On Mar 13, 2009, at 12:16 PM, Travis wrote:
[...] would people like to help me create one by
emailing me references to extant PRNG definitions?
This paper describes the architecture of a prototype I built at Sun
back in 1995 for a random number generating service that ran in user
land. It
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 11:07:31PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
This is a very important result. The need to transition from SHA-1
is no longer theoretical.
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the
I have never seen a good catalog of computationally-strong
pseudo-random number generators.
Chapter 3 of Knuth's TAOCP is all about pseudo-random number
generators, starting with a fine example of the wrong way to do it.
My copy is several thousand miles away but my recollection is that his
main
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
No, no there's not. In fact, I solicited information here about crypto
accellerators with onboard persistent key memory (secure key storage)
about two years ago and got basically no responses except pointers to
the same old, discontinued or obsolete products I was
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
To the extent of my knowledge there are currently _no_ generally
available, general-purpose crypto accellerator chip-level products with
onboard key storage or key wrapping support, with the exception of parts
first sold more than 5 years ago and being shipped now from
Peter Gutmann wrote:
(Does anyone know of any studies that have been done to find out how prevalent
this is for servers? I can see why you'd need to do it for software-only
implementations in order to survive restarts, but what about hardware-assisted
TLS? Is there anything like a study
On Sat, Mar 14, 2009 at 3:16 AM, Travis
travis+ml-cryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
I have never seen a good catalog of computationally-strong
pseudo-random number generators. It seems that everyone tries to roll
their own in whatever application they are using, and I bet there's a
lot of
Here is a response to Jon Callas' The Strange Rise and Fall of
Hardware Disk Encryption[1]:
http://security-basics.blogspot.com/2009/04/re-fde-mgiebelpgpcom-has-shared-strange_6682.html
1.
http://blog.pgp.com/index.php/2009/04/the-strange-rise-and-fall-of-hardware-disk-encryption/
On Tue, Mar 17, 2009 at 5:06 PM, R.A. Hettinga r...@shipwright.com wrote:
Title: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using Ideal Lattices
Speaker: Craig Gentry, Stanford University
Time/Place: 11 am, 18 March, Wozniak Lounge
[Ed. note: 4th floor, Soda Hall, UC Berkeley]
This looks fascinating, but
On Thu, 2009-04-30 at 13:56 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yp.to/837a0a8086fa6ca714249409ddfae43d.pdf
Wow! These slides say that they discovered a way to find collisions
in SHA-1 at a cost of only 2^52 computations. If this turns out to
be right (and the authors
Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net writes:
I cannot derive a realistic threat model from the very general
statements in the slides.
(BTW, you mean threat, not threat *model*, in this instance.)
As just one obvious example of a realistic threat, consider that there
are CAs that will happily sell
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
For example, Verisign has lots of cert infrastructure right now that
uses SHA-1. Imagine if I now use the above described attack and start
forging certs that look to all the world like they're from Verisign and
claim that I'm a major bank, or to
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