Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-28 Thread David Malone
On Tue, Dec 27, 2005 at 11:34:15PM +, Ben Laurie wrote: > If you don't have sufficient plain/ciphertext, then of course you can > choose incorrect pairs. Yep - that's my point. The thing to note is that for an arbitrary permutation, knowing the image of n plaintexts tells you (almost) nothing

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-27 Thread Ben Laurie
David Malone wrote: > On Tue, Dec 27, 2005 at 03:26:59AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: >> On 12/26/05, Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Surely if you do this, then there's a meet-in-the middle attack: for a >>> plaintext/ciphertext pair, P, C, I choose random keys to encrypt P and >>> decrypt C.

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-27 Thread David Malone
On Tue, Dec 27, 2005 at 03:26:59AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: > On 12/26/05, Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Surely if you do this, then there's a meet-in-the middle attack: for a > > plaintext/ciphertext pair, P, C, I choose random keys to encrypt P and > > decrypt C. If E_A(P)=D_B(C), then

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-27 Thread David Malone
On Mon, Dec 26, 2005 at 12:51:37PM +, Ben Laurie wrote: > > The other day I was thinking of using a very large key to select a > > permutation at random from the symmetric group S_(2^x). That would be > > a group, but I don't see how you knowing that I'm using a random > > permutation would he

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-27 Thread Travis H.
On 12/26/05, Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Surely if you do this, then there's a meet-in-the middle attack: for a > plaintext/ciphertext pair, P, C, I choose random keys to encrypt P and > decrypt C. If E_A(P)=D_B(C), then your key was A.B, which reduces the > strength of your cipher from

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-27 Thread Ben Laurie
Travis H. wrote: > On 12/21/05, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Good ciphers aren't permutations, though, are they? Because if they >>> were, they'd be groups, and that would be bad. >> Actually, by definition, a cipher should be a permutation from the set >> of plaintexts to the se

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-22 Thread Travis H.
On 12/21/05, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Good ciphers aren't permutations, though, are they? Because if they > > were, they'd be groups, and that would be bad. > > Actually, by definition, a cipher should be a permutation from the set > of plaintexts to the set of ciphertexts. I

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-22 Thread Bill Stewart
> Good ciphers aren't permutations, though, are they? Because if they > were, they'd be groups, and that would be bad. Actually, by definition, a cipher should be a permutation from the set of plaintexts to the set of ciphertexts. It has to be 1 to 1 bijective or it isn't an encryption algorith

RE: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-22 Thread Anton Stiglic
>Actually, by definition, a cipher should be a permutation from the set >of plaintexts to the set of ciphertexts. It has to be 1 to 1 bijective >or it isn't an encryption algorithm. > >Therefore, if you want an ergodic sequence of size 2^N, a counter >encrypted under an N bit block cipher will do i

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-22 Thread Ben Laurie
Matt Crawford wrote: > On Dec 21, 2005, at 0:10, Ben Laurie wrote: >> Good ciphers aren't permutations, though, are they? Because if they >> were, they'd be groups, and that would be bad. > > A given cipher, with a given key, is a permutation of blocks. (Assuming > output blocks and input blocks

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-22 Thread Matt Crawford
On Dec 21, 2005, at 0:10, Ben Laurie wrote: Good ciphers aren't permutations, though, are they? Because if they were, they'd be groups, and that would be bad. A given cipher, with a given key, is a permutation of blocks. (Assuming output blocks and input blocks are the same size.) It may

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-21 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Jack Lloyd wrote: >> On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:20:26AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: >>> 2) While CTR mode with a random key is sufficient for creating a >>> permutation of N-bit blocks for a fixed N, is there a general-purpose >>> way to create a N-bit permutat

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-21 Thread Ben Laurie
Jack Lloyd wrote: > On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:20:26AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: >> 2) While CTR mode with a random key is sufficient for creating a >> permutation of N-bit blocks for a fixed N, is there a general-purpose >> way to create a N-bit permutation, where N is a variable? How about >> pick

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-13 Thread Jason Holt
On Mon, 12 Dec 2005, Travis H. wrote: One thing I haven't seen from a PRNG or HWRNG library or device is an unpredictable sequence which does not repeat; in other words, a [cryptographically strong?] permutation. This could be useful in all Rich Schroeppel tells me his "Hasty Pudding" cipher

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-12 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:20:26AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: > 2) While CTR mode with a random key is sufficient for creating a > permutation of N-bit blocks for a fixed N, is there a general-purpose > way to create a N-bit permutation, where N is a variable? How about > picking a cryptographically