I agree with anonymous summary of the state of the art wrt
cryptographic anonymity of interactive communications.
Ulf Moeller, Anton Stiglic, and I give some more details on the
attacks anonymous describes in this IH 2001 [1] paper:
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/pubs/traffic.pdf
which explores
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
It will often be possible to also trace the communication channel back
through the crowd, by inserting delays onto chosen links and observing
which ones correlate with delays in the data observed at the endpoint.
This way it is not necessary to monitor
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
> Then the opponent can put unlimited effort into
> traffic analysis but won't get anything in return,
> beyond the _a priori_ obvious fact that some pair
> of subscribers *may* have communicated.
This is not true, and in fact this result is one of the
John S. Denker writes:
> A scenario of relevance to the present discussion
> goes like this:
> -- There exists a data haven. (Reiter and Rubin
> called this a "crowd".)
> -- Many subscribers have connections to the haven.
> -- Each subscriber maintains a strictly scheduled
> flow
