[Mac_crypto] I would like to shut down Mac-Crypto and Net-Thinkers..

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Vinnie Moscaritolo [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Mac_crypto] I would like to shut down Mac-Crypto and Net-Thinkers.. Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Id: Macintosh Cryptography mac_crypto.vmeng.com

Bowman Aims at Interoperability Target

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.mit-kmi.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=347 - Military Information Technology Bowman Aims at Interoperability Target The British military is beginning battalion field tests of a tactical communications system that will not only bring digitization to all U.K. ground units, but also

Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

2004-01-02 Thread John Kelsey
At 06:24 PM 12/23/03 -0700, Richard Johnson wrote: ... In my eperience, the terminology has more often been confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. Call it CIA if you need an acronym easy to memorize, if only due to its ironic similarity with that for the name of a certain US government

Re: I don't know PAIN...

2004-01-02 Thread John Kelsey
At 12:38 PM 12/29/03 -0500, Jerrold Leichter wrote: ... Merkle's knapsack systems (which didn't work out for other reasons) had the property that the public key was computed directly from the private key. (The private key had a special form, while the public key was supposed to look like a random

Re: why penny black etc. are not very useful (could crypto stop spam??)

2004-01-02 Thread Amir Herzberg
At 17:38 30/12/2003, Perry wrote: In my opinion, the various hashcash-to-stop-spam style schemes are not very useful, because spammers now routinely use automation to break into vast numbers of home computers and use them to send their spam. They're not paying for CPU time or other resources, so

World's most mysterious book may be a hoax: The Voynich manuscript may be elegant gibberish.

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.nature.com/nsu/031215/031215-5.html updated at midnight GMTtoday is thursday, january 1 search nature science update advanced search World's most mysterious book may be a hoax The Voynich manuscript may be elegant gibberish. 17 December 2003 JOHN WHITFIELD Using a Cardan grille the

Review: Cryptography: A Very Short Introduction,

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.newsforge.com/print.pl?sid=04/01/02/1341256 NewsForge The Online Newspaper for Linux and Open Source http://www.newsforge.com/ Title Linux Advisory Watch - January 2, 2004 Date 2004.01.02 8:00 Author warthawg Topic Linux

Re: Meander - from penny black back to TCB protections

2004-01-02 Thread Victor . Duchovni
On Thu, 1 Jan 2004, Ed Reed wrote: I'm curious, Victor - do you use any functions to verify that the sender's email address is live to insure that a valid reply is possible? No, this is not known to scale well to large sites. Also widespread adoption of sender verification encourages

Re: why penny black etc. are not very useful (could crypto stop spam??)

2004-01-02 Thread john saylor
hi Amir Herzberg wrote: E-mail (at least from new correspondents) must be signed by an `anti-spam mail certification authority (ASMCA)` - often the ISP of the sender. Recipient's mail client (or server) will reject mail (from new correspondents) not certified by a trustworthy ASMCA. ok, but

Re: why penny black etc. are not very useful (could crypto stop spam??)

2004-01-02 Thread Victor . Duchovni
On Thu, 1 Jan 2004, Amir Herzberg wrote: IMHO, your conclusion is wrong: cryptographic authentication could be a critical tool to stop spam; someone in our community should do this (write the software) already... How? E-mail (at least from new correspondents) must be signed by an `anti-spam

Re: [camram-spam] Re: Microsoft publicly announces Penny Black PoW postage project

2004-01-02 Thread Alan Brown
On Tue, 30 Dec 2003, Bill Stewart wrote: The reason it's partly a cryptographic problem is forgeries. Once everybody starts whitelisting, spammers are going to start forging headers to pretend to come from big mailing lists and popular machines and authors, so now you'll not only need to

Re: [OT] Encryption

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/10.1.4.030702.0 Date: Fri, 02 Jan 2004 21:08:21 +0100 Subject: Re: [OT] Encryption From: Robert Tito [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Kyle Moffett [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Cocoa Development [EMAIL PROTECTED], Shawn Erickson [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: [OT] Encryption

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/10.1.4.030702.0 Date: Fri, 02 Jan 2004 20:59:14 +0100 Subject: Re: [OT] Encryption From: Robert Tito [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Kyle Moffett [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Cocoa Development [EMAIL PROTECTED], Shawn Erickson [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: [OT] Encryption

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Cc: Cocoa Development [EMAIL PROTECTED], Shawn Erickson [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Kyle Moffett [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [OT] Encryption Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2004 15:30:53 -0500 To: Robert Tito [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Id: Discussions

Re: [OT] Encryption

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Cc: Cocoa Development [EMAIL PROTECTED], Kyle Moffett [EMAIL PROTECTED], Shawn Erickson [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Sherm Pendley [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [OT] Encryption Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2004 16:20:50 -0500 To: Robert Tito [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender:

Re: [OT] Encryption

2004-01-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2004 16:50:44 -0500 To: Robert Tito [EMAIL PROTECTED], Sherm Pendley [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [OT] Encryption Cc: Cocoa Development [EMAIL PROTECTED], Kyle Moffett [EMAIL PROTECTED],