Re: [cryptography] Improving the state of end-to-end crypto

2014-04-28 Thread Ben Laurie
On 28 April 2014 00:45, Arshad Noor arshad.n...@strongauth.com wrote: On 04/27/2014 10:33 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: http://www.links.org/files/SimplySecure.pdf Ben, As noble as the goals are of this initiative, the solution is likely to be accepted only in UK and the USA - only because it

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Improving the state of end-to-end crypto

2014-04-28 Thread Ben Laurie
On 28 April 2014 01:04, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: On 27/04/2014 18:33 pm, Ben Laurie wrote: We are hiring to improve the state of end-to-end crypto: http://www.links.org/files/SimplySecureProgramDirectorJobPosting.pdf http://www.links.org/files/SimplySecure.pdf To paraphrase, work with ...

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] GCC bug 30475 (was Re: bounded pointers in C)

2014-04-28 Thread John Young
The criminal liability of NSA, other spies corps, orgs and comsec wizards in de facto complicit deception and exploitation of the public is a worthy topic to drag out of the hideaways. It might be demonizing of the valiant code warriors to be described as a Racketeer Influenced Criminal

Re: [cryptography] Improving the state of end-to-end crypto

2014-04-28 Thread Warren Kumari
On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:45 PM, Arshad Noor arshad.n...@strongauth.com wrote: On 04/27/2014 10:33 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: http://www.links.org/files/SimplySecure.pdf Ben, As noble as the goals are of this initiative, the solution is likely to be accepted only in UK and the USA - only

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
We happen to live on a planet where most users are ordinary users. given the extent of phishing, it's probably best we outsource trust to centralized authorities. Although it should be easier establishing your own certificate authority. ___

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread ianG
On 28/04/2014 20:58 pm, Ryan Carboni wrote: We happen to live on a planet where most users are ordinary users. given the extent of phishing, it's probably best we outsource trust to centralized authorities. cof it's them that have shown themselves totally incapable of doing anything

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
trust is outsourced all the time in the non-cryptographic world unless you do not have a bank account On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 3:00 PM, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: On 2014-04-29 05:58, Ryan Carboni wrote: We happen to live on a planet where most users are ordinary users.

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread ianG
On 29/04/2014 00:12 am, Ryan Carboni wrote: trust is outsourced all the time in the non-cryptographic world trust is built up all the time, risks are taken all the time, choice is taken all the time. unless you do not have a bank account That's not outsourced, that's direct, person to bank,

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
One can always start with the difficult first step of uninstalling certificate authorities you do not trust. On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 4:42 PM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: On 29/04/2014 00:12 am, Ryan Carboni wrote: trust is outsourced all the time in the non-cryptographic world trust is built

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread ianG
On 29/04/2014 01:20 am, Ryan Carboni wrote: One can always start with the difficult first step of uninstalling certificate authorities you do not trust. Yup. And if you don't like your country, you can hand in your passport on the way out. Marketing lies aside, it is clear that the ordinary

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 8:20 PM, Ryan Carboni rya...@gmail.com wrote: One can always start with the difficult first step of uninstalling certificate authorities you do not trust. Opera will autorepair damage to the certificate repository, a missing Certificate Authority is considered damage.

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Jason Iannone
If browsers are defeating the purpose of the chain of trust, by forcing trust in this example, why design them to freak out when a site self signs? On Apr 28, 2014 6:32 PM, Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 8:20 PM, Ryan Carboni rya...@gmail.com wrote: One can