Re: Persisting /dev/random state across reboots

2010-07-30 Thread Thomas
Am Donnerstag 29 Juli 2010, 21:47:01 schrieb Richard Salz: > At shutdown, a process copies /dev/random to /var/random-seed which is > used on reboots. > Is this a good, bad, or "shrug, whatever" idea? > I suppose the idea is that "all startup procs look the same" ? Indeed. The boot process of a ma

Re: A slight modification of my comments on PKI.

2010-07-30 Thread Stephan Neuhaus
On Jul 29, 2010, at 22:23, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote: > On 07/28/2010 10:34 PM, d...@geer.org wrote: >> The design goal for any security system is that the number of >> failures is small but non-zero, i.e., N>0. If the number of >> failures is zero, there is no way to disambiguate good luck >> f

Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI

2010-07-30 Thread Peter Gutmann
Paul Tiemann writes: >What if... Firefox (or other) could introduce a big new feature (safety >controls) and ask you up front: "Do you want to be safer on the internet?" The problem is that neither the browser vendor nor the users will see it like this. For the user its: "Do you want to have

Re: Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.

2010-07-30 Thread Stefan Kelm
Perry, The administration wants to add just four words -- "electronic communication transactional records" -- to a list of items that the law says the FBI may demand without a judge's approval. Government Would that really make that much of a difference? In Germany, at least, the so-call

Hashing messages with lengths between 32 and 128 bytes is one of the most important practical issue (was Re: the skein hash function)

2010-07-30 Thread Paul
Bill Stewart wrote: Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2008 7:30 AM To: Cryptography List Subject: Re: the skein hash function > So if Skein becomes popular, ASIC accelerator hardware > may be practical for higher-speed applications. I see another strong point for Skein: Deterministically generated a

Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II

2010-07-30 Thread Peter Gutmann
Steven Bellovin writes: >When I look at this, though, little of the problem is inherent to PKI. >Rather, there are faulty communications paths. "Oh no my Lord, I assure you that parts of it are excellent!" :-). >[...] how should the CA or Realtek know about the problem? [...] That was the whol

Re: Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.

2010-07-30 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Fri, 30 Jul 2010 09:38:44 +0200 Stefan Kelm wrote: > Perry, > > > The administration wants to add just four words -- "electronic > > communication transactional records" -- to a list of items that > > the law says the FBI may demand without a judge's approval. > > Government > > Would tha

Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II

2010-07-30 Thread Anne & Lynn Wheeler
On 07/28/2010 11:52 PM, Pat Farrell wrote: A lot of the smart card development in the mid-90s and beyond was based on the idea that the smart card, in itself, was the sole authorization token/algorithm/implementation. some ssl, payment, smartcard trivia ... those smartcards were used for the o

Re: Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.

2010-07-30 Thread Steven Bellovin
On Jul 30, 2010, at 3:58 08PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > On Fri, 30 Jul 2010 09:38:44 +0200 Stefan Kelm wrote: >> Perry, >> >>> The administration wants to add just four words -- "electronic >>> communication transactional records" -- to a list of items that >>> the law says the FBI may deman