On Fri, Oct 08, 2010 at 04:27:57PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I have a client with the following problem. They would like to
encrypt all of their Windows workstation drives, but if they do that,
the machines require manual intervention to enter a key on every
reboot. Why is this a
On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 04:52:46PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
From https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:MD5and1024:
December 31, 2010 - CAs should stop issuing intermediate and end-entity
certificates from roots with RSA key sizes smaller than 2048 bits [0]. All
CAs should stop issuing
On Tue, Sep 07, 2010 at 10:22:57PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
But there isn't actually such a thing as classical thermodynamical
randomness! Classical physics is fully deterministic. Thermodynamics uses
a probabilistic model as a way to deal with situations where the necessary
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 08:58:25PM -0400, Thierry Moreau wrote:
The DNS root may be qualified as a high valued zone, but I made the
effort to put in writing some elements of a risk analysis (I have an
aversion for this notion as I build *IT*controls* and the consultants are
hired to
On Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 01:35:12AM -, John Levine wrote:
So should or should not an embedded system have a remote management
interface?
In this case, heck, no. The whole point of this thing is that it is
NOT remotely programmable to keep malware out.
Which is perhaps why it is not a
On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 10:57:04AM -0500, Jonathan Katz wrote:
Anyone care to give a layman's explanation of the attack? The
explanations I have seen assume a detailed knowledge of the way TLS/SSL
handle re-negotiation,
The re-negotiation handshake does not *commit* both parties in the
new
On Sun, Nov 08, 2009 at 01:08:54PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I'll point out that in the midst of several current discussions, the
news of the TLS protocol bug has gone almost unnoticed, even though it
is by far the most interesting news of recent months.
Not entirely unnoticed:
On Sat, Oct 17, 2009 at 02:23:25AM -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
Given that they are attempted to optimize for minimal packet size, the
choice of RSA for signatures actually seems quite bizarre.
Each of these records is cached on the client side, with a very long
timeout (e.g. at least a
in 1979.
An algorithm is not the same an implementation. There was no Java back
then either, and people still somehow wrote working code in '79.
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On Tue, Sep 29, 2009 at 10:51:33PM -0700, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
It's been long enough that everyone should be patched for this awesome
class of bugs. This certificate and corresponding private key should
help people test fairly obscure software or software they've written
themselves. I hope
On Wed, Jul 01, 2009 at 11:03:13AM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
On Tue, Jun 30, 2009 at 11:26:06AM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote:
| On Mon, Jun 29, 2009 at 11:29:48PM -0700, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
| This would be great if LoginWindow.app didn't store your unencrypted
| login and password in
On Fri, Jun 05, 2009 at 08:07:21PM -0700, Greg Perry wrote:
I have published a unique factoring method related to Pollard's Rho that
is published here:
http://blog.liveammo.com/2009/06/factoring-fun/
Several aspects of the RSA encryption algorithm can be attacked:
attacks against
On Sun, Jun 07, 2009 at 05:10:30PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 8:07 PM -0700 6/5/09, Greg Perry wrote:
Greetings list members,
I have published a unique factoring method related to Pollard's Rho
that is published here:
On Sun, Jun 07, 2009 at 05:41:00PM -0700, Greg Perry wrote:
The significance of this method is the ability to determine any
properties of p and q from a simple operation to n.
To be blunt, I see no significance of any kind...
You have observed that unless N is divisible by 3, p and q are both
On Mon, May 11, 2009 at 02:16:45PM -0400, Roland Dowdeswell wrote:
In any case, there are obvious, well-understood solutions here: Use
counter mode, which propagates changes by a single block of the
cryptosystem. Or use any other stream cipher mode. (An interesting
question is
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 11:07:31PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
This is a very important result. The need to transition from SHA-1
is no longer theoretical.
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the
was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.)
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090809fL
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On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 10:45:55AM +0100, Bodo Moeller wrote:
The RFC does exit (TLS 1.2 in RFC 5246 from August 2008 makes SHA-256
mandatory), so you can send a SHA-256 certificate to clients that
indicate they support TLS 1.2 or later. You'd still need some other
certificate for
well after 2010. New applications written in 2010 will ideally
support SHA-2, but SHA-1 will probably still be the default digest
in many applications through 2013 or 2015.
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On Thu, Jan 08, 2009 at 06:23:47PM -0600, Dustin D. Trammell wrote:
Nearly everything I've seen regarding the proposed solutions to this
attack have involved migration to SHA-1. SHA-1 is scheduled to be
decertified by NIST in 2010, and NIST has already recommended[1] moving
away from SHA-1
On Mon, Dec 08, 2008 at 08:53:18PM -0800, Jon Callas wrote:
In the NBC TV episode of /Chuck/ a couple of weeks ago, the NSA
cracked
a 512-bit AES cipher on a flash drive trying every possible key.
Could be hours, could be days. (Only minutes in TV land.)
