[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design
* DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design October 7 - 8, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Jayant Kalagnanam, IBM Watson Lab, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Eric Maskin, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, [EMAIL PROTECTED] David Parkes, Harvard University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Aleksandar Pekec, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences. Recent advances in information technology and its rapid acceptance by the business community have allowed for the possibility of expediting complex business transactions. The most prominent example is use of auctions in corporate procurement and in government deregulation efforts. When many items with interrelated values are being sold, economic efficiency can be increased by allowing bidders to make bids on combinations of items. Procedures for auctioning combinations of items have inherent computational problems that have to be overcome, and the emergence of these issues has sparked considerable research activity in the computer science and combinatorial optimization communities. The most prominent example is combinatorial auctions in which multiple goods are auctioned and bidders have and wish to express different valuations on which goods complement each other and which goods substitute for each other. Topics of interest include: -- expressive bidding languages -- practical applications (e.g. to electricity, spectrum,...) -- procurement and e-sourcing -- combinatorial exchanges -- preference elicitation -- optimal auction design -- approximate mechanisms -- communication and computation complexity in combinatorial auctions ** Workshop Program: Thursday, October 7, 2004 8:00 - 8:30 Registration and Breakfast - CoRE Building, 4th Floor 8:30 - 8:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director 8:45 - 9:30 Characterizing Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multi-dimensional types Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern 9:30 - 10:10 Multiitem auctions with credit limits Shmuel Oren and Shehzad Wadalawala, UC Berkeley 10:10 - 10:30 Break 10:30 - 11:15 Approximation Algorithms for Truthful Mechanisms Eva Tardos, Cornell 11:15 - 11:55 Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity generalized congestion games Lisa Fleischer, Carnegie Mellon University, Kamal Jain, MSR and Mohammad Mahdian, MIT 11:55 - 12:35 VCG Overpayment in Random Graphs Evdokia Nikolova and David Karger, MIT 12:35 - 2:00 Lunch 2:00 - 2:45 The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets Ilya Segal, Stanford University 2:45 - 3:25 The communication complexity of the private value single item bisection auction Elena Grigorieva, P Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller, and Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht, the Netherlands 3:25 - 3:45 Break 3:45 - 4:30 Market Mechanisms for Redeveloping Spectrum Evan Kwerel, FCC 4:30 - 5:15 Issues in Electricity Market Auction Design Richard O'Neill, FERC 5:15 - 6:15 Panel 6:30 Dinner Friday, October 8, 2004 8:00 - 8:30 Breakfast and Registration 8:30 - 9:15 Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions Sushil Bikhchandani, UCLA 9:15 - 10:00 The Over-Concentrating Nature of Simultaneous Ascending Auctions Charles Zheng, Northwestern 10:00 - 10:20 Break 10:20 - 11:00 Designing Auction Protocols under Asymmetric Information on Nature's Selection Takayuki Ito, Nagoya Inst., Makoto Yokoo, Kyushu and Shigeo Matsubara, NTT 11:00 - 11:40 Elicitation in combinatorial auctions with restricted preferences and bounded interdependency between items Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University, and Paolo Santi, Pisa University 11:40 - 12:20 Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions Sebastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes, Harvard 12:20 - 1:30 Lunch 1:30 - 2:15 To auction or not? Historical perspectives on the development of ecommerce Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota 2:15 - 2:55 Non-computational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems
[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design
* DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design October 7 - 8, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Jayant Kalagnanam, IBM Watson Lab, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Eric Maskin, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, [EMAIL PROTECTED] David Parkes, Harvard University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Aleksandar Pekec, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences. Recent advances in information technology and its rapid acceptance by the business community have allowed for the possibility of expediting complex business transactions. The most prominent example is use of auctions in corporate procurement and in government deregulation efforts. When many items with interrelated values are being sold, economic efficiency can be increased by allowing bidders to make bids on combinations of items. Procedures for auctioning combinations of items have inherent computational problems that have to be overcome, and the emergence of these issues has sparked considerable research activity in the computer science and combinatorial optimization communities. The most prominent example is combinatorial auctions in which multiple goods are auctioned and bidders have and wish to express different valuations on which goods complement each other and which goods substitute for each other. Topics of interest include: -- expressive bidding languages -- practical applications (e.g. to electricity, spectrum,...) -- procurement and e-sourcing -- combinatorial exchanges -- preference elicitation -- optimal auction design -- approximate mechanisms -- communication and computation complexity in combinatorial auctions ** Workshop Program: Thursday, October 7, 2004 8:00 - 8:30 Registration and Breakfast - CoRE Building, 4th Floor 8:30 - 8:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director 8:45 - 9:30 Characterizing Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multi-dimensional types Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern 9:30 - 10:10 Multiitem auctions with credit limits Shmeul Oren and Shehzad Wadawala, UC Berkeley 10:10 - 10:30 Break 10:30 - 11:15 Approximation Algorithms for Truthful Mechanisms Eva Tardos, Cornell 11:15 - 11:55 Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity generalized congestion games Lisa Fleischer, Carnegie Mellon University, Kamal Jain, MSR and Mohammad Mahdian, MIT 11:55 - 12:35 VCG Overpayment in Random Graphs Evdokia Nikolova and David Karger, MIT 12:35 - 2:00 Lunch 2:00 - 2:45 The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets Ilya Segal, Stanford University 2:45 - 3:25 The communication complexity of the private value single item bisection auction Elena Grigorieva, P Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller, and Dries Vermeulen, U. Maastricht 3:25 - 3:45 Break 3:45 - 4:30 Market Mechanisms for Redeveloping Spectrum Evan Kwerel, FCC 4:30 - 5:15 Issues in Electricity Market Auction Design Richard O'Neill, FERC 5:15 - 6:15 Panel 6:30 Dinner Friday, October 8, 2004 8:00 - 8:30 Breakfast and Registration 8:30 - 9:15 Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions Sushil Bikhchandani, UCLA 9:15 - 10:00 The Over-Concentrating Nature of Simultaneous Ascending Auctions Charles Zheng, Northwestern 10:00 - 10:20 Break 10:20 - 11:00 Designing Auction Protocols under Asymmetric Information on Nature's Selection Takayuki Ito, Nagoya Inst., Makoto Yokoo, Kyushu and Shigeo Matsubara, NTT 11:00 - 11:40 Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value queries in Combinatorial Auctions Paolo Santi, Pisa, Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University and Vincent Conitzer, CMU 11:40 - 12:20 Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions Sebastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes, Harvard 12:20 - 1:30 Lunch 1:30 - 2:15 To auction or not? Historical perspectives on the development of ecommerce Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota 2:15 - 2:55 Non-computational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems in Combinatorial Auctions Sasa Pekec, Duke University
