Michael Nelson nelson_mi...@yahoo.com writes:
Paper by Lenstra, Hughes, Augier, Bos, Kleinjung, and Wachter finds that two
of every one thousand RSA moduli that they collected from the web offer no
security. An astonishing number of generated pairs of primes have a prime in
common.
The title of
Hi,
Paper by Lenstra, Hughes, Augier, Bos, Kleinjung, and Wachter finds that two
of every one thousand RSA moduli that they collected from the web offer no
security. An astonishing number of generated pairs of primes have a prime in
common.
The title of the paper Ron was wrong, Whit is
On Feb 14, 2012, at 10:02 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
On 14 Feb, 2012, at 5:58 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
The practical import is unclear, since there's (as far as is known) no
way to predict or control who has a bad key.
To me, the interesting question is how to distribute the results.
Hi,
the following blog post, which documents similar efforts, sheds some
light, I think:
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/nadiah/new-research-theres-no-need-panic-over-factorable-keys-just-mind-your-ps-and-qs
Ralph
--
Ralph Holz
Network Architectures and Services
Technische Universität
On Wed, 15 Feb 2012, Ralph Holz wrote:
But they reach this conclusion in the abstract that RSA is
significantly riskier than ElGamal/DSA. In the body of the paper,
they indicate (although they are much more defensive already) that
this is due to the fact that you need two factors and more
On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 4:56 PM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 4:13 PM, Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
On Feb 14, 2012, at 10:02 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
On 14 Feb, 2012, at 5:58 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
The practical import is unclear, since there's
On Wed, 15 Feb 2012, Steven Bellovin wrote:
Note that they very carefully didn't say how they did it. I have my
own ideas -- but they're just that, ideas; I haven't analyzed them
carefully, let alone coded them.
If one limits the same-factor search to the keys of the same model of
each
On 15 February 2012 11:56, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
I did this years ago for PGP keys. Easy: take all the keys, do
pairwise GCD. Took 24 hours on my laptop for all the PGP keys on
keyservers at the time. I'm trying to remember when this was, but I
did it during PETS at Toronto, so that
Crypto shocker: four of every 1,000 public keys provide no security (updated)
By Dan Goodin | Published February 15, 2012 6:00 AM
Crypto shocker: four of every 1,000 public keys provide no security (updated)
Keys that share one prime factor are vulnerable to cracking by anyone. Keys
that share
This coming August.
--Paul Hoffman
___
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
From: James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com
Not only is their lower class law abiding, their bankers and
bureaucrats, unlike ours are also law abiding.
From which it is evident that the death penalty *does* deter, both for
institutions and individuals.
Sub-Saharan Africa is in general hotter
Alexander Klimov alser...@inbox.ru writes:
While the RSA may be easier to break if the entropy during the key
*generation* is low, the DSA is easier to break if the entropy during the key
*use* is low. Obviously, if you have access only to the public keys, the first
issue is more spectacular,
On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 5:57 PM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
Alexander Klimov alser...@inbox.ru writes:
While the RSA may be easier to break if the entropy during the key
*generation* is low, the DSA is easier to break if the entropy during the key
*use* is low. Obviously, if
On Wed, 15 Feb 2012, Steven Bellovin wrote:
On Feb 15, 2012, at 11:56 45AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
I did this years ago for PGP keys. Easy: take all the keys, do
pairwise GCD. Took 24 hours on my laptop for all the PGP keys on
keyservers at the time. I'm trying to remember when this was, but I
On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 8:17 PM, Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
On Feb 12, 2012, at 6:31 AM, Harald Hanche-Olsen wrote:
[Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com (2012-02-12 10:57:02 UTC)]
(1) How can a company
15 matches
Mail list logo
