full tilt all the time
> to regain their old throughput.
Believe me, the professionals have enough 0wned machines that this is
trivi
Scott Nelson wrote:
d*b
---
s
where: d = stamp delay in seconds
s = spam size in bytes
b = bandwidth in bytes per second
I don't understand this equation at all.
It's the rate limiting factor that counts, not a combination of
stamp speed + bandwidth.
well, stamp speed is method of r
At 04:20 30/12/2003, David Wagner wrote:
Ed Reed wrote:
>There are many business uses for such things, like checking to see
>if locked down kiosk computers have been modified (either hardware
>or software),
I'm a bit puzzled why you'd settle for detecting changes when you
can prevent them. Any cha
At 18:02 29/12/2003, Ben Laurie wrote:
Amir Herzberg wrote:
...
specifications, I use `non-repudiation` terms for some of the
requirements. For example, the intuitive phrasing of the Non-Repudiation
of Origin (NRO) requirement is: if any party outputs an evidence evid
s.t. valid(agreement, evid,
At 01:43 PM 12/29/03 -0500, Eric S. Johansson wrote:
>Bill Stewart wrote:
>
>> At 09:37 PM 12/26/2003 -0500, Adam Back wrote:
>>
>>> The 2nd memory [3] bound paper (by Dwork, Goldber and Naor) finds a
>>> flaw in in the first memory-bound function paper (by Adabi, Burrows,
>>> Manasse, and Wobber)
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