Re: oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

2021-07-05 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 5:07 PM Karl Semich <0xl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> Karl, pleasure writing to you, I hope you understand a bit better why
>> >> I'm asking about ORAM-FS's benefits.
>> >
>> >
>> > I hear you asking with an eye towards when a large business or government 
>> > might find it efficient to use.
>> >
>> > I don't understand why you are asking this.  I observed you didn't share a 
>> > threat model.
>> >
>> > Oramfs is actually completely pluggable under the hood.  What do you think 
>> > about expanding it so it can do non-obfuscated encryption if desired?
>> >
>> > This would be incredibly easy to add.
>>
>> Karl,
>> How do we know that your commentary isn't in bad faith? Textbook
>> disruption techniques. Please share your rationale for questioning my
>> rationale.
>>
>> Just kidding,
>>
>> -Travis
>
>
> Thanks for the joke, Travis.
>
> Yeah, don't trust me, I'm messed up in the head from my fears and 
> experiences.  It's nice to read your quote that answered part of your 
> question.
>
> I composed a couple emails that answered more as I saw them, but honestly I 
> was scared to send them, I'm so sorry.
>
> We need to build, share, and use stuff like oramfs more.  I don't know what 
> to say to cause that.

Yes,
The development, open distribution, and use of tools like ORAM-FS is important.

Here's where I'm at;

A frame; just one example of the differences between windows' early
NTFS file encryption and 'TrueCrypt''s approach. In NTFS the structure
of the filesystem was not encrypted, so an adversary could see all the
filenames and metadata but no content. In a TrueCrypt volume an
adversary has an opaque blob.

An adversary can look at r/w access to a TC-like blob (a non-ORAM
encrypted FS) and determine what filesystem is in use, then the
attacker might guess at the boundaries of individual files, determine
the specific implementation of the filesystem (a specific version),
the Operating System writing to it, and when some typical files are
being written to or read from. If you don't hook any commodity
software up to the ORAM-FS then the attacker can probably at most
glean the filesystem type and the boundaries of individual files.
Depending on the filesystem they may also recover more structural
information.

I don't see a clear benefit when the files being r/w'd are a variety
that your attacker can't predict (a mix of non-standardized mission
specific artifacts). But I see an advantage if they can.

It looks like access patterns are really useful when the domain of the
data is constrained (in structure and type, or perhaps the access
domain (e.g. search)); e.g. medical records and emails.

The ORAM topic is fresh to me, maybe it's time to do a deep dive on
the academic work. Happy for other examples or pointers to content
that might help.

-Travis

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Re: oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

2021-07-05 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 4:40 PM Karl Semich <0xl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hidden volumes solve for any type of coerced decryption.
>
>
> That's what a rubber hose attack is.
>
>>
>> I can use Tahoe-LAFS for personal backup and it'll be encrypted, but
>> it wont have ORAM. Most academic work on ORAM is in the context of a
>> centralized cloud service provider. ORAM was not invented in absence
>> of a threat, but it may be applied to a system with no benefit.
>>
>> Here's an example statement from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.09779.pdf
>> "ObliviSync: Practical Oblivious File Backup and Synchronization"
>>
>> "ORAM is a powerful tool that solves a critical problem in cloud
>> security. Consider a hospital which uses cloud storage to backup their
>> patient records. Even if the records are properly encrypted, an
>> untrusted server that observes which patient files are modified will
>> learn sensitive medical information about those patients. They will
>> certainly learn that the patient has visited the hospital recently,
>> but also may learn things like whether the patient had imaging tests
>> done based on how large the file is that is updated. Moreover, they
>> might learn for instance that a patient has cancer after seeing an
>> oncologist update their records. This type of inference, and more, can
>> be done despite the fact that the records themselves are encrypted
>> because the access pattern to the storage is not hidden".
>>
>> Karl, pleasure writing to you, I hope you understand a bit better why
>> I'm asking about ORAM-FS's benefits.
>
>
> I hear you asking with an eye towards when a large business or government 
> might find it efficient to use.
>
> I don't understand why you are asking this.  I observed you didn't share a 
> threat model.
>
> Oramfs is actually completely pluggable under the hood.  What do you think 
> about expanding it so it can do non-obfuscated encryption if desired?
>
> This would be incredibly easy to add.

Karl,
How do we know that your commentary isn't in bad faith? Textbook
disruption techniques. Please share your rationale for questioning my
rationale.

