Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
Allen wrote: William Allen Simpson wrote: [snip] The whole point of a notary is to bind a document to a person. That the person submitted two or more different documents at different times is readily observable. After all, the notary has the document(s)! No, the notary does not have the documents *after* they are notarized, nor do they keep copies. Having been a notary I know this personally. Thanks, Allen. Interestingly, digital signatures do provide what notaries can't provide in this case. Even though a digital signature binds a document to a key, there are known legal frameworks that can be used to bind the key to a person. Cheers, Ed Gerck - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
| The whole point of a notary is to bind a document to a person. That | the person submitted two or more different documents at different | times is readily observable. After all, the notary has the | document(s)! | | No, the notary does not have the documents *after* they are notarized, | nor do they keep copies. Having been a notary I know this | personally. When I stopped being a notary all I had to submit to the | state was my seal and my record books. | | If I had to testify about a document I would only be attesting that | the person who presented themselves adequately proved, under the | prudent businessman's standard, that they were the person that they | said they were and that I saw them sign the document in | question. That's it. No copies at all. What would anyone have to | testify about if a legal battle arose after the notary either died or | stopped being a notary? | | Think for a minute about the burden on a notary if they had to have a | copy of every document they notarized. What a juicy target they would | make for thieves and industrial spies. No patent paperwork would be | safe, no sales contract, no will, or other document. Just think how | the safe and burglar alarm companies would thrive. Now ask yourself | how much it costs to notarize a document. Would that pay for the | copying and storage. I don't know what the current fees are in | California but 20 years ago they were limited to $6.00 per person per | document and an extra buck for each additional copy done at the same | time. My average was about $14.00 per session. My insurance was | $50/year. Nowhere near enough to cover my liability if I was to This whole discussion has an air of unreality about it. Historically, notary publics date from an era when most people couldn't read or write, and hardly anyone could afford a lawyer. How does someone who can't read a document and can perhaps only scrawl an X enter into a contract? In the old days, he took the written contract to a notary public, who would read it to him, explain it, make sure he understood it, then stamp his scrawled X. The notary's stamp asserted exactly the kind of thing that we discuss on this list as missing from digital signatures: That the particular person whose X was attached (and who would be fully identified by the notary) understood and assented to the contents of the contract. Today, we assume that everyone can read, and where a contract is at all complex, that everyone will have access to a lawyer. (Of course, this assumption is often invalid, but that's another story.) The requirement for a notary public's stamp is a faded vestige. For certain important documents, we still require that a notary sign off, but what exactly that proves any more is rather vague. Yes, in theory it binds a signature to a particular person, with that signature being on a particular document. That latter is why the notary's stamp is a physical stamp through the paper - hard(er) to fake. Of course, most of the time, the stamp is only applied to the last page of a multi-page contract, so proves only that that last page was in the notary's hands - replacing the early pages is no big deal. I think I've seen notaries initial every page, but I've also seen notaries who don't. In practice, whenever I've needed to have a document notarized, a quick look at some basic ID is about all that was involved. It's quite easy to get fake ID past a notary. Given the trivial fee paid to a notary - I think the limit is $2 in Connecticut - asking the notary to actually add much of value is clearly a non-starter. The financial industry has actually created its own system - I forget the name, some like a Gold Bond Certification - that it requires for certain high-importance transactions (e.g., a document asserting you own some stock for which you've lost the certificates). I've never actually needed to get this - it's appeared as a requirement for some alternative kinds of transactions on forms I've had to fill out over the years - so I don't know exactly how it works. However, it's completely independent of the traditional notary public system, and is run through commercial banks. Trying to justify anything based on the current role of notary publics - at least as it exists in the US - is a waste of time. -- Jerry - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
William Allen Simpson wrote: The whole point of a notary is to bind a document to a person. That the person submitted two or more different documents at different times is readily observable. After all, the notary has the document(s)! The notary does not want to have the documents, or to have the necessary apparatus to produce them on demand. Actually existent notaries do not keep the documents. Again, you are trying to invent a protocol that works around the flaws in MD5. No doubt a competent engineer can create such a protocol, but a competent engineer would much prefer not to have flaws he needs to work around. Further, there is a long history of cryptographic disasters, such as WiFi, where supposedly competent engineers set to working around flaws, and instead created more and bigger flaws. Even if someone really is a competent engineer, and perfectly capable of producing a protocol that works around the known flaws, it is hard for anyone else to tell if he really is competent enough to work around the flaws, or has produced, like WiFi and so many Microsoft projects, an even bigger hole than that which he was trying to fix. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
