Eric Rescorla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> All the toll lanes that accept EZ Pass that I've seen are equipped
>> with cameras. These cameras are used to identify toll evaders
>> already. You point out that doing this would require manual work, but
>> in fact several systems (including the one us
On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Anton Stiglic wrote:
>The problem is not really authentication theft, its identity theft, or if
>you want to put it even more precisely, it's "identity theft and
>authenticating as the individual to whom the identity belongs to". But the
>latte doesn't make for a good buz-wo
"Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> John Gilmore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>> It would be relatively easy to catch someone
>>> doing this - just cross-correlate with other
>>> information (address of home and work) and
>>> then photograph the car at the on-ramp.
>>
>> Am I missing
On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 10:28:49AM +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
>
> If they could do that reliably, they wouldn't need the toll thingy, nu? I
> have been told by someone in the photo-enforcement industry that their
> reliability is only around 75%, and they're very expensive, and ... anyway,
> not a
* Hal Finney:
> Only now are we belatedly beginning to pay the price for that decision.
> If anything, it's surprising that it has taken this long. If phishing
> scams had sprung up five years ago it's possible that SET would have
> had a fighting chance to survive.
Wouldn't typical phishing att
* Amir Herzberg:
> Florian Weimer wrote:
>
>> * Amir Herzberg:
>>
>>># Protecting (even) Naïve Web Users, or: Preventing Spoofing and
>>>Establishing Credentials of Web Sites, at
>>>http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/trusted%20credentials%20area.PDF
>> The trusted credentials area i
FasTrak is a passive system relative to the transponder -- it uses the
transponder ID, a vehicle sensor, and an axle counter to generate toll
records. The associated license plate capture-and-decode feature is only
invoked if a non-transponder-equipped or invalidated-transponder-equipped
vehicle at
At 21:54 2004-07-09 +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
John Gilmore wrote:
It would be relatively easy to catch someone
doing this - just cross-correlate with other
information (address of home and work) and
then photograph the car at the on-ramp.
Am I missing something?
It seems to me that EZ Pass spoofing s
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, John Gilmore writes:
>If they could read the license plates reliably, then they wouldn't
>need the EZ Pass at all. They can't. It takes human effort, which is
>in short supply.
>
There are, in fact, toll roads that try to do that; see, for example,
http://www.whe
John Gilmore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> It would be relatively easy to catch someone
>> doing this - just cross-correlate with other
>> information (address of home and work) and
>> then photograph the car at the on-ramp.
>
> Am I missing something?
>
> It seems to me that EZ Pass spoofing sho
John Gilmore wrote:
[By the way, [EMAIL PROTECTED] is being left out of this conversation,
by his own configuration, because his site censors all emails from me. --gnu]
Sourceforge was doing that to me today!
Well, I am presuming that ... the EZ Pass does have an account
number, right? And then,
| > No mention is made of encryption or challenge response
| > authentication but I guess that may or may not be part of the design
| > (one would think it had better be, as picking off the ESN should be duck
| > soup with suitable gear if not encrypted).
|
| From a business perspective, it ma
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