On 18 Sep 2013 07:44, "Christoph Gruber" wrote:
>
> On 2013-09-17 Max Kington wrote:
>
>
> [snip]
> > Hence, store in the clear, keep safe at rest using today's archival
mechanism and when that starts to get dated move onto the next one
en-masse, for all your media not just emails.
> [snip]
>
> I
On 2013-09-17 Max Kington wrote:
[snip]
> Hence, store in the clear, keep safe at rest using today's archival mechanism
> and when that starts to get dated move onto the next one en-masse, for all
> your media not just emails.
[snip]
I would tend to agree for environments with very high regul
On 17 Sep 2013 15:47, "Christoph Gruber" wrote:
>
> On 2013-09-16 Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> [snip]
>>
>> If people are sending email through the corporate email system then in
many cases the corporation has a need/right to see what they are
sending/receiving.
>
> [snip]
>
> Even if an organis
On 2013-09-16 Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
[snip]
> If people are sending email through the corporate email system then in many
> cases the corporation has a need/right to see what they are sending/receiving.
[snip]
Even if an organisation has a need/right to look into people's email, it is
nece
On 16 September 2013 18:49, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> To me the important thing about transparency is that it is possible for
> anyone to audit the key signing process from publicly available
> information. Doing the audit at the relying party end prior to every
> reliance seems a lower prior
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> On 16 September 2013 18:49, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> To me the important thing about transparency is that it is possible for
>> anyone to audit the key signing process from publicly available
>> information. Doing the audit at the re