* William Allen Simpson: Assuming, Dp := any electronic document submitted by some person, converted to its canonical form Cp := a electronic certificate irrefutably identifying the other person submitting the document Cn := certificate of the notary Tn := timestamp of the notary S() := signature of the notary S( MD5(Tn || Dp || Cp || Cn) ). Of course, I'm sure the formula could be improved, and there are traditionally fields identifying the algorithms used, etc. -- or something else I've forgotten off the top of my head -- but please argue about the actual topic of this thread, instead of incessant strawmen. The problem is not the outer MD5 (explicitly mentioned in your description), but that Dp is typically (well, to the extent such services have been deployed) some kind of hash. This has got the advantage that the timestamping service does not need to know the contents of the document. On the other hand, if the timestamping service archives Dp and can reveal it in a dispute, evil twins can be identified and analyzed -- which undermine the submitting party's claim that it submitted the second document instead of the first. Of course, this is actually cheating by substituting proven protocols for fragile cryptography. And the result is still open to interpretation, but all evidence is. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
William Allen Simpson wrote: [snip] The whole point of a notary is to bind a document to a person. That the person submitted two or more different documents at different times is readily observable. After all, the notary has the document(s)! No, the notary does not have the documents *after* they are notarized, nor do they keep copies. Having been a notary I know this personally. When I stopped being a notary all I had to submit to the state was my seal and my record books. If I had to testify about a document I would only be attesting that the person who presented themselves adequately proved, under the prudent businessman's standard, that they were the person that they said they were and that I saw them sign the document in question. That's it. No copies at all. What would anyone have to testify about if a legal battle arose after the notary either died or stopped being a notary? Think for a minute about the burden on a notary if they had to have a copy of every document they notarized. What a juicy target they would make for thieves and industrial spies. No patent paperwork would be safe, no sales contract, no will, or other document. Just think how the safe and burglar alarm companies would thrive. Now ask yourself how much it costs to notarize a document. Would that pay for the copying and storage. I don't know what the current fees are in California but 20 years ago they were limited to $6.00 per person per document and an extra buck for each additional copy done at the same time. My average was about $14.00 per session. My insurance was $50/year. Nowhere near enough to cover my liability if I was to retain a copy of the document. Best, Allen - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
On Dec 11, 2007 5:06 AM, Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What puzzles me in all this long and rather arcane discussion is why isn't the solution of using a double hash - MD5 *and* SHA whatever. The odds of find a double collision go way up. Some open source software people are already doing this. I've played around with the sample files that are out there and find an easy way to do this but I don't have either the horsepower or skill to be at all definitive. My gut tells me that using two processes that use different algorithms, even though compromised, will raise the bar so high that it would be secure for a long time. At my skill level and horsepower I can't find even a single way to do this with CRC32 and MD5. Granted, that certainly doesn't mean a whole lot. Work has actually been done on this exact topic. One link is here: http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/2004/otherformats.html I think there may be more; I'm not sure. But to take a real world example, a safety deposit box, the two keys have to work together to open the box. It really does not matter is one is a Yale and the other a combination, either one of which are easily compromised by themselves, but together you would have to find both at the same time to open the box, a lot tougher problem. Best, Allen Francois Grieu wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dp := any electronic document submitted by some person, converted to its canonical form Cp := a electronic certificate irrefutably identifying the other person submitting the document Cn := certificate of the notary Tn := timestamp of the notary S() := signature of the notary S( MD5(Tn || Dp || Cp || Cn) ). In this context, the only thing that guards agains an attack by some person is the faint hope that she can't predict the Tn that the notary will use for a Dp that she submits. That's because if Tn is known (including chosen) to some person, then (due to the weakness in MD5 we are talking about), she can generate Dp and Dp' such that S( MD5(Tn || Dp || Cp || Cn) ) = S( MD5(Tn || Dp' || Cp || Cn) ) whatever Cp, Cn and S() are. If Tn was hashed after Dp rather than before, poof goes security. Francois Grieu - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- mike http://lets.coozi.com.au/ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
