Alexander Klimov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Wed, 2 May 2007, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>> All cryptography is about economics. In crypto, we usually
>> consider what the best strategy for an attacker is in terms of
>> breaking a cryptosystem, but here I think the right question
>> is what the
On Wed, 2 May 2007, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> All cryptography is about economics. In crypto, we usually
> consider what the best strategy for an attacker is in terms of
> breaking a cryptosystem, but here I think the right question
> is what the optimal strategy is for the attacker in terms of
> m
At 11:32 AM 5/2/2007, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Anyone very familiar with AACS have ideas on what optimal attack and
defense strategies are? This seems like a fertile new ground for
technical discussion.
Ed Felton wrote and excellent piece on AACS from the technical and
economic/tactical standp
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney") writes:
> The interesting thing is that publishing a processing key like this does
> not provide much information about which device was cracked in order
> to extract the key. This might leave AACSLA in a quandary about what to
> revoke in order to fix the problem