Just kidding,

-Travis
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Re: oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

2021-07-05 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 3:31 PM Karl Semich <0xl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 5, 2021, 3:17 PM Travis Biehn  wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 2:04 PM Karl Semich <0xl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > I'm afraid I can't give a good answer because of my "locks" situation, but 
>> > obviously we are enswathed with multi-user disk situations, for real.
>>
>> Karl,
>> If I asked 'what do you have to hide?' then I think your spidey sense
>> should tingle :) That's not the case.
>>
>> ORAM is a technique that you can apply to a system, an encrypted
>> filesystem ideally incorporates the requisite design and mix of
>> primitives in order to achieve effective operational security, with
>> that meets operational impact objectives.
>> I'm wondering why I would take on the operational costs (to my
>> mission, say, 'taking over the moon', and cost, for example, of
>> decreased bandwidth and increased latency) of a filesystem that uses
>> ORAM, rather than conventional encrypted filesystems.
>>
>>
>> As another example, a 'hidden volume' is a feature that an encrypted
>> filesystem can have, I can explain that a hidden volume exists to
>> counter a rubber hose attack. If someone
>>
>> asked why a hidden volume is
>> useful there's no problem in asking or answering the question. The
>>
>> attack isn't obvious to everyone and consequently the benefit of
>> suffering the operational burden of solving the problem (e.g. using
>> hidden volumes with plausible contents) can't be understood until
>> explained.
>>
>> So maybe with this framing in mind; what attacks does the use of
>> ORAM-FS counter?
>
>
> What's your threat model?  I bet I can think of a lot.
>
> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2021-July/088855.html
>
> Would you consider a rubber hose attack to be the only thing a hidden volume 
> can help against?
>
>>
>> -Travis
>>
>>
>> --
>> Twitter | LinkedIn | GitHub | TravisBiehn.com

Hidden volumes solve for any type of coerced decryption.

I can use Tahoe-LAFS for personal backup and it'll be encrypted, but
it wont have ORAM. Most academic work on ORAM is in the context of a
centralized cloud service provider. ORAM was not invented in absence
of a threat, but it may be applied to a system with no benefit.

Here's an example statement from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.09779.pdf
"ObliviSync: Practical Oblivious File Backup and Synchronization"

"ORAM is a powerful tool that solves a critical problem in cloud
security. Consider a hospital which uses cloud storage to backup their
patient records. Even if the records are properly encrypted, an
untrusted server that observes which patient files are modified will
learn sensitive medical information about those patients. They will
certainly learn that the patient has visited the hospital recently,
but also may learn things like whether the patient had imaging tests
done based on how large the file is that is updated. Moreover, they
might learn for instance that a patient has cancer after seeing an
oncologist update their records. This type of inference, and more, can
be done despite the fact that the records themselves are encrypted
because the access pattern to the storage is not hidden".

Karl, pleasure writing to you, I hope you understand a bit better why
I'm asking about ORAM-FS's benefits.

-Travis

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Re: oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

2021-07-05 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 2:04 PM Karl Semich <0xl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I'm afraid I can't give a good answer because of my "locks" situation, but 
> obviously we are enswathed with multi-user disk situations, for real.

Karl,
If I asked 'what do you have to hide?' then I think your spidey sense
should tingle :) That's not the case.

ORAM is a technique that you can apply to a system, an encrypted
filesystem ideally incorporates the requisite design and mix of
primitives in order to achieve effective operational security, with
that meets operational impact objectives.
I'm wondering why I would take on the operational costs (to my
mission, say, 'taking over the moon', and cost, for example, of
decreased bandwidth and increased latency) of a filesystem that uses
ORAM, rather than conventional encrypted filesystems.

As another example, a 'hidden volume' is a feature that an encrypted
filesystem can have, I can explain that a hidden volume exists to
counter a rubber hose attack. If someone asked why a hidden volume is
useful there's no problem in asking or answering the question. The
attack isn't obvious to everyone and consequently the benefit of
suffering the operational burden of solving the problem (e.g. using
hidden volumes with plausible contents) can't be understood until
explained.

So maybe with this framing in mind; what attacks does the use of
ORAM-FS counter?

-Travis


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Re: oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

2021-07-05 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 6:32 AM Karl Semich <0xl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> What are some motivations for a general oram fs?
>>
>> Travis
>
>
> Travis, I felt quite scared and confused and a little angry reading this 
> question.  What led you to ask it?  What kind of plans are you hoping to 
> inform from the answer?  Do you use encryption, or do anything to protect 
> your privacy?
>
> Regarding access timing, like tor you could use cover traffic accessing your 
> data, writing and reading to it constantly.  I wonder if there is something 
> newer than ORAM that obscures access timing patterns.
>
>
Karl,
The last system I used that employed chaff packets was
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WASTE. WASTE had a setting that would
generate traffic constantly - there was a little discussion with the
Tor people around whether or not to employ a similar system, but they
decided against it.

