Andrea Pasquinucci wrote:
>or to sit next to a
> coercer with a gun watching her voting.
>
> The fact that the voter is remote and outside a controlled location
> makes it impossible to guarantee incoercibility and no-vote-selling.
> This is not a crypto or IT problem. I do not think (correct
On Sat, Feb 03, 2007 at 08:52:35PM -0800, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "Andrea Pasquinucci" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Cryptography"
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 12:33 PM
Subject: Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and
On Tue, 30 Jan 2007, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
> This is a common misconception. The legal system does not rely on
> lawyers, judges, members of Congress, and so on understanding how
> technology or science works. It doesn't rely on them coming to
> accept the trustworthiness of the technology on an
- Original Message -
From: "Andrea Pasquinucci" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Cryptography"
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 12:33 PM
Subject: Re: Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.
I have been working for
the last 2 years on a
thing like a
Windows SAM file containing the NTLM v2 hash of the passphrase consisting of
the answer might be something to consider? Not perfect but...
--Anton
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Matt Blaze
Sent: January 26, 2007 5:58 PM
| > |
| > | ...There's an obvious cryptographic solution, of course: publish the
| > | hash of any such documents. Practically speaking, it's useless.
| > | Apart from having to explain hash functions to lawyers, judges,
| > | members of Congress, editorial page writers, bloggers, and talk
| > |
On Jan 30, 2007, at 16:41, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 30 Jan 2007 16:10:47 -0500 (EST)
"Leichter, Jerry" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
|
| ...There's an obvious cryptographic solution, of course: publish
the
| hash of any such documents. Practically speaking, it's useless.
| Apart
On Tue, 30 Jan 2007 16:10:47 -0500 (EST)
"Leichter, Jerry" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> |
> | ...There's an obvious cryptographic solution, of course: publish the
> | hash of any such documents. Practically speaking, it's useless.
> | Apart from having to explain hash functions to lawyers, ju
| ...I agree with you about intuitive cryptography. What you're
| complaining about is, in effect, "Why Johnny Can't Hash". There was
| another instance of that in today's NY Times. In one of the court
| cases stemming from the warrantless wiretapping, the Justice
| Department is, in the holy na
On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 05:58:16PM -0500, Matt Blaze wrote:
*
* It occurs to me that the lack of secure, practical crypto primitives and
* protocols that are intuitively clear to ordinary people may be why
* cryptography has had so little impact on an even more important problem
* than psychic deb
[Perry, please use this one if possible]
Matt Blaze wrote:
> an even more important problem
> than psychic debunking, namely electronic voting. I think "intuitive
> cryptography" is a very important open problem for our field.
Matt,
You mentioned in your blog about the crypto solutions for votin
Matt Blaze wrote:
> an even more important problem
> than psychic debunking, namely electronic voting. I think "intuitive
> cryptography" is a very important open problem for our field.
The first problem of voting is that neither side (paper vote vs e-vote)
accepts that voting is hard to do right
Good work. In fact, I knew days ago that you would post this...
I agree with you about intuitive cryptography. What you're complaining
about is, in effect, "Why Johnny Can't Hash". There was another
instance of that in today's NY Times. In one of the court cases
stemming from the warrantless w
I was surprised to discover that one of James Randi's "million dollar
paranormal challenges" is protected by a surprisingly weak (dictionary-
based) commitment scheme that is easily reversed and that suffers from
collisions. For details, see my blog entry about it:
http://www.crypto.com/blog/ps
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