Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, Apr 23, 2004 at 05:06:44PM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > Pulling the power is the exact wrong thing to do if it's a CFS requiring a > passphrase at startup. > > Does anyone know what the default procedure is when hardware is being seized > (threat model=knuckle-dragger/gumshoe)? This might

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

> underground railroad would have worked better, but your still black. Obviously you don't know about whitening properties of moder ciphers! Seriously, today the distingushing marks among classes, tribes and castes are far more informational than physical. So today crypto *can* make you white, or

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, A.Melon wrote: > Are there any publicly available documents that detail interrogation > protocols and what brainwave patterns and bloodflow look like during truth > telling and lying? Preferably something that gets into how to consciously > alter brainwave patterns and blood

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

Major Variola writes... > If you physically destroy the keys or the data, there is little to gain by > torturing you or your family. That is superior to gambling that your > deeper duress levels are convincing to the man with the electrodes. Are there any publicly available documents that detail

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >> filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego. > >Are there any decent implementations for Linux/BSD/NT? > > I haven't looked recently. One property that such a FS or app should > have is that it is useful for something *else* besides stego

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 09:23 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: >Innocents could be a good "cannon fodder" that can bring a lot of >backslash and alienation aganst the goons, stripping them from public >support. Yes, this has been discussed before, in addition to using it retributionally --finger some deserving

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

t 10:09 AM 4/23/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >"I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field >with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't >help." > >Well, what if there were 3 passwords: > >1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 08:51 PM 4/23/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: >On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote: > >> The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When >> does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you? > >This serves a purpose as well. > >Why would you ever coo

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 11:33 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > This will produce a loud bang, obviously. > >Thermite is a good choice to turn your fileserver into lava, but that thing >better be outside, or mounted in chamotte- or asbestos-lined metal closet. >Will produce smoke, and take some time, too. Thanks,

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

>From: Tyler Durden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Sent: Apr 23, 2004 10:09 AM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push .. >Well, what if there were 3 passwords: >1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote: > The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When > does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you? > After he gets one? Yeah, that's plausible, if he's convinced there's > only one. But once he's seen a second

RE: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

> Right, there are at least two workable solutions- > > Hard drives with user alterable firmware. I surprised that none of the > major drive manufacturers seems to have thought about offering a version of > their controllers, for substantially more money, that offers this. > > A retrofit device th

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

From: "Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > 3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys > the real data as it opens the plausible real data. For Windows, look up Strong Disk Pro, they're quite paranoid - it can be used like this. Mark

RE: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 07:43 AM 4/23/2004, Trei, Peter wrote: If you're dealing with a state-level attacker, any scheme involving explosives or incendiaries would get the attackee in as much or more trouble than the original data would. This is a hard problem. I suspect any solution will involve tamper-resistant hardw

RE: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

Tyler Durden wrote: > > "I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field > with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't > help." > > Well, what if there were 3 passwords: > > 1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will > actually be

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Fri, Apr 23, 2004 at 10:43:14AM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: > Step zero is to pull the power, > so any shutdown code does not run. Pulling the power is the exact wrong thing to do if it's a CFS requiring a passphrase at startup. Does anyone know what the default procedure is when hardware is be

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

behind them) will be able to detect that data is being destroyed, but statistically speaking that will be much rarer. -TD From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Tyler Durden wrote: | However, I'd bet there are short-term applications for crypto that | really matter and yet have no real relationship to $$$ (for instance, | what if there was widespread communications and crypto in Nazi | Germany...would the holo

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 11:53:07AM -0700, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field > with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't > help. Smallish lithium battery has enough oomph to heat a NiCr filament (or charge a

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 4:00 PM -0400 4/22/04, Pete Capelli wrote: >But the goal isn't to ban it; just marginalize it enough to be able to tar >it as a terrorist action. > >True, there is no worldwide ban on finance. But there is the delightful >'know your customer' law. That's just a monster in the closet. Fact is,

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, 2004-04-22 at 14:53, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field > with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't > help. The first thing that popped into my mind is a USB key with a small cake of potassium perman

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

$$$ (for instance, what if there was widespread communications and crypto in Nazi Germany...would the holocaust have happened?) -TD From: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA w

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >However, it's not entirely reliable. At some point, the suspect tells > >you what you want to hear, whether or not it is the truth, just so you > >leave him alone. It can even happen that the suspect convinces himself > >that what he really did w

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

> At 12:09 PM +0200 4/22/04, Eugen Leitl wrote: > >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? > > Amen. > > It's like expecting a worldwide ban on finance. Been tried. Doesn't work. But the goal isn't to ban it; just marginalize it enough to be able to tar it as a terrorist action. Tr

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 05:56 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: >On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >> At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> > >> >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove >> >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel? >> >>

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 4:32 PM +0100 4/22/04, Dave Howe wrote: >There isn't a worldwide ban on breaking CSS - doesn't stop the film >industry trying to enforce it in the US courts. Carl Ellison tells the story about how, with the advent of the longbow, all these peasants had to get absolution from their local priests

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

R. A. Hettinga wrote: > At 12:09 PM +0200 4/22/04, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? > It's like expecting a worldwide ban on finance. Been tried. Doesn't > work. There isn't a worldwide ban on breaking CSS - doesn't stop the film industry trying to enforc

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 01:13:48AM +0100, Dave Howe wrote: >> No, it is a terrible situation. >> It establishes a legal requirement that communications *not* be >> private from the feds. from there, it is just a small step to >> defining encryption as a deliberate attempt to ci

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > > >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove > >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel? > > Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel? Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has worked pretty well. If you're good you don't even leave mark

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

At 12:09 PM +0200 4/22/04, Eugen Leitl wrote: >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? Amen. It's like expecting a worldwide ban on finance. Been tried. Doesn't work. :-) Cheers, RAH -- - R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

> The extreme ease of use of internet wiretapping and lack of accountability > is not a good situation to create. False. It is the best possible situation cpunk-wise I can imagine. It effectively deals away with bs artists (those who *argue* against this or that) and empowers mathematics. If one

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

Morlock Elloi wrote: >> The extreme ease of use of internet wiretapping and lack of >> accountability is not a good situation to create. > False. > It is the best possible situation cpunk-wise I can imagine. No, it is a terrible situation. It establishes a legal requirement that communications *not

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 01:13:48AM +0100, Dave Howe wrote: > No, it is a terrible situation. > It establishes a legal requirement that communications *not* be private from > the feds. from there, it is just a small step to defining encryption as a > deliberate attempt to circumvent that law, and s