William Allen Simpson wrote: The notary would never sign a hash generated by somebody else. Instead, the notary generates its own document (from its own tuples), and signs its own document, documenting that some other document was submitted by some person before some particular time. James A. Donald: And how does it identify this other document? William Allen Simpson wrote: Sorry, obviously I incorrectly assumed that we're talking to somebody skilled in the art Reminding you that several of us have told you that a notary has the document in her possession; and binds the document to a person; and that we have rather a lot of experience in identifying documents (even for simple things like email), such as the PGP digital timestamping service. Assuming, Dp := any electronic document submitted by some person, converted to its canonical form Cp := a electronic certificate irrefutably identifying the other person submitting the document Cn := certificate of the notary Tn := timestamp of the notary S() := signature of the notary S( MD5(Tn || Dp || Cp || Cn) ). Assuming that the attacker knows or can guess Tn, and that the canonical form allows images, then the attack still works. The attacker can create several documents, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, such that MD5(Tn || D1 || Cp || Cn) is equal to MD5(Tn || D2 || Cp || Cn), which is equal to MD5(Tn || D3 || Cp || Cn), etc. He then gets the notary to sign MD5(Tn || D1 || Cp || Cn), and then uses whichever of D1, D2, D3, D4, and D5 is convenient. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
Francois Grieu wrote: That's because if Tn is known (including chosen) to some person, then (due to the weakness in MD5 we are talking about), she can generate Dp and Dp' such that S( MD5(Tn || Dp || Cp || Cn) ) = S( MD5(Tn || Dp' || Cp || Cn) ) whatever Cp, Cn and S() are. First of all, the weakness in MD5 (computational feasibility over time) that we are talking about is not (yet) a preimage or second preimage attack. Please don't extrapolate your argument. Second of all, you need to read my messages more carefully. No good canonical format allows random hidden fields or images. Third of all, that's not a weakness of a notary protocol -- it's a trap! The whole point of a notary is to bind a document to a person. That the person submitted two or more different documents at different times is readily observable. After all, the notary has the document(s)! Remember, the notary is not vouching for the validity of the content of the document. A notary only certifies that something was submitted by some person at some time. And that cannot be broken by making multiple submissions, or submissions that themselves have the same hash. That's one reason I'm much more interested in the attack on X.509. If Tn was hashed after Dp rather than before, poof goes security. But since it's not, that's a ridiculous strawman. I was remembering PGP off the top of my head. Fairly certain that Kerberos does, too. Not everybody is naive! And since the timestamp is predictable (within some range, although picoseconds really aren't very predictable), the protocols that I've designed include message identifiers, nonces, and sequence numbers, too. As you may recall, I mentioned that there were other fields He asked for an explanation about how a document is identified, he got one. Don't expect me to redesign an entire notary (or even a timestamp) protocol on a Sunday evening for a mailing list Really, there are fairly secure standards already available. However, the actual topic of this thread is code distribution. In that case, there is no other party certifying the documents. The code packager is also the certifier. There is (as yet) no weakness in the MD4 family (including MD5 and SHA1) that allows this attack by another party. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
William Allen Simpson wrote: The notary would never sign a hash generated by somebody else. Instead, the notary generates its own document (from its own tuples), and signs its own document, documenting that some other document was submitted by some person before some particular time. And how does it identify this other document? The notary is only safe from this flaw in MD5 if you assume he is not using MD5 for its intended purpose. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
Personally, I thought this horse was well drubbed, but the moderator let this message through, so he must think it important to continue James A. Donald wrote: William Allen Simpson wrote: The notary would never sign a hash generated by somebody else. Instead, the notary generates its own document (from its own tuples), and signs its own document, documenting that some other document was submitted by some person before some particular time. And how does it identify this other document? Sorry, obviously I incorrectly assumed that we're talking to somebody skilled in the art Reminding you that several of us have told you that a notary has the document in her possession; and binds the document to a person; and that we have rather a lot of experience in identifying documents (even for simple things like email), such as the PGP digital timestamping service. Assuming, Dp := any electronic document submitted by some person, converted to its canonical form Cp := a electronic certificate irrefutably identifying the other person submitting the document Cn := certificate of the notary Tn := timestamp of the notary S() := signature of the notary S( MD5(Tn || Dp || Cp || Cn) ). Of course, I'm sure the formula could be improved, and there are traditionally fields identifying the algorithms used, etc. -- or something else I've forgotten off the top of my head -- but please argue about the actual topic of this thread, instead of incessant strawmen. The notary is only safe from this flaw in MD5 if you Another statement with no proof. As the original poster admitted, there is not a practical preimage or second preimage attack on MD5 (yet). assume he is not using MD5 for its intended purpose. As to its intended purpose, rather than making one up, I've always relied upon the statement of the designer: ... The MD5 algorithm is intended for digital signature applications, where a large file must be compressed in a secure manner before being encrypted with a private (secret) key under a public-key cryptosystem such as RSA. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