The question is earnest, I literally don't know why you would want an
ORAM-FS for general personal use. The linked paper covers the ability
to recover information in a multi-user environment, and suggests an
ORAM storage to account for that - I get that. An ORAM-FS is
different.

What threats does the added benefit of using ORAM account for in a
file system? As in; I really enjoy encryption and privacy, and I'm
looking to get read up on when and where I should apply ORAM to a
filesystem.

-Travis

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Re: oramfs - ORAM filesystem written in Rust

2021-07-03 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Sat, Jul 3, 2021 at 5:08 PM coderman  wrote:

> ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
> On Thursday, July 1st, 2021 at 5:01 PM, Peter Fairbrother pe...@tsto.co.uk
> wrote:
>
> ... It seems simple to attack, 'oh look the
> file(system) has been changed, the user wrote or deleted a file'
>
> therefore he has accessed the filesystem.
>
>
> i did not write this, but i did want to point out: even reads drive
> obfuscating writes to the underlying volume.
>
> note that for SSDs in particular, this is a change in behavior: usually
> once error limit reached, and write leveling maxed out, you can still read
> what has been written.
>
> in this case, only reading can still drive duty cycle to failure on SSD
> type storage.
>
> i don't have a specific number on write overload for any activity
> (including reads) but this would be useful to know in advance...
>
> best regards,
>

>
Here's the scheme they mention as an option, it has what you're looking
for...

https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/280.pdf

Seems like something a service provider uses, might result in thier hosting
provider doing slightly more ssd swaps.

What are some motivations for a general oram fs?

Travis
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Re: TechRadar: Multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Tor have been disclosed online

2020-08-01 Thread Travis Biehn 
I've had several people question me on the integrity of Signal. This stems
from a post where Cisco Talos revealed it had 'hacked' signal by stealing
long term secrets out of the desktop client. Those poor regular folk are
going as far as using inferior tech.

The signature attack is unfortunate, at worst presenting a DoS condition.
Its too bad the Tor project won't answer his calls or accept his patches -
it seems at first glance he'd be a solid addition to the project.

I hope this conversation ultimately does more good than harm. The techradar
article is advertising VPNs and 'privacy browsers'. Hm.

Travis

On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 2:45 AM jim bell  wrote:

> TechRadar: Multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Tor have been disclosed 
> online.https://www.techradar.com/news/tor-network-hit-by-two-major-zero-day-attacks
>
>
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Re: X86 dispatch contention vulnerability

