Zack Weinberg writes:
> I've seen claims that quantum key agreement lets both parties detect a
> man in the middle with no prior communication and no trusted third party.
Nope. The security of QKE relies on the parties both knowing a shared
secret key to authenticate messages. This begs the questi
On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:49 PM, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:30 AM, Natanael wrote:
>> Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not
>> see any benefit over classical methods. If one trusts the entire link and
>> knows it's not MitM'd in advance, w
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 1:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
> ...
> Every three months I, the Grantor, [store] my secret in a new
> place that [...] I give to the trustee,
the frequency of key update would be driven by decay rate and coding
gain assuming you had a reliably decaying, surreptitious r
By the way, using SMPC remotely can be generalized beyond "Dead Man Switch"
pretty easily (IMHO). While SMPC actually isn't needed to do a DMS, just
secret sharing, SMPC lets you hide the terms for when to release the
secret, and even to change the terms while keeping them secret. Here's how:
Firs
