On Tue, 13 May 2008 12:10:16 -0400
Jonathan S. Shapiro [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben's points are well taken, but there is one *small* piece of this
where I have some sympathy for the Debian folks:
What can we learn from this? Firstly, vendors should not be fixing
problems (or, really,
On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 02:10:45PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
[Moderator's note: A quick reminder: please use ASCII except if you
need Unicode to spell your name right. Microsoft's proprietary quote
marks are not a standard and don't look right on non-Microsoft
displays. I edited them out of
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems
pointed out by security tools can be disastrous.
I've blogged about it here: http://www.links.org/?p=327
Vendors Are Bad For Security
On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:00:57 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems
pointed out by security tools can be disastrous.
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:00:57 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems
pointed out by security tools can
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:27:52 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben: I haven't looked at the actual code in question -- are you
saying that the *only* way to add more entropy is via this pool of
uninitialized memory?
No. That would be fantastically stupid.
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I must confess that I said that because I did not have the energy to figure
out the other routes to adding entropy, such as adding an int (e.g. a PID,
which I'm told still makes it in there).
So just to clarify, does the Debian patch only remove the ability
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I must confess that I said that because I did not have the energy to figure
out the other routes to adding entropy, such as adding an int (e.g. a PID,
which I'm told still makes it in there).
So just to clarify, does the Debian patch
On Tue, 13 May 2008, Ben Laurie wrote:
Had Debian done this in this case, we (the OpenSSL Team) would have
fallen about laughing
I think we all should not miss this ROTFL experience:
Original code (see ssleay_rand_add)
Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
Ben: I'm idly curious. Was this exceptionally unusual case where use of
uninitialized memory was valid properly commented in the code?
Well. Kinda. It didn't really explain why:
i=fread(buf,1,n,in);
if (i = 0) break;
Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
On Wed, 2008-05-14 at 10:34 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
Ben: I'm idly curious. Was this exceptionally unusual case where use of
uninitialized memory was valid properly commented in the code?
Well. Kinda. It didn't really explain why...
Then
Given the published list of bad ssh keys due to the Debian mistake (see
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/), should sshd be
updated to contain a blacklist of those keys? I suspect that a Bloom
filter would be quite compact and efficient.
--Steve Bellovin,
The 5th international Security in Storage Workshop (SISW)
http://ieeeia.org/sisw/2008/
will be held on Sept 25th, 2008 in conjunction with MSST 2008
http://storageconference.org/2008/
and theKey Management Summit 2008.
http://www.keymanagementsummit.com/2008/
Paul Hoffman wrote:
I'm confused about two statements here:
At 2:10 PM +0100 5/13/08, Ben Laurie wrote:
The result of this is that for the last two years (from Debian's
Edgy release until now), anyone doing pretty much any crypto on
Debian (and hence Ubuntu) has been using easily guessable
At 10:25 AM +0100 5/15/08, Ben Laurie wrote:
Paul Hoffman wrote:
I'm confused about two statements here:
At 2:10 PM +0100 5/13/08, Ben Laurie wrote:
The result of this is that for the last two years (from Debian's
Edgy release until now), anyone doing pretty much any crypto on
Debian (and
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 10:25 AM +0100 5/15/08, Ben Laurie wrote:
Paul Hoffman wrote:
I'm confused about two statements here:
At 2:10 PM +0100 5/13/08, Ben Laurie wrote:
The result of this is that for the last two years (from Debian's
Edgy release until now), anyone doing pretty much any
Hi gang,
In looking at captchas that have been broken via software it
dawned on me that the amount of mental processing involved is
actually very little. I'm interested in what the current state of
image recognition via software of things like knowing the
difference between a monkey and a
Ben Laurie alerts us to the recent bug in Debian distributions of
OpenSSL which caused the RNG to have almost no entropy. The distribution
mistakenly commented out the call that added seeding and most other
sources of entropy to the RNG state. This is requiring many keys to
be re-issued.
One of
The International Association for Cryptologic Research (http://www.iacr.org/
) is seeking presentations and demos of e-voting systems. For its next
meeting in August-17, 2008 (in Santa-Barbara, CA, USA), the IACR board
would like to invite presentations and demos of cryptographic e-voting
More interesting threadage about the issue here:
http://taint.org/2008/05/13/153959a.html, particularly in the
comments.
--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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The Cryptography Mailing List
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I didn't see Ben forward this himself, but it's definitely relevant to
the discussion of malware hiding in hardware:
Without needlessly boring everyone with the various steps allow me to
share an interesting observation: drivers often assume the hardware is
misbehaved but never malicious. It is
A wonderful place. I hope it manages to pull through.
http://resources.zdnet.co.uk/articles/imagegallery/0,102003,39415278,00.htm?r=234
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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The Cryptography Mailing List
At Wed, 14 May 2008 19:52:58 -0400,
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Given the published list of bad ssh keys due to the Debian mistake (see
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/), should sshd be
updated to contain a blacklist of those keys? I suspect that a Bloom
filter would be
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
A wonderful place. I hope it manages to pull through.
http://resources.zdnet.co.uk/articles/imagegallery/0,102003,39415278,00.htm?r=234
There is a mechanism whereby US donors can send tax deductible donations
to the trust. Go to http://www.cafamerica.org and
Check out http://www.numenta.com/ . They have an SDK that you d/l and
play with it.
saqib
http://doctrina.wordpress.com/
On Fri, May 16, 2008 at 8:36 AM, Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi gang,
In looking at captchas that have been broken via software it dawned on me
that the amount of
On Wed, May 14, 2008 at 07:52:58PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Given the published list of bad ssh keys due to the Debian mistake (see
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/), should sshd be
updated to contain a blacklist of those keys? I suspect that a Bloom
filter
On Wed, May 14, 2008 at 7:52 PM, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Given the published list of bad ssh keys due to the Debian mistake (see
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/), should sshd be
updated to contain a blacklist of those keys? I suspect that a Bloom
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