It seems consistent that Al Qaeda prefers being 'fish in the sea' to
standing out by use of crypto. Also, given the depth and breadth of
conspiracies they believe in, it seems that they might see all us
cryptographers as a massive deception technique to get them to use bad
crypto. (And hey,
It seems consistent that Al Qaeda prefers being 'fish in the sea' to
standing out by use of crypto. Also, given the depth and breadth of
conspiracies they believe in, it seems that they might see all us
cryptographers as a massive deception technique to get them to use bad
crypto. (And hey,
(Guys, this has drifted out of crypto into finance, so I
have a feeling that it will disappear of the crypto list.
But the topics that are raised are interesting and important
enough to carry on, I think.)
[Hal:]
Interesting. In the e-gold case, both parties have the same bank,
e-gold
(Guys, this has drifted out of crypto into finance, so I
have a feeling that it will disappear of the crypto list.
But the topics that are raised are interesting and important
enough to carry on, I think.)
[Hal:]
Interesting. In the e-gold case, both parties have the same bank,
e-gold
Enzo Michelangeli writes:
In the world of international trade, where mutual distrust between buyer
and seller is often the rule and there is no central authority to
enforce
the law, this is traditionally achieved by interposing not less than
three
trusted third parties: the shipping line,
Enzo Michelangeli writes:
In the world of international trade, where mutual distrust between buyer
and seller is often the rule and there is no central authority to
enforce
the law, this is traditionally achieved by interposing not less than
three
trusted third parties: the shipping line,
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030
An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is little danger of
unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want told the newssite:
It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance,
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030
An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is little danger of
unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want told the newssite:
It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance,
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/technology/3753886.stm
US scientists have discovered that every desktop printer has a signature
style that it invisibly leaves on all the documents it produces.
I don't think this is new - I'm pretty sure it was
published about 6 or 7 years back
Joe Touch wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
On the backbone, between BGP peers, one would have thought
that there are relatively few attackers, as the staff are
highly trusted and the wires are hard to access - hence no
active attacks going on and only some passive eavesdropping
attacks. Also, anyone
Joe Touch wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
On the backbone, between BGP peers, one would have thought
that there are relatively few attackers, as the staff are
highly trusted and the wires are hard to access - hence no
active attacks going on and only some passive eavesdropping
attacks. Also, anyone
Bill Stewart wrote:
Also, the author's document discusses protecting BGP to prevent
some of the recent denial-of-service attacks,
and asks for confirmation about the assertion in a message
on the IPSEC mailing list suggesting
E.g., it is not feasible for BGP routers to be configured with the
Bill Stewart wrote:
Also, the author's document discusses protecting BGP to prevent
some of the recent denial-of-service attacks,
and asks for confirmation about the assertion in a message
on the IPSEC mailing list suggesting
E.g., it is not feasible for BGP routers to be configured with the
Brian McGroarty wrote:
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion (I can't prove I voted
Brian McGroarty wrote:
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion (I can't prove I voted
Trei, Peter wrote:
Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion (I can't prove
Steve Schear wrote:
By combining a mandated digital cash system for contributions, a cap on the
size of each individual contribution (perhaps as small as $100), randomized
delays (perhaps up to a few weeks) in the posting of each transaction to
the account of the counter party, it could
Steve Schear wrote:
By combining a mandated digital cash system for contributions, a cap on the
size of each individual contribution (perhaps as small as $100), randomized
delays (perhaps up to a few weeks) in the posting of each transaction to
the account of the counter party, it could
John Kelsey wrote:
So, what can I do about it, as an individual? Make the cellphone companies
build good crypto into their systems? Any ideas how to do that?
Nope. Cellphone companies are big slow moving
targets. They get their franchise from the
government. If the NSA wants weak crypto,
Derik asks the pertinant question:
The question is: how do we convince M$ and Netscape to include something
else in their software? If it's not supported in IE, then it wont be
available to the vast majority of users out there.
My view, again, IMHO: ignore Microsoft. Concentrate
on the
From: Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Just curious, but what was the rationale under which private posession
of gold was made illegal in the US? It boggles the mind...
Roosevelt needed to in effect devalue the dollar during the Great
Depression. In a deflationary depression, this acts as
SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days.
Costs are still way too high. This won't change until
browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being
valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in
cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons.
Ian Grigg wrote:
Costs are still way too high. This won't change until
browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being
valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in
cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons.
[...]
Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days.
Costs are still way too high. This won't change until
browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being
valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in
cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons.
Ken Brown wrote:
Er, I hit send prematurely, and I meant to go on to say that I have
often used 1 or 200 UKP in folding money - it is easy to do with
universal availability of ATMs. If anything I use more cash than I did
15 years ago because it is so simple to get hold of. And saves the
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 6:03 PM -0700 on 5/11/02, Eric Cordian wrote:
The reason we have ready availability of credit in the first place
is because consumer debt is the most profitable business in the
United States.
What are the margins on consumer debt? Isn't it
all securitized,
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
The Third Edinburgh Financial Cryptography Engineering Conference
This is so fucking boring. No one gets laid any more for doing FC.
No, no, NO!! You are talking about Financial Cryptography,
the conferences running on a bunch of Caribbean islands.
Very
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 6:03 PM -0700 on 5/11/02, Eric Cordian wrote:
The reason we have ready availability of credit in the first place
is because consumer debt is the most profitable business in the
United States.
What are the margins on consumer debt? Isn't it
all securitized,
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