On 09/02/2011 12:55 PM, coderman wrote:
the next escalation will be sploiting private keys out of hardware
security modules presumed impervious to such attacks.
given the quality of HSM firmwares they're lucky cost is somewhat a
prohibiting factor for attackers.
authority in the wild, not
Marsh Ray writes:
Why would they need to?
What's the difference between a private key in the wild and a pwned
CA that, even months after a breakin and audit, doesn't revoke or
even know what it signed?
(This is a serious question)
The pwned CA leaves evidence that other people can
On Fri, Sep 2, 2011 at 11:50 AM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote:
...
What's the difference between a private key in the wild and a pwned CA that,
even months after a breakin and audit, doesn't revoke or even know what it
signed?
i should have been more clear; by pwning the HSM i
[NB: CC'd to the randombit cryptography list, since this is an interesting
point for discussion].
Ian G i...@iang.org writes:
What we'll likely see now is a series of breaches at multiple levels to
acquire and misuse certs. We've seen compromises in the past, but what makes
this new is