2018-11-14 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 4:15 PM jim bell  wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, November 14, 2018, 11:52:43 AM PST, juan 
> wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, 14 Nov 2018 19:00:52 + (UTC)
>
> jim bell  wrote:
>
>
> >> My company, SemiDisk Systems, was very close to the first disk emulator
> for a number of types of PC, including the S-100, TRS-80 Model II, IBM PC,
> Epson Q-10.
> https://www.pcworld.com/article/246617/storage/evolution-of-the-solid-state-drive.html
>
>
> >IIRC you also worked for intel designing memory chips? Excuse my
> rather naive question but...Did you see/hear at that time any hints that
> chips  were being tampered with or somehow backdooored  because of
> 'national security'?
>
> I didn't design memory chips.  I was a "product engineer" for a specific
> self-refreshing dynamic RAM (otherwise called a "pseudo-static") device
> called a 2186.
> https://www.ebay.com/p/Vintage-Intel-D2186a-30-8k-X-8-Pseudo-Static-RAM-D2186-2186-SRAM/1918155784
>  Vintage Intel D2186a-30 8k X 8 Pseudo Static RAM D2186 2186 SRAM | eBay
> 
>   It, along with a 32K x 8 "21D1", were Intel's first by-8 dynamic RAMs.
>
> Product engineers design the test programs which check out the performance
> of a chip, using (at that time) an ultra-fast dedicated computer made by
> Teradyne.
> https://www.teradyne.com/products/test-solutions/semiconductor-test
>  This computer very accurately placed clock edges, to a position and
> accuracy of a small fraction of a nanosecond.   The 2186 was tricky by the
> standards of the day, partly due to the self-refreshing feature, but also
> because the 2186 (and 21D1) were the first Intel memory devices (possibly
> the first from anyone?) that employed "redundancy":  Previous memory
> devices were essentially unusable if even a single bit, or row, or column
> failed.  The 2186 incorporated many spare rows, and spare columns, which
> could be programmed in to substitute for bits, rows, and columns that had
> failed.
>
> My program tested the chip, then took the map of bad rows, columns, and
> bits, and first checked to see if the part could be made good, at least
> theoretically, if the available rows and columns would solve the visible
> problems.  If that appeared to be possible, my program determined which
> redundant rows and columns needed to be activated, and at which row and
> column they needed to be placed at.  From this, a bit stream was generated
> that was clocked into the chip, one bit at a time, and was used to blow
> poly-silicon links (fuses) in a write-once memory area.  That was the
> memory area which told the chip where to access the redundant rows and
> columns, instead of the array rows and columns.
>
> In fact, I was the first person at Intel, and perhaps in the world, who
> saw the flash(es) through the microscope of the as-being-blown fuses on
> these chips.  Intel was doing this redundancy before anyone else, I
> believe.
> ×
>
> Pseudo-static DRAMs refreshed themselves, with the (possible) aid of RFSH
> signal that might occasionally be applied to the chip.  Myself, I didn't
> think that DRAMs were hard to use, having designed a digital circuit and a
> DRAM card using an old Motorola DRAM called a "6605", that I got cheaply.
>
> https://computerarchive.org/files/mirror/www.bitsavers.org/pdf/motorola/_dataBooks/1979_Motorola_Memory_Data_Book.pdf
>
> I don't think that the 2186 was successful, mostly because Intel
> eventually got out of the DRAM business, and mostly that because other
> manufacturers got much better and more efficient than Intel was.
>
> I was never in a position to hear if chips could be "backdoored".
>
> Jim Bell
>
>
>
>
>

I believe Intel refers to 'backdoors' as 'features' for 'customer support
scenarios'.

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Re: [liberationtech] Public Shielded Room Work

2018-10-15 Thread Travis Biehn 
Hey Karl,
Cool.

On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 10:01 AM Karl  wrote:

> Thanks so much for your replies.
>
> On 10/14/2018 09:07 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> > Consider utilizing a github / wiki somewhere for this project,
> > People can join together to generate the motivations and goals,
> > outline areas of research, hacking and acquisitions needed,
> > develop workplans, reproducible test setups, progress, results,
> > costs, etc. Perhaps also some form of makerspace later on.
>
> Okay.  I made these:
>
> - gitlab wiki:
> https://gitlab.com/xloem/openemissions/wikis/FAQ-and-Discussion
> - chat: #openemissions:matrix.org on matrix and #openemissions on freenode
> - loomio decision-making group:
> https://www.loomio.org/g/MYQFl2dC/open-emissions
>
> I struggle with organization and would really appreciate any work to
> make things more organized.
>
> If anybody is interested in collaborating actively on this right now,
> chat is most convenient for me at the moment.
>
> On 10/14/18, CANNON  wrote:
> > Any power going into such a room should use a UPS battery to prevent data
> > leakage through power lines/usage.
> > (Would power lines become an antennae for electro-magnetic frequency
> > leakage?) Would a UPS be sufficient enough for
> > security?
>
> Your use of 'UPS' seems a little ambiguous here.  I have been thinking
> of keeping a 12V battery inside the room, and using only DC power.  AC
> power seems like just another source of emissions to track, to me.
>
> My understanding is that filters are placed on lines to prevent any
> but acceptable frequencies being carried on them.  The field of
> electromagnetic compatibility covers this a lot, I think.  Power lines
> completely behave as antennae, and couple nearby signals from one end,
> to the other, by receiving them and then re-radiating them.
>
> Filtered AC power could be plugged straight into the mains, but I
> don't at this time have the experience to trust the filters, and it
> complicates construction of the room to make an additional penetration
> for the wiring.
>
> > And if network connectivity is needed, to prevent network cables from
> being
> > a carrier of EMF leakage, perhaps fiber optic line?
>
> As above, I think sneakernet is the way to go for highest security.
>
> With regard to fiberoptic transmissions, it seems to me the gold
> standard would be open-source transcievers that are shielded to
> decrease the utility of compromising them, and a way to sniff the
> fiber-optic line to verify it does not carry unexpected data.
>

I recently prototyped one of these types of systems, just to prevent EMR
between different security domains, using off-the-shelf components;
PC <-> Arduino <-> MAX232 <-> Fiber Converter <-> Duplicate (apparently
popular for aging SCADA systems, cheaper than BAE Data Diodes - probably
just as good.)

