RE: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Hi Ed, What about ID-based crypto: the public key can be any string, such as your e-mail address. So the sender can encrypt even before the recipient has a key pair. The private key is derived from the public key by a trusted party when the recipient asks for it. Yes, the recipient does have some

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote: PGP allows that a relying party vet a public key with the key owner and/or vet the key with one or more others (web-of-trust) note that while public key alleviates the requirement that a key be distributed with secrecy ... it doesn't eliminate the requirement that the

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Benne, With Voltage, all communications corresponding to the same public key can be decrypted using the same private key, even if the user is offline. To me, this sounds worse than the PKC problem of trusting the recipient's key. Voltage also corresponds to mandatory key escrow, as you noted, with

Re: pci hardware for secure crypto storage (OpenSSL/OpenBSD)

On Wed, 15 Sep 2004 16:30:54 +0100, Ian Grigg said: > There is a device that is similar to those characteristics: > http://woudt.nl/epass-pgp/ > http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000201.html The advantage of the OpenPGP card is that is is a specification that it is open and ready f

[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design

* DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design October 7 - 8, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Jayant Kalagnanam, IBM Watson Lab, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Eric M

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great. * I don't see Verisign's web server tax as meaningful; they accept no liability, and numerous companies foist you off to unrelted domains. We could get roughly the same s

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

At 11:19 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote: Yes, PKC provides a workable solution for key distribution... when you look at servers. For email, the PKC solution is not workable (hasn't been) and gives a false impression of security. For example, the sender has no way of knowing if the recipient's key is

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Adam Shostack wrote: Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great. I think the consensus from debate back last year on this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it didn't do anything that couldn't be done with P

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote: > the issue then is what level do you trust the recipient, what is the threat model, and what are the countermeasures. if there is a general trust issue with the recipient (not just their key generating capability) ... then a classified document compromise could happen

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

Adam Shostack wrote: I think the consensus from debate back last year on this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it didn't do anything that couldn't be done with PGP, and added more risks to boot. Voltage actually does. It allows secure communication without pre-registering the recipient. C

Phones gain coded security

IT Week Phones gain coded security Certicom offers a cross platform security kit for handset developers Daniel Robinson, IT Week 16 Sep 2004 Cryptography firm Certicom has announced a cross-platform security toolkit for future mobile phone handsets. The C

Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

On Wed, Sep 15, 2004 at 11:39:25AM -0700, Ed Gerck wrote: > > Yes, SSL and public-key encryption are and continue to be a success for web > servers. However, the security model for protecting email with public-key > cryptography seems to be backwards, technically and business wise. Exactly. It i