Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform

2003-09-09 Thread Joseph Ashwood
- Original Message - 
From: Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform


 At 04:51 PM 9/8/2003 -0700, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
 - Original Message -
 From: Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [anonymous funding of politicians]
   Comments?
 
 Simple attack: Bob talks to soon to be bought politician. Tomorrow
you'll
 recieve a donation of $50k, you'll know where it came from.
 Next day, buyer makes 500 $100 donations (remember you can't link him to
any
 transaction), 50k arrives through the mix. Politician knows where it came
 from, but no one can prove it.

 Not so fast.  I said the mix would delay and randomize the arrival of
 payments.  So, some of the contributions would arrive almost immediately
 others/many might take weeks to arrive.

You act like they aren't already used to addressing that problem. I'll go
back to the Bustamante, simply because it is convenient right now.
Bustamante recieved a multi-million dollar donation from the Native
Americans, this was not done through a single check, that would be illegal,
instead it was done through multiple smaller checks, each of which ends up
randomized and delayed in processing (USPS is wonderful source of
randomness), so the actual occurance of the donations is scattered acros
several days, from several accounts, by several people, and I'm sure
Bustamante never even looked to see who the donations were actually from,
just that the full amount arrived. The problem that you found, is already
addressed, and already not a problem.
Joe

Trust Laboratories
Changing Software Development
http://www.trustlaboratories.com


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Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform

2003-09-08 Thread Joseph Ashwood
- Original Message - 
From: Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[anonymous funding of politicians]
 Comments?

Simple attack: Bob talks to soon to be bought politician. Tomorrow you'll
recieve a donation of $50k, you'll know where it came from.
Next day, buyer makes 500 $100 donations (remember you can't link him to any
transaction), 50k arrives through the mix. Politician knows where it came
from, but no one can prove it.

By implementing this we'll see a backwards trend. It will be harder to prove
the buyout (actually impossible), but the involved parties will know exactly
who did the paying. Right now you can actually see a similar usage in the
Bustamante (spelling?) campaign in the California Recall Election, the
Native Americans donated $2M to him in spite of a limit of ~22k by donating
from several people. Same method only now we know who did the paying.
Joe

Trust Laboratories
Changing Software Development
http://www.trustlaboratories.com


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Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform

2003-09-08 Thread Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=60331

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272787

http://www.cfp2000.org/papers/franklin.pdf

http://www.yale.edu/yup/books/092628.htm




On Mon, 8 Sep 2003, Steve Schear wrote:

 Everyone knows that money is the life blood of politics.  The topic of 
 campaign finance reform in the U.S. has been on and off the front burner of 
 the major media, for decades.  Although the ability of citizens and 
 corporations to support the candidates and parties of their choice can be a 
 positive political force, the ability of political contributors to buy 
 access and influence legislation is probably the major source of 
 governmental corruption.  Despite some, apparently, honest efforts at 
 limiting these legal payoffs there has been little real progress.  The 
 challenge is to encourage neutral campaign contributions.  Perhaps 
 technology could lend a hand.
 
 One of the features of Chaimian digital cash is unlinkability.  Normally, 
 this has been viewed from the perspective of the payer and payee not 
 wishing to be linked to a transaction.  But it also follows that that the 
 payee can be prevented from learning the identity of the payee even if they 
 wished.  Since the final payee in politics is either the candidate or the 
 party, this lack of knowledge could make it much more difficult for the 
 money to be involved in influence peddling and quid pro quo back room deals.
 
 By combining a mandated digital cash system for contributions, a cap on the 
 size of each individual contribution (perhaps as small as $100), randomized 
 delays (perhaps up to a few weeks) in the posting of each transaction to 
 the account of the counter party, it could create mix conditions which 
 would thwart the ability of contributors to easily convince candidates and 
 parties that they were the source of particular funds and therefore 
 entitled to special treatment.
 
 Comments?
 
 steve
 
 
 A foolish Constitutional inconsistency is the hobgoblin of freedom, adored 
 by judges and demagogue statesmen.
 - Steve Schear 
 
 
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