Unidirectional properties are as easy to confirm as leaving a fiber cable
unplugged. Monitoring the fiber itself is probably hard & expensive - but
the signal out of the MAX232s at either end, and going in and out of the
microcontrollers, is easy to inspect using a cheap PC attached Logic
Analyzer (digital domain smuggling between bits) and Oscilloscope (unlikely
analog domain covert channels, which Apple has employed for different
reasons.) I used DSLogic kit paired w/ their fork of sigrok. All very
straightforward.

IF a transmitter was modified to analyze or retransmitting important parts
of EMR over a covert fiber channel, and the receiver was modified to
forward clean RS232 and covertly exfil from the fiber side channel, you
won't catch it with this setup. Interested in whether it's more feasible to
detect side-channels over fiber or verify the transmitters.


> Karl
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Re: Is it still good practice to reinstall everything after you are owned?

2017-09-25 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Georgi Guninski <gunin...@guninski.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 01:57:33PM -0400, Travis Biehn wrote:
> > Yes - in addition, since some attackers have been shown to compromise not
> > only UEFI firmware, but also blobs in peripheral devices, a re-flashing
> of
> > those components from HW land. In many cases, this type of recovery is
> > 'impossible'.
> >
> > Practically, individuals will take a stab on guessing attacker capability
> > between; zero sophisticated persistence and h/w re-install survivability
> > and act accordingly. It is difficult to get that right, if not
> impossible.
> >
>
> Thanks. I suppose it is safe guess that non-negligible part of the world
> is persistently owned?
>

Hey Georgi,

On prevalence I won't speculate - but my number would be pretty low. You
don't burn your fancy hardware persistence on just any target.

In somewhat-related news, the cat and mouse game is getting a bit more
interesting with Apple High Sierra's eficheck. While I don't expect it to
remain effective long, it promises to find some 'interesting' old samples.

-Travis

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Re: Is it still good practice to reinstall everything after you are owned?

2017-09-19 Thread Travis Biehn 
On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Steve Kinney  wrote:

>
>
> On 09/19/2017 07:37 AM, Georgi Guninski wrote:
> > Is it still good practice to reinstall everything after you are owned?
> >
> > It used to be, but after reading about windows viruses I am not sure it
> > is.
>
> Well if somebody who reads the CPunk list is "fixing" a failed Microsoft
> operating system, that implies that the computer in question belongs to
> somebody else who demands Microsoft.  In that case, industry best
> practice is to follow the most expensive path possible:  "It is morally
> wrong to allow a sucker to keep his money."  The more of a client or
> employer's money you spend, the more important your job appears to be
> and the more /you/ can charge.
>
> So you will want to go shopping, and buy any "upgrades" that are
> available.  Assure that the anti-virus and related tools installed are
> the very most expensive.  If possible replace hardware, not just
> software.  Explore the potential for adding firewall appliances etc. to
> the network the compromised system plugs into - every security incident
> is a window of sales opportunity and, thanks to the popular press and
> the efforts of Microsoft and other snake oil vendors, the sky is not
> necessarily the limit.  Start building a case to change out /everything/
> IT related at the shop in question for the most expensive and massively
> over-built infrastructure possible - where and as this becomes possible,
> it qualifies as a Total Win.
>
> Also bear in mind that once Microsoft has been specified, "security" is
> out the window and compliance with popular misconceptions and IT sales
> literature constitute due diligence on the security front.  As a
> practical security objective, you will want to see the largest number of
> security incidents your client or employer will tolerate going forward,
> as you play the part of a heroic warrior battling hordes of Evil Genius
> Super Hackers on their behalf.  Do this well, with a straight face and
> the assistance of talking points from your vendors, to meet the only
> security objective that matters:  Your job and retirement security.
>
> Remember that an occasional /real/ loss of important assets will assure
> that your client or employer values your services very highly.  If
> things get too quiet around the shop for too long, dropping a couple of
> anonymous tips on security issues at your shop in "hacking" forums -
> make them look like a disgruntled ex-employee looking for pay-back - can
> do wonders to boost your importance in the eyes of management.
>
> :o)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Georgi,

Yes - in addition, since some attackers have been shown to compromise not
only UEFI firmware, but also blobs in peripheral devices, a re-flashing of
those components from HW land. In many cases, this type of recovery is
'impossible'.

