RE: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Kuehn, Ulrich
From: Erik Tews [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Donnerstag, 5. Oktober 2006 23:52 [...] Later, you can remotely query your system and get a report what has been bootet on your system. You can do this query using a java application and tpm4java. However, this is the big problem

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Fri, 6 Oct 2006, Erik Tews wrote: And the TPM knows that your BIOS has not lied about the checksum of grub how? The TPM does not know that the BIOS did not lie about the checksum of grub or any other bios component. What you do is, you trust your TPM and your BIOS that they never lie

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread James A. Donald
Erik Tews wrote: What you do is, you trust your TPM and your BIOS that they never lie to you, because they are certified by the manufature of the system and the tpm. (This is why it is called trusted computing) So if you don't trust your hardware and your manufactor, trusted computing is

DIMACS Workshop on Information Security Economics

2006-10-09 Thread Linda Casals
* DIMACS Workshop on Information Security Economics January 18 - 19, 2007 DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University Organizers: Alessandro Acquisti, Carnegie Mellon University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jean Camp, Indiana University,

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Adam Back
So the part about being able to detect viruses, trojans and attest them between client-server apps that the client and server have a mutual interest to secure is fine and good. The bad part is that the user is not given control to modify the hash and attest as if it were the original so that he

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Martin Hermanowski
Alexander Klimov schrieb: On Fri, 6 Oct 2006, Erik Tews wrote: And the TPM knows that your BIOS has not lied about the checksum of grub how? The TPM does not know that the BIOS did not lie about the checksum of grub or any other bios component. What you do