On Sun, 2013-09-08 at 13:27 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> - Forwarded message from "James A. Donald" -
> On 2013-09-08 3:48 AM, David Johnston wrote:
> > Claiming the NSA colluded with intel to backdoor RdRand is also to
> > accuse me personally of having colluded with the NSA in producing a
Darren J Moffat wrote:
> Ignoring performance for now what is the consensus on the suitabilty
> of using AES-GMAC not as MAC but as a hash ?
>
> Would it be safe ?
>
> The "key" input to AES-GMAC would be something well known to the data
> and/or software.
>
> The only reason I'm asking is assuming
Hovav Shacham wrote:
> On Aug 24, 2008, at 5:20 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>
>> Speaking of CPU-specific optimisations, I've seen a few algorithm
>> proposals
>> from the last few years that assume that an algorithm can be scaled
>> linearly
>> in the number of CPU cores, treating a multicore CPU as
Eric Young wrote:
> I've not looked at it enough yet, but currently I'm doing an AES round
> in about 140 cycles a block (call it 13 per round plus overhead) on a
> AMD64, (220e6 bytes/sec on a 2ghz cpu) using normal instructions.
Urk, correction, I forgot I've recen
Paul Crowley wrote:
> http://www.ddj.com/hpc-high-performance-computing/201803067
>
> In the above Dr Dobb's article from a little over a year ago, AMD
> Senior Fellow Leendert vanDoorn states "the Advanced Encryption
> Standard (AES) algorithm gets a factor of 5 performance improvement by
> using
> #ifndef PURIFY
> MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
> #endif
>
>
I just re-checked, this code was from SSLeay, so it pre-dates OpenSSL
taking over from me
(about 10 years ago, after I was assimilated by RSA Security).
So in some ways I'm the one at fault for not
James A. Donald wrote:
--
James A. Donald wrote:
>> Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain
>> complicated malicious information to cause code to go
>> wrong. If we do not have that information, or simply
>> ignore it, no problem.
Ben Laurie wrote:
> This is incorrect. The simple form
Jostein Tveit wrote:
Anyone got a test key with a real and a forged signature to test
other implementations than OpenSSL?
Well, since this in not really an issue about forging signatures, rather
invalid verification,
I've appended 2 self-signed certs (resigned apps/server.pem), one with a
valid
Quoting Brian Gladman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Ian Grigg wrote:
>
> > Jack Lloyd also passed along lots of good comments I'd
> > like to forward (having gained permission) FTR. I've
> > edited them for brevity and pertinence.
>
> [snip]
> > >>I'm obviously being naive here ... I had thought that
Ian Grigg wrote:
It's like the GSM story, whereby 8 years
down the track, Lucky Green cracked the
crypto by probing the SIMs to extract
the secret algorithm over a period of
many months (which algorithm then fell to
Ian Goldberg and Dave Wagner in a few hours).
In that case, some GSM guy said that
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