Practically, individuals will take a stab on guessing attacker capability
between; zero sophisticated persistence and h/w re-install survivability
and act accordingly. It is difficult to get that right, if not impossible.

Broadly, the types of activities you perform on various hardware would
dictate the appropriate response. For example, you might not go about
generating a root CA on the computer you routinely clean adware from, and
you might not consider that computer 'safe for the task' after a OS
reinstall, instead favoring fresh, network interface stripped, or purpose
built HW.

-Travis

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Re: Are you also a Soviet Spy

2017-06-03 Thread Travis Biehn 
Top-post.

James,
You're looking for a quick and easy way to discover all persons' political
and ideological compatibility based on all public and private
communications - of course, facilitated by some membership-based secret
escrow scheme (backdoor.)

In fact, a lot of different groups have this same problem - how do you
discover which populations belong to which ideological groupings; why not
employ some handy algorithms to make a judgement for you?

Quite the idea, the good people at Palantir might be able to help you out.

-Travis

On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 2:03 AM, James A. Donald  wrote:

> I have asked this question, how to do a secret handshake that reveals
> common membership of the group without giving away your membership to non
> members, several times before, and not been happy with the answers, so I
> guess I am asking it badly.
>
> I will try to be clearer about the problem I am trying to solve.
>
> These days, people no longer communicate on Usenet and email lists. Rather
> they use something for which we have not formed a word. I will call it a
> social blogging platform, unless someone has a better word.
>
> Twitter, Facebook, and to a lesser extent WordPress, and such are all
> examples of this.
>
> In a blogging platform, you post and people comment on your post.
> WordPress is the classic example
>
> Plus, it is a communication medium, you can chat privately to people and
> groups, like viber.
>
> Viber and skype are messenger with very little blogging, WordPress is
> blogging with very little messenger, Facebook is the two integrated. Viber
> is currently the best messaging system, WordPress the best blogging,
> Facebook the best integrated messaging and blogging system, but the world
> is moving to tighter integration.  Every messaging platform is adding some
> blog like features, every blogging system is adding some messaging type
> features.
>
> Facebook consists largely of chicks posting "look at me, I am hot", boys
> commenting, "yes, you are hot", and then they go into Facebook messenger,
> communicate privately, and make an assignation to have sex. It was designed
> from the beginning for the purpose, hence the excellent integration between
> the posting and commenting, which is analogous to WordPress, and the
> private messaging, which is analogous to skype. Facebook is pretty much
> Skype+WordPress, and all the others are competing for the same market
> niche, though Facebook totally dominates the sexual assignation and booty
> call niche by far.
>
> Specialist systems, for example the Cupid system for international dating
> have the same basic architecture - posts plus tightly integrated private
> messaging.
>
> The trouble is that the major systems, especially twitter, are heavily
> politicized and censored, and so people are forming alt-tech, such as Gab,
> to escape from politics and censorship.
>
> If you want to read a science paper about the nut gathering activities of
> the gray squirrel, or an adventure comic about the Mighty Thor, or a
> science fiction story about flash Gordon traveling to the far stars, you
> instead get politics.
>
> You think you are reading about the nut gathering activities of the gray
> squirrel, and it turns into the effect of global warming on the gray
> squirrel, which effect we are told is extremely bad, though no concrete
> evidence of this is provided, the evils of global warming upon the squirrel
> being asserted but not actually shown.
>
> But it is not actually about the effect of global warming on the gray
> squirrel, rather it is about global warming itself. We are told that global
> warming is even worse than we thought, though how bad we used to think it
> was is never precisely specified, and how bad now we think it is not
> specified either, and the evidence that we should now think it even worse
> is alluded to rather than given.
>
> But it is not actually about global warming itself, rather it is that the
> industrial civilization that white people created is destroying the earth.
>
> But it is not actually about the destruction of the earth by white
> civilization, rather it is that heterosexual white males are horribly bad,
> and extremely harmful to all other kinds of creatures.
>
> Similarly, when one read the adventures of Thor, one encounters female
> Thor.  But it is not actually about female Thor, it is that gender binary
> is false and evil.  But it is not actually about gender binary, it is that
> ... heterosexual white males are horribly bad, and extremely harmful to all
> other kinds of creatures.
>
> And similarly, when Flash Gordon travels to the far stars, it turns out
> that an evil corporation run by white heterosexual patriarchal males is
> oppressing blue skinned tree living aliens to steal their natural resources
> ... bad, and extremely harmful to all other kinds of creatures.
>
> This endless insulting, ignorant, stupid, and offensive hectoring happens
> all the time, everywhere, on