Re: [cryptography] How much does it cost to start a root CA ?

2013-01-06 Thread ianG
On 6/01/13 09:48 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: Perhaps it's this kind of thinking that leads to failed audits :) It will, it does, and the information is readily available from the previous post. https://www.cabforum.org/Baseline_Requirements_V1_1.pdf Sections 14 through 16 Additionally,

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

2013-01-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ben Laurie b...@links.org writes: On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: In the light of yet another in an apparently neverending string of CA failures, how long are browser vendors going to keep perpetuating this PKI farce? [0]. Not only is there no

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

2013-01-06 Thread Ralph Holz
Certificate Transparency is a real security measure that is a response by a browser vendor. So the response to the repeated failure of browser PKI is PKI-me-harder. Yeah, that's really going to make users safer. I don't see why CT is PKI-me-harder. EV or BR would fall into that category.

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

2013-01-06 Thread Ben Laurie
On Sun, Jan 6, 2013 at 1:15 PM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Ben Laurie b...@links.org writes: On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: In the light of yet another in an apparently neverending string of CA failures, how long are browser

Re: [cryptography] How much does it cost to start a root CA ?

2013-01-06 Thread Natanael
Bitcoin based DNS? That would be Namecoin. I am unsure if it also manages SSL or similiar link encryption or if that is a separate thing for the scheme. Den 6 jan 2013 08:27 skrev James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com: On 2013-01-05 12:07 PM, Morlock Elloi wrote: Correct. The cost of being CA is

Re: [cryptography] another cert failure

2013-01-06 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 6:40 PM, d...@geer.org wrote: you may have already seen this, but http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20908546 Cyber thieves pose as Google+ social network ... The fake ID credentials have been traced back to Turkish security firm TurkTrust which mistakenly

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

2013-01-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ben Laurie b...@links.org with: a) I don't believe your figures, Well I don't believe in the tooth fairy, but in this case you're going to have to provide a more convincing rebuttal than I choose not to believe in this inconvenient information. I suspect you don't understand CT - perhaps you'd

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

2013-01-06 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-01-07 9:20 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: I'll update it as soon as browser PKI starts working (meaning that we have real evidence that it's effectively preventing the sorts of things attackers are doing, phishing and so on). Deal? The fundamental cause of phishing is that it is so easy to

Re: [cryptography] another cert failure

2013-01-06 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 4:23 PM, Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 3:59 PM, Ryan Hurst ryan.hu...@globalsign.com wrote: In the future, we won't need their honesty. Or the 'honesty' they want use to perceive. Did anyone really think a CA would risk a

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

2013-01-06 Thread ianG
There are two long-term trends that might inform this argument. 1. Vendors have typically refused to improve the model of browser security if it has involved changes to the model. There is a long history of people providing suggestions, papers and code, and the vendors have ignored them.