Take many grains of salt before concluding that MITM attacks are either
hard or don't happen.
It is just that the environment for them is not the Internet per se, but
modern switched LANs. The basic trick to monitoring someone's LAN traffic
is to convince the ARP machinery that the MITM MAC is a
(this is a resend, apologies for duplicates)
As David Wagner points out, encryption with a public key (for which the
private key has been discarded) would seem to work.
I think there is a bit more to be said about requirements though.
For a one-way encryption algorithm to be injective will also
Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before
being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks:
* Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that
missing or added ballots can be detected.
* Put check digits on each ballot, so that alte
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Would anyone there have any good predictions on how
> cryptography is going to unfold in the next few years
> or so? I have my own ideas, but I would love
> to see what others see in the crystal ball.
>
I'd like to think we would see a new flowering of c