[Boing Boing Blog] Kismac: WEP cracking for OS X

2002-12-08 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Status: RO To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Cory Doctorow [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mailing-List: list [EMAIL PROTECTED]; contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2002 05:09:54 -0800 Subject: [Boing Boing Blog] Kismac: WEP cracking for OS X Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

[ISN] PGP Opens Up Encryption Source Code

2002-12-08 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Status: RO Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 01:00:19 -0600 (CST) From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [ISN] PGP Opens Up Encryption Source Code Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-12-08 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 10:48 PM -0500 11/29/02, Donald Eastlake 3rd wrote: Arnold, If you want to play with this as in intellectual exercise, be my guest.  But the probability of changing the underlying IEEE 802.11i draft standard, which would take a 3/4 majority of the voting members of IEEE 802.11, or of making

PGPfreeware 8.0: Not so good news for crypto newcomers

2002-12-08 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Status: RO From: pplf [EMAIL PROTECTED] User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i586; en-US; rv:1.2.1) Gecko/20021130 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: PGPfreeware 8.0:

Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-12-08 Thread Donald Eastlake 3rd
I'm not saying there might not be a level of error or weakness that would cause a emergency reset of the standards process. I'm saying that this diddle-shit minor DoS attack isn't such an error or weakness. It was fully known about by the 802.11 working group, repeatedly debated at great length,

Help! (fwd)

2002-12-08 Thread Eugen Leitl
-- Forwarded message -- Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 03:12:30 +0100 (CET) From: Robert Harley [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Help! Help! I need access to a big fast machine ASAP, to count points on a humongous elliptic curve. That requires running a process that

DBCs now issued by DMT

2002-12-08 Thread R. A. Hettinga
I suppose that if it's not blinded, or at least functionally anonymous, like you'd get with statistically-tested streaming cash, it's not *that* bearer, but, hey, that's just *my* opinion, right? :-). I would assume that anything that has accounts with client names on them is probably not

Re: DBCs now issued by DMT

2002-12-08 Thread R. A. Hettinga
At 4:06 PM -0800 on 12/3/02, Somebody wrote: I forgot to ask: who the hell is DMT? Nobody I ever heard of... How are they marketing this stuff - on a website with only an IP address... :-). or, who have they gotten to use it thus far? Nobody I ever heard of... However, that old

Re: DBCs now issued by DMT

2002-12-08 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Status: RO Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 16:06:12 -0800 Subject: Re: DBCs now issued by DMT From: Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tuesday, December 3, 2002, at 01:55 PM, Steve Schear wrote: Digital Monetary Trust now supports

Re: DBCs now issued by DMT

2002-12-08 Thread Peter Fairbrother
OK, suppose we've got a bank that issues bearer money. Who owns the bank? It should be owned by bearer shares, of course. Can any clever person here devise such a protocol? I'd guess that all the Bank's finances should be available to anyone who asks. That should include an accounting of all

[ANNOUNCE] OpenSSL 0.9.7 beta 5 released

2002-12-08 Thread Richard Levitte - VMS Whacker
The fifth beta release of OpenSSL 0.9.7 is now available from the OpenSSL FTP site URL: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/. This beta contains quite a number of fixes since beta 4. This is NOT a final beta, even if that was the original plan. The updated plan has beta 6 as final beta. It

[ANNOUNCE] OpenSSL 0.9.6h released

2002-12-08 Thread Richard Levitte - VMS Whacker
OpenSSL version 0.9.6h released === OpenSSL - The Open Source toolkit for SSL/TLS http://www.openssl.org/ The OpenSSL project team is pleased to announce the release of version 0.9.6h of our open source toolkit for SSL/TLS. This new OpenSSL version is

Re: [mnet-devel] Ditching crypto++ for pycrypto (fwd)

2002-12-08 Thread bear
On Tue, 3 Dec 2002, James A. Donald wrote: Anything that is good, gets ported a lot. Anything that is ported a lot gets build/port problems. Actually, I've found the reverse to be true. Anything that gets ported a lot eventually gets all the portability crap straightened out so that porting

Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-12-08 Thread David Wagner
Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: If I am right and WPA needlessly introduces a significant denial of service vulnerability, then it should be fixed. If I am wrong, no change is needed of course. But TKIP (the part of WPA you're talking about) is only a temporary measure, and will soon be replaced by

Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-12-08 Thread Derek Atkins
The answer is multi-fold. 1) The 802.11i standard wont be finished for a while. 2) There is an apparent Market Requirement for something better than WEP __NOW__. 3) The WPA can only change their requirements once per year, so even if 802.11i were ready in 3 months, it would still take

Re: PGPfreeware 8.0: Not so good news for crypto newcomers

2002-12-08 Thread John Doe Number Two
If PGP, Inc was going after all seventeen users of gnupg and trying to convert them, you'd be right. I have the feeling however, that the PGP crowd would actually like people to use their product. For all the whining from the 'free beer' crowd, no one had bothered to make PGP/gnupg compatible

Re: DBCs now issued by DMT

2002-12-08 Thread bear
On Thu, 5 Dec 2002, Peter Fairbrother wrote: OK, suppose we've got a bank that issues bearer money. Who owns the bank? It should be owned by bearer shares, of course. Can any clever person here devise such a protocol? I thought about this problem for several months. The problem I kept

Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-12-08 Thread James A. Donald
-- Arnold G. Reinhold Cryptographic standards should be judged on their merits, not on the bureaucratic difficulties in changing them. Specs have been amended before. Even NSA was willing to revise its original secure hash standard. That's why we have SHA1. If I am right and WPA