If on the one hand, the correct procedure is sign-encrypt-sign, then why, on the other hand, is the parallel not sign-hash-sign ? --dan = http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.ps Donald T. Davis, Defective Sign Encrypt in S/MIME, PKCS#7, MOSS, PEM, PGP, and XML., Proc. Usenix Tech. Conf. 2001 (Boston, Mass., June 25-30, 2001), pp. 65-78.(180 Kbytes) (PDF, 200 Kbytes) (HTML, 80 Kbytes) Summary of the paper. Abstract: Simple Sign Encrypt, by itself, is not very secure. Cryptographers know this well, but application programmers and standards authors still tend to put too much trust in simple Sign-and-Encrypt. In fact, every secure e-mail protocol, old and new, has codified naïve Sign Encrypt as acceptable security practice. S/MIME, PKCS#7, PGP, OpenPGP, PEM, and MOSS all suffer from this flaw. Similarly, the secure document protocols PKCS#7, XML- Signature, and XML-Encryption suffer from the same flaw. Naïve Sign Encrypt appears only in file-security and mail-security applications, but this narrow scope is becoming more important to the rapidly-growing class of commercial users. With file- and mail-encryption seeing widespread use, and with flawed encryption in play, we can expect widespread exposures. In this paper, we analyze the naïve Sign Encrypt flaw, we review the defective sign/encrypt standards, and we describe a comprehensive set of simple repairs. The various repairs all have a common feature: when signing and encryption are combined, the inner crypto layer must somehow depend on the outer layer, so as to reveal any tampering with the outer layer. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
James A. Donald wrote: Not true. Because they are notarizing a signature, not a document, they check my supporting identification, but never read the document being signed. This will be my last posting. You have refused several requests to stick to the original topic at hand. Apparently, you have no actual experience with the legal system, or are from such a different legal jurisdiction that your scenario is somehow related to MD5 hashes of software and code distribution. Because human beings often try to skirt the rules, there's a long history of detailed notarization requirements. How it works here: (1) You prepare the document(s). They are in the form prescribed by law -- for example, Michigan Court Rule (MCR 2.114) SIGNATURES OF ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES; VERIFICATION; EFFECT; SANCTIONS (2) The clerk checks for the prescribed form and content. (3) You sign and date the document(s) before the notary (using a pen supplied by the notary, no disappearing ink allowed). (4) The notary signs and dates their record of your signature, optionally impressing the document(s) with an embossing stamp (making it physically difficult to erase). You have now attested to the content of the documents, and the notary has attested to your signature (not the veracity of the documents). Note that we get both integrity and non-repudiation The only acceptable computer parallel would require you to bring the documents to the notary, using a digital format supplied by the notary, generate the digital signature on the notary's equipment, and then the notary indempotently certify your signature (on the same equipment). In the real world, the emphasis is on binding a document to a person, and vice versa. Any digital system that does not tie the physical person to the virtual document is not equivalent. This is simply not equivalent to a site producing its own software and generating a hash of its own content. There should be no third party involved as a certifier. If they were to generate an MD5 hash of documents prepared by someone else, then the attack described (eight different human readable documents with the same MD5 hash) works. If a notary were to do that, they'd be looking at a fairly severe penalty. By definition, such a notary was compromised. But nothing like the prison sentence that you'd be facing for presenting the false documents to the court. And I'd be pushing the prosecutor for consecutive sentences for all 8 fraudulent documents, with enhancements. Nobody has given any examples of human readable documents that will produce the same hash when re-typed into the system. All those proposed require an invisible component. They are machine readable only. That's why we, as security analysts, don't design or approve such systems. We're not (supposed to be) fooled by parlor tricks. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
Weger, B.M.M. de wrote: See http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/TargetCollidingCertificates/ ... Our first chosen-prefix collision attack has complexity of about 2^50, as described in our EuroCrypt 2007 paper. This has been considerably improved since then. In the full paper that is in preparation we'll give details of those improvements. Much more interesting. Looks like the death knell of X.509. Why didn't you say so earlier? (It's a long known design flaw in X.509 that it doesn't provide integrity for all its internal fields.) Where are MD2, MD4, SHA1, and others on this continuum? And based on the comments in the page above, the prefix is quite large! Optimally, shouldn't it be = the internal chaining variables? 512 bits for MDx. So, the attacks need two values for comparison: the complexity versus the length of the chosen prefix. Let me know when you get the chosen prefix down to 64-bits, so I can say I told you so to Bellovin again. I was strongly against adding the random IV field to IPsec - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
