Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.:
> Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software?
Yes, thats easy. We created a java library for the tpm chip. You can get
it at
http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/
Using this lib, you need less than 10 lines
The question is what the threat model is. We all know that email can be
intercepted over the wire. We also know that that's not very common or
very easy, except for wireless hotspots. I assert that *most* email does
not flow over such links, and that the probability of a successful
interceptio
Here in the Netherlands, we have a bank (Rabobank) which sends the
required code by SMS to your (registered) cellular phone as soon as
you want to log in. So the codes are always fresh and random and only
available to whoever knows the password ánd has the phone.
At my own bank, the bank-card is
http://frode.home.cern.ch/frode/ulfving/ulfving.html
This discusses Swedish decryption of a German crypto machine.
Although the break was done without any hints, it was a fairly
straightforward system of long-period XOR and fixed transposition, and
eventual success was predicated on the laziness
Quoting:
Disk drives gear up for a lockdown
Rick Merritt, EE Times (09/25/2006 9:00 AM EDT)
Built-in security is the next big thing for hard-disk drives. By 2008,
drive makers should be shipping in volume a broad array of drives
based on a maturing standard.
...
The first version of the Truste
James A. Donald wrote:
> In order for this to actually be any use, the recipient
> needs to verify the signature and do something on the
> basis of that signature - presumably whitelist email
> that genuinely comes from well known domains.
>
> Unfortunately, the MTA cannot reliably do something -
Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> recently published IETF RFC
>
> ... from my IETF RFC index
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
>
> 4686 I
> Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys Identified
> Mail (DKIM),
> Fenton J., 2006/09/26 (29pp) (.txt=70382) (Refs
> 1939, 2821, 2822, 3501, 4033) (was
