Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm

to spend time implementing it. To test it, I recommend going through the process of getting an algorithm certificate from NIST. Cheers! Matt Ball, Chair, IEEE P1619 Security in Storage Working Group Staff Engineer, Sun Microsystems, Inc. 500 Eldorado Blvd, Bldg #5 BRM05-212, Broomfield, CO 80021

Re: AES-GMAC as a hash

to this approach, then it would be possible to securely use GMAC. However, there are many caveats when using GMAC, so it's vitally important to understand all the constraints. Cheers, Matt Ball, Chair, IEEE P1619 Security in Storage Working Group Staff Engineer, Sun Microsystems, Inc. 500 Eldorado Blvd

Re: Warning! New cryptographic modes!

On Mon, May 11, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On May 11, 2009, at 2:16 PM, Roland Dowdeswell wrote: On 1241996128 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch Jerry Leichter wrote: I'm not convinced that a stream cipher is appropriate here because if you change the

Parallel Skein Hash Construction based on the Subset Sum Problem?

will be poised for an exciting NIST hash competition! Cheers, -Matt Matt Ball, IEEE P1619.x SISWG Chair Cell: 303-717-2717 http://www.linkedin.com/in/matthewvball http://www.mavaball.net/ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe

NIST has posted public comments on XTS-AES

-Liskov_Minematsu.pdf * Seagate Technology: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/XTS/XTS_comments-Seagate.pdf * Matt Ball: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/XTS/XTS_comments-Ball.pdf * Collected comments: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM

Period for public comments on XTS (as standardized by IEEE std 1619-2007) ends Sept 3, 2008

Hi Folks, Please remember that the 90-day public comment period for XTS ends Sept 3, which is coming up very quickly. If you have any comments you would like to submit to NIST concerning XTS-AES (as specified in IEEE Std 1619-2007), please send an e-mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] The excerpt of IEEE

Re: security questions

to the question. Right now, I don't answer any of these questions with any guessable information -- it's all the result of a cryptographic operation on the question and a hidden secret. Cheers, -Matt -- Thanks! Matt Ball, IEEE P1619.x SISWG Chair M.V. Ball Technical Consulting, Inc. Phone: 303-469-2469

Re: Looking through a modulo operation

On Mon, Jul 21, 2008 at 8:33 AM, Matt Ball [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If someone uses the __random32 function as defined in the 2.6.26 Linux kernel, and leaks to you the result of taking successive outputs modulo 28233 (= 9 * 3137), can you determine the probable 96-bit internal state

The 2008 IEEE Key Management Summit is Currently Seeking Panelists

://storageconference.org/2008/ (MSST) in Baltimore, Maryland on September 23-24, 2008. Thanks! Matt Ball, Chair, KMS 2008 Phone: 303-469-2469, Cell: 303-717-2717 http://www.linkedin.com/in/matthewvball - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe