Peter Gutmann writes:
Is anyone aware of a commercial product that implements
secret sharing? If so, can I get a pointer to some product
literature?
It's available as part of other products (e.g. nCipher do it
for keying their HSMs)
Do you mean the k of n operator cards? For those, I
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
Suppose we use AES128-CBC with a fixed IV. It's clear that the only
vulnerability of concern occurs when a key is reused. OK, where do
No, remember that if the IV is in the clear, an attacker can
make some controlled bit changes in the first plaintext block.
(There has
Victor Duchovni wrote:
On Sun, Jan 28, 2007 at 12:47:18PM -0500, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
That doesn't make sense to me -- the end-of-chain (server or client)
certificate won't be signed by _both_ the old and new root,
I wouldn't
think (does x.509 even make this possible)?
Or do I