I am considering adding TLS Server Name Indication support in the Postfix
SMTP server and client. I am puzzled by the exceedingly terse description
of the semantics of the HostName sent in the SNI extension:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4366#section-3.1
If the hostname labels
On Tue, Sep 16, 2008 at 09:01:51PM +0200, Weger, B.M.M. de wrote:
There's a new biggest known RSA modulus.
It is (in hexadecimal notation):
FF...(total of 9289166 F's)...FFDFF...(total of 1488985
F's)...FF800...(total of 9289165 0's)...001
It is guaranteed to be the product of two
satisfies:
x_96 = c_95 * x_95 + c_94 * x_94 ... + c_0
for the same coefficients.
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On Mon, Jul 21, 2008 at 12:03:50PM -0400, Victor Duchovni wrote:
On Sun, Jul 20, 2008 at 04:14:33PM -0600, Matt Ball wrote:
From a little bit of off-line discussion, I think I've got a restatement of
the problem that is more suitable to those with a stronger programming
background than
specifically the second paragraph the mentions the Birthday Attack. The
assumptions of that paragraph can be relaxed in a natural way to broaden
the scope of the attack.
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/story/hackers-hell-privacy-compromised/
This reads like a pump'n'dump stock scam.
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On Fri, Jul 04, 2008 at 04:04:11PM -0700, Allen wrote:
Interesting tidbit:
http://www.epaynews.com/index.cgi?survey=ref=browsef=viewid=121516308313743148197block=
Nick Ogden, a Briton who launched one of the world's first
e-commerce processors in 1994, has developed a system for
On Tue, Jun 03, 2008 at 04:37:20PM -0400, Eric Cronin wrote:
On Jun 3, 2008, at 11:51 AM, Adam Aviv wrote:
Depending on the level of protection you want, you could just add a
script to your .forward to encrypt your email before delivery using
PGP/GPG. However, this will leave the headers
mature offerings any
time soon. We'd have to build a boutique service for cipher-punks.
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the current KEK. There is not in practice
any need for a PKI in this context, it looks rather a lot more like
Kerberos than PKI.
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On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 10:05:17AM -0400, Derek Atkins wrote:
Arshad Noor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Even if RIM does not have the device keys, in order to share encrypted
data with applications on the RIM server, the device must share a session
key with the server; must it not?. Isn't
On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 08:08:11PM +0100, Dave Korn wrote:
Well spotted. Yes, I guess that's what Jim Youll was asking. And I
should have said seemingly-contradictory. This is, of course, what I
meant by marketeering: when someone asks if your service is insecure and
interceptable, you
On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 02:10:45PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
[Moderator's note: A quick reminder: please use ASCII except if you
need Unicode to spell your name right. Microsoft's proprietary quote
marks are not a standard and don't look right on non-Microsoft
displays. I edited them out of
in (realistic)
bounded memory (no fork: out of memory).
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On Sun, May 04, 2008 at 10:24:13PM -0400, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
I believe that those who supply security products have a responsibility
to consider the knowledge, experience, and tendencies of their likely
users to the greatest extent to which they're able, and supply products
which will
On Tue, May 06, 2008 at 11:40:53AM -0700, David Wagner wrote:
- With the upcoming EECDH support, users don't choose curves
directly, they again choose a security grade, and the correspnding
curves are configurable via parameters they are not expected to
ever look at or modify.
of privacy at work vary by jurisdiction and industry. In
the US, and say in the financial services industry, any such expectations
are groundless (IANAL).
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crack a cipher with ~95
bits security, the estimate is grossly wrong.
If (generously) A5 is 64 bits of work, AES is ~20 orders of magnitude
stronger.
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On Tue, Apr 01, 2008 at 12:47:45AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Actually there are already companies doing something like this
Which ones do you think are doing a decent job of this?
but they've
run into a problem that no-one has ever considered so far: The GTCYM needs a
(relatively)
On Sun, Mar 30, 2008 at 05:13:07PM -0400, Ivan Krsti?? wrote:
That's a brute force search. If your convergence key, instead of being
a simple file hash, is obtained through a deterministic but
computationally expensive function such as PBKDF2 (or the OpenBSD
bcrypt, etc), then step 3
On Thu, Feb 07, 2008 at 08:47:20PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
While Firefox should ideally be developing and testing PSK now, without
stable libraries to use in servers and browsers, we can't yet expect anything
to be released.
Is that the FF
and rather
minimally documented. The interfaces are not portable between browsers,
... It's a mess.
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Firefox should ideally be developing and testing PSK now, without
stable libraries to use in servers and browsers, we can't yet expect
anything to be released.
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is not the answer. Otherwise, claiming that SSL is less efficient
over TCP smacks of arrogance.
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On Thu, Jan 31, 2008 at 02:28:30PM -0500, Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
TCP requires minimum of seven message exchange for reliable transport
VMTP (rfc 1045) got that down to minimum of five messages, and XTP
then
got it down to three messages minimum for reliable transport (disclaimer
we
#smtpd_tls_auth_only
http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html#smtp_sasl_tls_security_options
which is highly suggestive of using TLS to protect plain-text passwords
in flight.
