Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> Even in totally ordinary circumstances it is important to have very
> strong signing keys. Your comments were insupportable.
there is a somewhat separate issue having to do with security
proportional to risk. minor old posting:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61
t
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0%2c70001-0.html?tw=wn_tophead_5
...
So, on a semiconductor chip roughly the size of a postage stamp, the
Michigan scientists designed and built a device known as an ion trap,
which allowed them to isolate individual charged atoms and manipulate
their quant
Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>> Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>
>>>Travis H. wrote:
>>>
I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I
remember a problem wit
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Travis H. wrote:
I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I
remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the
impression that
Travis H. wrote:
On 1/10/06, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
2. DSA has a problem, it relies on a 160
bit hash, which is for most purposes the
SHA-1 hash. Upgrading the crypto to cope
with current hash circumstances is not
worthwhile; we currently are waiting on
NIST to lead review in hashes
There are a number of differences in key management priorities between
(communication) signature and encryption keys.
For encryption keys:
- you want short lived keys
- you should wipe the keys after at first opportunity
- for archiving you should re-encrypt with storage keys
- you can't detect o
On 1/10/06, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2. DSA has a problem, it relies on a 160
> bit hash, which is for most purposes the
> SHA-1 hash. Upgrading the crypto to cope
> with current hash circumstances is not
> worthwhile; we currently are waiting on
> NIST to lead review in hashes so as to
Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Travis H. wrote:
>> I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
>> GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I
>> remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the
>> impression that the 1024 bit s
Amir Herzberg wrote:
Ian G wrote:
Travis H. wrote:
I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I
remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the
impression that the 1024 bit strength p
