-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com writes:
... and the trustee (that I never really trusted) ...
Actually, Trustee may prefer to have no access to the secret so as to
be above suspicion if some of the gold should disappear.
- --
--
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
On 2012-09-05 11:51 PM, StealthMonger wrote:
Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be
revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be
cryptographically strong
I can not imagine anything inherently trustable. I do not want to trust
that single server won't be hacked, tapped by NSA or raided by FBI.
Den 22 sep 2012 22:49 skrev StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Natanael natanae...@gmail.com writes:
I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tapped by
NSA or raided by FBI.
I absolutely agree. But the adversary here is nothing like NSA or
FBI, and the stakes are nowhere near threats to any
In that case Anonymous and other hacker groups is your problem.
Den 23 sep 2012 01:37 skrev StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Natanael natanae...@gmail.com writes:
I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tapped by
By the way, using SMPC remotely can be generalized beyond Dead Man Switch
pretty easily (IMHO). While SMPC actually isn't needed to do a DMS, just
secret sharing, SMPC lets you hide the terms for when to release the
secret, and even to change the terms while keeping them secret. Here's how:
First
On Wed, Sep 5, 2012 at 9:51 AM, StealthMonger
stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be
revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be
cryptographically strong and not rely on a
Doh, don't know why I brought public-key crypto into this. There isn't
a need for it. Just pick, say, an AES key and give the trustee some of
the key's bits so they only have to brute force part of the key.
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 4:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Sep
But you can't revoke his ability to keep bruteforcing the message.
- Sent from my tablet
Den 19 sep 2012 23:01 skrev mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com:
Doh, don't know why I brought public-key crypto into this. There isn't
a need for it. Just pick, say, an AES key and give the trustee some
On Sep 19, 2012, at 4:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
Every three months I, the Grantor, encrypt my secret in a new
secret-encrypting-key and place that secret in my box. (I keep my box
away from others - maybe put it in a safe).
I also encrypt that secret-encrypting key in
On 2012-09-19 17:01:02 -0400 (-0400), mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
[...]
If I should die, I will stop re-encrypting the secret and the trustee
(that I never really trusted) can break the public key and get to the
secret.
[...]
And how does the trustee get access to the encrypted form of the
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 2:08 PM, The Fungi fu...@yuggoth.org wrote:
...
And how does the trustee get access to the encrypted form of the
secret?
presumably you get it to him securely.[0]
... If he has a copy of it encrypted with the old key, how do
you ensure he throws it out when you
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 4:32 PM, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote:
...
presumably you get it to him securely.[0]
s/him/her/. or other; perhaps a trained sea mammal.
avoid those honeypot vulns fueled by testosterone...
___
cryptography mailing list
And make sure there are multiple internet connections to the hidden servers.
Adam
On Thu, Sep 06, 2012 at 03:40:23AM +0100, StealthMonger wrote:
Good argument. Thanks. It makes Natanael's solution, or some variant
of it, all the more appealing. Keep Natanael's servers secret, such
as on
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be
revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be
cryptographically strong and not rely on a trusted other party.
The motivating application is a Living Trust wherein
Hi,
what's the difference from a normal dead man switch that would reveal said
secret if/when messages stop appearing.
You can't check the signature of a message that isn't received, right?
It could work in a way where the 'switch' sends a message and reveals the
message if there is no signed
If the trustee (correct word?) stops passing the messages to your CDMS
(cryptographic dead man switch), it would simply decrypt the original
message automatically. So you can not put the entire mechanism in the hands
of the trustee, especially not the part that authorizes the decryption. I
could
So to be short: no, there cannot.
The absence of new information cannot cause the information needed for
decryption to become known. Unless you find some way to reverse that or use
a hybrid crypto and non-crypto solution a DMS cannot happen.
Anyone disagree?
Note that a Bitcoin-like/distributed
On 2012-09-05 11:51 PM, StealthMonger wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be
revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be
cryptographically strong and not rely on a trusted other party.
Such
19 matches
Mail list logo