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, and training can
be based around the approaches taken in the show-case systems.
When I hear developers demanding security APIs I pretend to be deaf...
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in error,
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, but
if I were a budget director I would spend the money elsewhere...
I am most curious as to the legal issue that came up regarding QKD.
Indeed, what was the legal question that got us here?
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MITM (just as plausible IMHO with fixed circuits as passive
eavesdropping)?
Once QKD is augmented with authentication to address MITM, the Q
seems entirely irrelevant.
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interactions with the fake terminal. Is the system
still secure? Likely not, I would bet The threat model was card forgery,
not MITM.
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(charitably) fiction.
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On Wed, May 23, 2007 at 06:34:26PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
* Victor Duchovni:
That's good of you not to expect it, given that zero of the major CAs
seem to support ECC certs today, and even if they did, those certs
would not work in IE on XP.
We are not talking about this year
the server certificate by its md5, sha1, or
SHA256/384/512 fingerprint. (No support for web-of-trust, one step
at a time).
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.
With EECDH one can use ECDH handshakes signed with RSA keys, but that
does not really address any looming demise of 1024 bit RSA.
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question, not an algorithm question, so you need a
security review of the protocol (which you have not described).
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less likely, so though I
don't find it a credible threat, the publicity may help to avert any
silliness from coming to pass.
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to follow in the footsteps of Randal
L. Schwartz, it is sadly best to stay ignorant of such matters...
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On Wed, Jan 31, 2007 at 01:57:04PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
What I don't understand is how the old (finally expired) root helps to
validate the new unexpired root, when a verifier has the old root and the
server presents the new root in its trust
On Wed, Jan 31, 2007 at 01:57:04PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
What I don't understand is how the old (finally expired) root helps to
validate the new unexpired root, when a verifier has the old root and the
server presents the new root in its trust
On Sat, Jan 27, 2007 at 02:12:34PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Wouldn't the old root also (until it actually expires) verify any
certificates signed by the new root? If so, why does a server need to send
the new root?
Because the client may
a verifier has the old root and the server presents the new root
in its trust chain.
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On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 07:06:00PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Generally it is enough for a TLS server or client to present its own
certificate and all *intermediate* CA certificates, sending the root CA cert
is optional, because if the verifying
.
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and use
On Sat, Jan 20, 2007 at 10:10:47PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It took reading the code to determine the following:
- ASN.1 Strings extracted from X.509v3 certs are not validated for
conformance with the declared character syntax. Strings
of the interface,
that I am not making unfounded assumptions, and there are no obvious bugs
in the part of the library that I am reviewing.
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On Wed, Jan 10, 2007 at 06:31:21PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
I just stumbled on a web site that strongly believes in crypto --
*everything* on the site is protected by https. If you go there via
http, you receive a Redirect. The site? www.cia.gov:
$ telnet www.cia.gov 80
Trying
handshake per
cache TTL and then just bulk crypto for many deliveries that reuse the
cached SSL session.
So what is your load like?
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On Wed, Oct 18, 2006 at 12:00:41AM -0400, Victor Duchovni wrote:
Hash functions are supposed to be pseudo-random. For a 160 bit hash In
an input set of 2^80 elements we should expect to find a collision...
If we iterate from a random starting point we expect to enter a cycle
of length ~2^79
).
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be a good foundation.
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to re-invent the wheel? It took multiple iterations of design
improvements to get TLS right, even though it was designed by experts.
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On Sun, May 14, 2006 at 07:56:17PM -0500, Travis H. wrote:
On 5/14/06, Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Security is fragile. Deviating from well understood primitives may be
good research, but is not good engineering. Especially fragile are:
Point taken
that
are file system agnostic, cannot violate block update atomicity and so
MUST not offer integrity.
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principals (global naming) to subjects/users
(local naming). So principal != account.
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is stored, new key management issues come to the surface.
I for one would not want to lose my hard-drive if the CPU is fried...
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On Wed, Mar 29, 2006 at 10:51:08AM +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In am nearly sure that a preimage attack (MD5) will be found in the
next two or three years.
Is there already evidence of progress in that direction?
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model for the mass market.
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.
MaximEither it is not mature enough, or it has spam./Maxim
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to unfairly tarnish
the competence of the email RFC writers, without regard to the intrinsic
properties of the medium.
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interoperable systems...
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expect views to shift dramatically. If the developers were open to the
issue, the request might have been fruitful. If they dig in their heels,
I am free to use other libraries.
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-
sons.
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and needs to be reported as such.
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over OpenSSL (not GnuTLS) and OpenSSL has an error stack, which
the application can process as it sees fit. The libgrypt approach to
error reporting is not acceptable.
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\n);
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with HTTP servers, but the majority of TLS capable MTAs
negotiate EDH ciphers.
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