William Allen Simpson wrote: [snip] Actually, I deal with notaries regularly. I've always had to physically sign while watched by the notary. They always read the stuff notarized, and my supporting identification, because they are notarizing a signature (not a document). And yes, they always generate the stamp or imprint they sign. To do otherwise would be irresponsible (and illegal). Having been a notary in the State of California (Shocked myself, got 100% on the test!) I can attest that the contents of the document are looked at, but only so that I could record what *type* of document I was notarizing, not the exact textual meaning of the content or whether it might or might not allege something that is untrue. The description of the document in my log book was always relatively short as there was only space for about 20 words. The requirements are simple, see that the document you are notarizing has as many pages it says it does so that the count can't be changed without arousing suspicion, and the the person who is signing the paper is identified by enough documentation that I could be assured, within the limits of my ability to give a superficial, not expert, less than ten minutes perusal of the identification documents presented match the person presenting them to the best of my ability to judge. Best, Allen It always was a good faith certification, not a proof beyond challenge. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
James A. Donald wrote: This attack does not require the certifier to be compromised. You are referring to a different page (that I did not reference). Never-the-less, both attacks require the certifier to be compromised! The attack was to generate a multitude of predictions for the US election, each of which has the same MD5 hash. If the certifier certifies any one of these predictions, the recipient can use the certificate for any one of these predictions. That's a mighty big if -- as in infinite improbability. Therefore, a parlor trick, not cryptography. There are no circumstances in which any reputable certifier will ever certify any of the multitude containing a hidden pdf image, especially where generated by another party. The attack requires the certifier to be compromised, either to certify documents that the certifier did not generate, or to include the chosen text (hidden image) in its documents in exactly the correct location. While there are plenty of chosen text attacks in cryptography, this one is highly impractical. The image is hidden. It will not appear, and thus would not be accidentally copied by somebody (cut-and-paste). The parlor trick demonstrates a weakness of the pdf format, not MD5. This attack renders MD5 entirely worthless for any use other than as an error check like CRC - and CRC does it better and faster. To be as weak as CRC, the strength would be 2**8. I've seen no papers that reduce MD5 complexity to 2**8. Please present your proofs and actual vulnerabilities, including specific examples of actual PPP CHAP compromised traffic -- and for extra credit, actual compromise of netbsd and/or openbsd software distribution. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
Weger, B.M.M. de wrote: The parlor trick demonstrates a weakness of the pdf format, not MD5. I disagree. We could just as easy have put the collision blocks in visible images. Parlor trick. ... We could just as easy have used MS Word documents, or any document format in which there is some way of putting a few random blocks somewhere nicely. Parlor trick. ... We say so on the website. We did show this hiding of collisions for other data formats, such as X.509 certificates More interesting. Where on your web site? I've long abhorred the X.509 format, and was a supporter of a more clean alternative. ... and for Win32 executables. Parlor trick. So far, all the things you mention require the certifier to be suborned. Our real work is chosen-prefix collisions combined with multi-collisions. This is crypto, it has not been done before, Certainly it was done before! We talked about it more than a decade ago. We knew that what was computationally infeasible would become feasible. Every protocol I've designed or formally reviewed is protected against the chosen prefix attack. (To qualify, where I had final say. I've reviewed badly designed protocols, such as IKE/ISAKMP. And I've been overruled by committee from time to time) What *would* be crypto is the quantification of where MDx currently falls on the computational spectrum. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: PlayStation 3 predicts next US president
Hi William, ... We say so on the website. We did show this hiding of collisions for other data formats, such as X.509 certificates More interesting. Where on your web site? I've long abhorred the X.509 format, and was a supporter of a more clean alternative. See http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/TargetCollidingCertificates/ Our real work is chosen-prefix collisions combined with multi-collisions. This is crypto, it has not been done before, Certainly it was done before! I was referring to MD5. Apart from that, I'd be interested in seeing references to older work on chosen-prefix multicollisions. What *would* be crypto is the quantification of where MDx currently falls on the computational spectrum. Our first chosen-prefix collision attack has complexity of about 2^50, as described in our EuroCrypt 2007 paper. This has been considerably improved since then. In the full paper that is in preparation we'll give details of those improvements. Grtz, Benne - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]