Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening

2013-09-19 Thread Max Kington
On 19 Sep 2013 19:11, "Bill Frantz" wrote: > > On 9/19/13 at 5:26 AM, rs...@akamai.com (Salz, Rich) wrote: > >>> I know I would be a lot more comfortable with a way to check the mail against a piece of paper I >> >> received directly from my bank. >> >> I would say this puts you in the sub 1% of t

Re: [Cryptography] End to end

2013-09-18 Thread Max Kington
On 18 Sep 2013 07:44, "Christoph Gruber" wrote: > > On 2013-09-17 Max Kington wrote: > > > [snip] > > Hence, store in the clear, keep safe at rest using today's archival mechanism and when that starts to get dated move onto the next one en-masse, for all

Re: [Cryptography] End to end

2013-09-17 Thread Max Kington
On 17 Sep 2013 15:47, "Christoph Gruber" wrote: > > On 2013-09-16 Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > [snip] >> >> If people are sending email through the corporate email system then in many cases the corporation has a need/right to see what they are sending/receiving. > > [snip] > > Even if an organis

Re: [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity

2013-09-14 Thread Max Kington
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 10:12 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 16:55:05 -0400 John Kelsey > wrote: > > Everyone, > > > > The more I think about it, the more important it seems that any > > anonymous email like communications system *not* include people who > > don't want to be pa

Re: [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far

2013-09-14 Thread Max Kington
On 13 Sep 2013, at 21:46, Nico Williams wrote: > On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 03:17:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >> On Thu, 12 Sep 2013 14:53:28 -0500 Nico Williams >> wrote: >>> Traffic analysis can't really be defeated, not in detail. >> >> What's wrong with mix networks? > > First: you ca

Re: [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis

2013-09-11 Thread Max Kington
On 11 Sep 2013 18:37, "Bernie Cosell" wrote: > > The recent flood of discussions has touched on many modern attacks on > cryptosystems. I'm long out of the crypto world [I last had a crypto > clearance *before* differential cryptanalysys was public info!]. Attacks > that leak a bit at a time st

Re: [Cryptography] SPDZ, a practical protocol for Multi-Party Computation

2013-09-11 Thread Max Kington
On 11 Sep 2013 18:01, "Eugen Leitl" wrote: > > > http://www.mathbulletin.com/research/Breakthrough_in_cryptography_could_result_in_more_secure_computing.asp > > Breakthrough in cryptography could result in more secure computing > (9/10/2013) > > Tags: computer science, research, security, cryptogr

Re: [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)

2013-09-10 Thread Max Kington
On 10 Sep 2013, at 17:07, Walter van Holst wrote: > On 08/09/2013 21:51, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >> On Sun, 8 Sep 2013 14:50:07 -0400 Jerry Leichter >> wrote: >>> Even for one-to-one discussions, these days, people want >>> transparent movement across their hardware. If I'm in a chat >>> sessio

Re: [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help

2013-09-08 Thread Max Kington
This space is of particular interest to me. I implemented just one of these and published the protocol (rather than pimp my blog if anyone wants to read up on the protocol description feel free to email me and I'll send you a link). The system itself was built around a fairly simple PKI which the