I was the person who originated the DES Challenges at RSA, and also
helped set up and run them.
I knew that there was a stealth effort underway at SGI, but didn't
know any of the details.
A good deal of cool stuff came out of the contests.
Other prior art against this patent would include
RSA's BSAFE 6.2.1.0 supports Bloom-Shamir secret sharing.
Peter Trei
Principal Engineer
RSA: the Security Division of EMC.
Disclaimer: I am not a spokesperson for RSA or EMC.
-Original Message-
Charles Jackson asks:
A quick question.
Is anyone aware of a commercial product that
Bill Stewart wrote:
At 01:04 PM 5/18/2007, Trei, Peter wrote:
If the Russians aren't behind this, who else should be suspected? It
isn't like Estonia has a wide selection of enemies. :-)
There are three likely suspects
- the actual Russian government (or some faction thereof)
- Russian
Dave Korn wrote:
On 18 May 2007 05:44, Alex Alten wrote:
This may be a bit off the crypto topic,
You betcha!
but it is interesting nonetheless.
Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329864981-103610,00.html
Estonia accuses Russia
Taral wrote:
I'm just waiting for someone with access to photograph said keys and
post it all over the internet.
Let us hope that happnes - it won't make passenger security worse, and
would
demonstrate that The Emperor Has No Clothes.
Even if that doesn't happen, it is presumabley feasible
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Sun, 04 Feb 2007 15:46:41 -0800
Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi gang,
An idle question. English has a relatively low entropy as a
language.
Don't recall the exact figure, but if you look at words that start
with q it is very low indeed.
Travis H. wrote:
On Sun, Feb 04, 2007 at 03:46:41PM -0800, Allen wrote:
[...]
What about other languages? Does anyone know the relative entropy of
other alphabetic languages? What about the entropy of ideographic
languages? Pictographic? Hieroglyphic?
IIRC, it turned out that Egyptian
It is with some irony I note that this message from
Peter Saint-Andre failed a signature check - startcom
isn't among the trusted roots in my copy of Outlook.
Peter Trei
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter Saint-Andre
Sent: Wednesday,
You missed the old standby - the microwave oven.
The disk remains physically intact (at least after the
5 seconds or so I've tried), but a great deal of pretty
arcing occurs in the conductive data layer. Where the
arcs travel, the data layer is vapourized.
The end result is an otherwise intact
Alexander Klimov wrote:
On Wed, 11 Jan 2006, Ian G wrote:
Even though triple-DES is still considered to have avoided that trap,
its relatively small block size means you can now put the entire
decrypt table on a dvd (or somesuch, I forget the maths).
This would need 8 x 2^{64} bytes of
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Peter Saint-Andre
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 4:56 PM
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Re: Another entry in the internet security hall of shame
Tim Dierks wrote:
[resending due to
Interesting encrypted VoIP application for
Symbian GSM phones.
Peter Trei
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf
Of David Farber
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:58 AM
To: Ip
Subject: [IP] i secure cell phone via software
Full disclosure: Burt Kaliski and I share an employer.
Peter Trei
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf
Of David Farber
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2005 7:48 PM
To: Ip
Subject: [IP] One cryptographer's perspective on the SHA-1 result
From:
Once again, the RSA Conference is upon us, and many of the
corrospondents on these lists will be in San Francisco. I'd like to
see if anyone is interested in getting together. We've done this
before.
At past conferences, we've had various levels of participation,
from 50 down to 3. Since the
Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
your computer which you may not have full control over.
Peter Trei
Tyler Durden
ANyone familiar with computer architectures and chips able to
answer this
question:
That
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
No. Really. I'm serious...
Cheers,
RAH
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In both cases, this is SecurID.
Peter
Admittedly somewhat old and creaky, but try Googling
RSAREF. I don't know where that stands for IP rights
(presumably we still have copyright), bout for
research it's a startin point.
Peter
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Sandeep N
James A. Donald wrote:
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
[The mobile phone is] certainly getting to be like Chaum's
ideal crypto device. You own it, it has its own I/O, and it
never leaves your sight.
Is there a phone that is programmable enough to store secrets
on and sign and decrypt stuff?
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Aaron Whitehouse
Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 1:58 AM
To: Ian Grigg
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake
companies,
real money)
Ian Grigg
Back in late 1996, I wrote to Jim Bidzos, proposing an RSA
Challenge to break single DES by brute force computation.
Later in 1997, the first DES Challenge was successfully
completed.
Its taken another 7 years, but NIST has finally pulled
single DES as a supported mode.
Favorite line: DES
R. A. Hettinga
At 12:35 PM -0400 5/27/04, John Kelsey wrote:
Does anyone know whether the low-power nature of wireless
LANs protects
them from eavesdropping by satellite?
It seems to me that you'd need a pretty big dish in orbit to
get that kind
of resolution.
The Keyholes(?) are
Tom Shaddack wrote:
On Tue, 18 May 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
Monyk believes there will be a global market of several
million users once
a workable solution has been developed. A political
decision will have to
be taken as to who those users will be in order to prevent
terrorists
Ed Gerck[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
John Kelsey wrote:
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to
'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for
voter
coercion.
I think
privacy wrote:
[good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic
Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
The company's software is designed to let voters verify that their ballots
were properly handled. It assigns random identification numbers to ballots
and candidates. After people vote, they get a receipt that shows which
candidates they
Ian Grigg[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Trei, Peter wrote:
Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly
David Honig[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 02:37 AM 9/9/03 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
At 05:18 PM 9/7/2003 -0700, David Honig wrote:
Laughing my ass off. Since when do governments care about patents?
How would this help/harm them from exploiting it? Not that
high-end LEOs haven't already
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