actually it is possible to build chips that generate keys as part of
manufactoring power-on/test (while still in the wafer, and the private key
never, ever exists outside of the chip) ... and be at effectively the same
trust level as any other part of the chip (i.e. hard instruction ROM).
using
Lucky Green wrote:
Ray wrote:
From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
Jim Choate writes:
On Mon, 5 Aug 2002, Russell Nelson wrote:
AARG!Anonymous writes:
So don't read too much into the fact that a bunch of anonymous postings
have suddenly started appearing from one particular remailer. For your
information, I have sent over 400 anonymous
Mr AARG! writes...
Eric Murray writes:
Yes, the spec says that it can be turned off. At that point you
can run anything that doesn't need any of the protected data or
other TCPA services. But, why would a software vendor that wants
the protection that TCPA provides allow his software
On Mon, Jul 29, 2002 at 03:35:32PM -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Declan McCullagh writes at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-946890.html:
The world is moving toward closed digital rights management systems
where you may need approval to run programs, says David Wagner,
an assistant
On Thu, 1 Aug 2002 16:45:15 -0700, AARG!Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
... snipt ...
Also, as stated earlier, data can be sealed such that it can only be
unsealed when the same environment is booted. This is the part above
about encrypting cryptographic keys and making sure the right
Jon Callas[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
our corrospondent may have decided to go undercover...
I
Jon Callas wrote:
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only people who need anonymity or
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
our
AARG! Anonymous[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] writes
[...]
Now, there is an optional function which does use the manufacturer's key,
but it is intended only to be used rarely. That is for when you need to
transfer your sealed data from one machine to another (either because you
have
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 14:36, Trei, Peter wrote:
OK, It's 2004, I'm an IT Admin,
and I've converted my corporation over to TCPA/Palladium machines. My
Head of Marketing has his TCPA/Palladium desktop's hard drive
jam-packed with corporate confidential documents he's been actively
working on
Peter Trei writes:
It's rare enough that when a new anononym appears, we know
that the poster made a considered decision to be anonymous.
The current poster seems to have parachuted in from nowhere,
to argue a specific position on a single topic. It's therefore
reasonable to infer that
Peter Trei envisions data recovery in a TCPA world:
HoM: I want to recover my data.
Me: OK: We'll pull the HD, and get the data off it.
HoM: Good - mount it as a secondary HD in my new system.
Me: That isn't going to work now we have TCPA and Palladium.
HoM: Well, what do you have to
--
On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
So TCPA and Palladium could restrict which software you could
run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be
changed and restrictions added.
Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed
around them, is
On Wed, Jul 31, 2002 at 11:45:35PM -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Peter Trei writes:
AARG!, our anonymous Pangloss, is strictly correct - Wagner should have
said could rather than would.
So TCPA and Palladium could restrict which software you could run.
TCPA (when it isn't turned off)
From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
Eric Murray writes:
TCPA (when it isn't turned off) WILL restrict the software that you
can run. Software that has an invalid or missing signature won't be
able to access sensitive data[1]. Meaning that unapproved software
won't work.
[1] TCPAmain_20v1_1a.pdf, section 2.2
We need to
On Thu, 1 Aug 2002, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
Eric Murray writes:
TCPA (when it isn't turned off) WILL restrict the software that you
can run. Software that has an invalid or missing signature won't be
able to access sensitive data[1]. Meaning that unapproved software
won't work.
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 3:31, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
More generally, as long as we have computers which allow data to
be addressed as code and vice versa, the ability to control use
of data will necessarily entail ability to control use of code.
So, either we will get systems where
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