Actually, I _am_ the proud posessor of a Psion Series 5mx, and I have had
PGP for EPOC installed on it for a few years now. It's not the original,
obviously, but it claims to be a port to the EPOC operating system of PGP
2.6.3ia. The About page says "International version - not for use in the
USA.
John Kelsey wrote:
> At 01:22 PM 5/29/03 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
>
>> The following appears to be a bone fide case of a
>> threat model in action against the PGP program.
>
>
> ...
>
> Two comments:
>
> a. It sure seems like it would be a pain to enter a long passphrase on
> one of these thin
A lot of the tools and blocks are too hard to
understand. "Inaccessible" might be the proper
term. This might apply to, for example, SSL,
and more so to IPSec. These have a lower survival
rate, simply because as developers look at them,
their eyes glaze over and they move on. I heard
one guy s
Erik is right: there must be very strong motivation to consider using a
cryptographic mechanism/protocol which is not `standard` (de-facto
standards are Ok). When this motivation is supposedly improved security,
the new (supposedly more secure) primitive should preferably be composed
with a sup
Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>Also, a lot of cryptosystems are put together by committees. SSH was
>originally put together by one guy. He did the lot. Allegedly, a fairly
>grotty protocol with a number of weakneses, but it was there and up and
>running. And SSH-2 is apparantly nice,
On Mon, Jun 02, 2003 at 10:09:06AM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
> A lot of the tools and blocks are too hard to
> understand. "Inaccessible" might be the proper
> term. This might apply to, for example, SSL,
> and more so to IPSec. These have a lower survival
> rate, simply because as developers look
"Scott Guthery" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> When I drill down on the many pontifications made by computer
> security and cryptography experts all I find is given wisdom. Maybe
> the reason that folks roll their own is because as far as they can see
> that's what everyone does. Roll your own t
Eric Murray wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 02, 2003 at 10:09:06AM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
> > A lot of the tools and blocks are too hard to
> > understand. "Inaccessible" might be the proper
> > term. This might apply to, for example, SSL,
> > and more so to IPSec. These have a lower survival
> > rate,
Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Eric Murray wrote:
> It may be that the SSL underlying code is
> perfect. But that the application is weak
> because the implementor didn't understand
> how to drive it; in which case, if he can
> roll his own, he may end up with a more
> secure overall pac
At 11:38 AM 05/30/2003 -0700, John Young wrote:
If the FBI cannot crack PGP that does not mean other
agencies with greater prowess cannot. It is unlikely that
the capability to crack PGP would be publicly revealed
for that would close an invaluable source of information.
.
Still, it is impressi
Ian Grigg wrote:
> Also, a lot of cryptosystems are put together
> by committees. SSH was originally put together
> by one guy. He did the lot. Allegedly, a fairly
> grotty protocol with a number of weakneses, but
> it was there and up and running. And SSH-2 is
> apparantly nice, elegant and ea
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