I took a look at the new cipher used in iTunes 4.7, and spent some time
reducing it. The algorithm appears to have a similar structure to a 10-round
Twofish variant with fixed S-boxes, optimized via precomputed tables. I have
not fully analyzed what the permutation matrix and polynomial are,
On Wednesday 08 June 2005 21:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes, encrypting indexed columns for example is a problem. But if you
limit yourself to encrypting sensitive information (I'm talking about
stuff like SIN, bank account numbers, data that serves as an index to
external databases and are
On Thursday 09 June 2005 17:37, Charles M. Hannum wrote:
If we assume that the last 4 digits have been exposed somewhere -- and they
usually are -- then this gives you at most 38 bits -- i.e. 2^38 hashes to
test -- to search (even a couple less if you know a priori which *brand* of
card
Most implementations of /dev/random (or so-called entropy gathering daemons)
rely on disk I/O timings as a primary source of randomness. This is based on
a CRYPTO '94 paper[1] that analyzed randomness from air turbulence inside the
drive case.
I was recently introduced to Don Davis and, being
On Sunday 03 July 2005 05:21, Don Davis wrote:
From: Charles M. Hannum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2005 17:08:50 +
While I have found no fault with the original analysis,
...I have found three major problems with the way it
is implemented in current systems.
hi, mr. hannum
On Wednesday 13 July 2005 18:29, Mike Owen wrote:
Back in 2000, I opened an account with BofA, and they took a photo of
me, and added it to my debit/check card. Around that same time,
American Express was doing the same with their Costco branded cards.
I'm sure others are doing it, those are
