At 06:32 PM 4/28/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
People don't need to spend several months wading through cryptography
textbooks to come up to a level that is sufficient to understand the
real issues.)
--Tim May
In fact, crypto textbooks will teach you about the tensile strength
of steel, but not
Quoting Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
At 6:32 PM -0700 4/28/01, Tim May wrote:
(You see, the quick review process is much better than the method
you suggested re: economics, that people read the main textbooks.
People don't need to spend several months wading through
cryptography
On Sat, 28 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
If only they worked. There was an interesting paper presented here
in Pittsburgh at the info hiding workshop this week that suggested
a way to strengthen the somewhat-suckful mixmaster network. (Of
That would be
A Reputation System To Increase
On Sat, Apr 28, 2001 at 08:49:43PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
Well, better than nothing. (Like I said in another article tonight,
the best is often the enemy of the good.) We knew even in 1992 that
remailers were a pale imitation of the DC Nets discussed a few
years earlier by Chaum and
At 11:22 PM -0400 4/28/01, Declan McCullagh wrote:
On Sat, Apr 28, 2001 at 06:32:08PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
None of the non-cryptographic methods are very resistant to legal,
technical, sniffing, and black bag attacks. And only multiply-chained
encrypted-at-each-stage messages, a la
Tim May wrote:
None of the non-cryptographic methods are very resistant to legal,
technical, sniffing, and black bag attacks. And only multiply-chained
encrypted-at-each-stage messages, a la remailers, are adequate for
high-value messages.
Those who've read it know that Jim Bamford's Body of
At 6:32 PM -0700 4/28/01, Tim May wrote:
(You see, the quick review process is much better than the method
you suggested re: economics, that people read the main textbooks.
People don't need to spend several months wading through
cryptography textbooks to come up to a level that is sufficient
At 2:24 PM -0500 4/28/01, Aimee Farr wrote:
Reading the IMC gag order, Henson, the latest anonymous poster stuff, and
Tim et. al. beating my head in pavement
Since many forums don't allow for 'nymity, (or people just don't), what
about a protected/offshore self-destruct quicktopic-like
I wrote:
---
If you plan to stay on this list, I think it's long past time that
you spend several hours reviewing past developments in these areas.
(You see, the quick review process is much better than the method
you suggested re: economics, that people read the main textbooks.
People
Tim said:
At 2:24 PM -0500 4/28/01, Aimee Farr wrote:
Reading the IMC gag order, Henson, the latest anonymous poster stuff, and
Tim et. al. beating my head in pavement
Since many forums don't allow for 'nymity, (or people just don't), what
about a protected/offshore self-destruct
At 9:43 PM -0500 4/28/01, Aimee Farr wrote:
Tim said:
* Keith Henson chose to post under his own name, to appear in person
at COS offices and recruiting centers, to picket, and so on. He was
not trying to be anonymous or pseudonymous, so your proposal above
would be pointless in his
At 10:09 PM -0400 4/28/01, John Young wrote:
Finally, reading the NYT account of Kerry's team killing the
Vietnamese is sobering. The article is much more disturbing
than accounts of it have portrayed. Kerry's and other killers'
spin over the years have induced an intolerance for reading
the
On Sat, Apr 28, 2001 at 06:32:08PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
None of the non-cryptographic methods are very resistant to legal,
technical, sniffing, and black bag attacks. And only multiply-chained
encrypted-at-each-stage messages, a la remailers, are adequate for
high-value messages.
If only
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