On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
> Well, there's an idea: use different physical media formats for entertainment
> and non-
> entertainment content (meaning, content created by MPAA members vs. not) and
> don't sell
> writable media nor devices capable of writing it f
> Well, there's an idea: use different physical media formats for
> entertainment and non-entertainment content (meaning, content created by
> MPAA members vs. not) and don't sell writable media nor devices capable
> of writing it for the former, not to the public, keeping very tight
> controls on
Allen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I know I'm in over my head on this so my apologies, but if the
> key is used in one machine in a product line - Sony DVD players
> say - then if they find the one machine that it came from and
> disable it, wouldn't figuring out the key for the next machine in
At 07:50 AM 5/4/2007, Nicolas Williams wrote:
On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
> At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
> >This seems to assume that when a crack is announced, all revenue
> >stops. This would appear to be false. When cracks are announced in such
> >syst
On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
> At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
> >This seems to assume that when a crack is announced, all revenue
> >stops. This would appear to be false. When cracks are announced in such
> >systems, normally revenues aren't strongly effecte
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue durin
Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue during the release window
Hal Finney wrote:
[snip]
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=
"By this point in our series on AACS (the encryption scheme used in
HD-DVD and Blu-ray) it should be clear that AACS creates a nontrivial
strategic game between the AACS central authority (representing the
movie studios) and t
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue during the release window,
and sometimes
Perry Metzger writes:
> I will again solicit suggestions about "optimal" strategies both for
> the attacker and defender for the AACS system -- I think we can learn
> a lot by thinking about it. It would be especially interesting if
> there were modifications of the AACS system that would be more h
Florian Weimer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> * Perry E. Metzger:
>> This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
>> consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
>
> Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
> devices that can copy HD di
* Perry E. Metzger:
> This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
> consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
devices that can copy HD disks? Or download software that does, with
a readily
Expanding my last message to make it clearer:
Schemes like the AACS one work quite well for satellite TV broadcast
protection. In such systems, one's goal is to disable the units owned
by rogue subscribers, but the only "inventory" that one might ruin by
a key invalidation is a bit of electromagn
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