On Fri, Apr 23, 2004 at 05:06:44PM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Pulling the power is the exact wrong thing to do if it's a CFS requiring a
passphrase at startup.
Does anyone know what the default procedure is when hardware is being seized
(threat model=knuckle-dragger/gumshoe)?
This might have
Major Variola writes...
If you physically destroy the keys or the data, there is little to gain by
torturing you or your family. That is superior to gambling that your
deeper duress levels are convincing to the man with the electrodes.
Are there any publicly available documents that detail
underground railroad would have worked better, but your still black.
Obviously you don't know about whitening properties of moder ciphers!
Seriously, today the distingushing marks among classes, tribes and castes are
far more informational than physical. So today crypto *can* make you white, or
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, A.Melon wrote:
Are there any publicly available documents that detail interrogation
protocols and what brainwave patterns and bloodflow look like during truth
telling and lying? Preferably something that gets into how to consciously
alter brainwave patterns and
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Tyler Durden wrote:
| However, I'd bet there are short-term applications for crypto that
| really matter and yet have no real relationship to $$$ (for instance,
| what if there was widespread communications and crypto in Nazi
| Germany...would the
to detect that data is being destroyed, but statistically
speaking that will be much rarer.
-TD
From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap
push
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 11:53:07 -0700
At 05
On Fri, Apr 23, 2004 at 10:43:14AM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
Step zero is to pull the power,
so any shutdown code does not run.
Pulling the power is the exact wrong thing to do if it's a CFS requiring a
passphrase at startup.
Does anyone know what the default procedure is when hardware is
Tyler Durden wrote:
I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
help.
Well, what if there were 3 passwords:
1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will
actually be
smart
At 07:43 AM 4/23/2004, Trei, Peter wrote:
If you're dealing with a state-level attacker, any
scheme involving explosives or incendiaries would get
the attackee in as much or more trouble than the
original data would.
This is a hard problem. I suspect any solution will
involve tamper-resistant
From: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED]
3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys
the real data as it opens the plausible real data.
For Windows, look up Strong Disk Pro, they're quite paranoid - it can be
used like this.
Mark
Right, there are at least two workable solutions-
Hard drives with user alterable firmware. I surprised that none of the
major drive manufacturers seems to have thought about offering a version of
their controllers, for substantially more money, that offers this.
A retrofit device that
From: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Apr 23, 2004 10:09 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
..
Well, what if there were 3 passwords:
1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually
be smart enough to look
At 11:33 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
This will produce a loud bang, obviously.
Thermite is a good choice to turn your fileserver into lava, but that
thing
better be outside, or mounted in chamotte- or asbestos-lined metal
closet.
Will produce smoke, and take some time, too.
Thanks, I
At 08:51 PM 4/23/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote:
The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is:
When
does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you?
This serves a purpose as well.
Why would you ever cooperate if
t 10:09 AM 4/23/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
help.
Well, what if there were 3 passwords:
1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will
At 09:23 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Innocents could be a good cannon fodder that can bring a lot of
backslash and alienation aganst the goons, stripping them from public
support.
Yes, this has been discussed before, in addition to using it
retributionally --finger some deserving
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote:
The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When
does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you?
After he gets one? Yeah, that's plausible, if he's convinced there's
only one. But once he's seen a second
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego.
Are there any decent implementations for Linux/BSD/NT?
I haven't looked recently. One property that such a FS or app should
have is that it is useful for something *else* besides stego duress
On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 01:13:48AM +0100, Dave Howe wrote:
No, it is a terrible situation.
It establishes a legal requirement that communications *not* be private from
the feds. from there, it is just a small step to defining encryption as a
deliberate attempt to circumvent that law, and so a
Morlock Elloi wrote:
The extreme ease of use of internet wiretapping and lack of
accountability is not a good situation to create.
False.
It is the best possible situation cpunk-wise I can imagine.
No, it is a terrible situation.
It establishes a legal requirement that communications *not* be
The extreme ease of use of internet wiretapping and lack of accountability
is not a good situation to create.
False.
It is the best possible situation cpunk-wise I can imagine.
It effectively deals away with bs artists (those who *argue* against this or
that) and empowers mathematics. If one
At 12:09 PM +0200 4/22/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption?
Amen.
It's like expecting a worldwide ban on finance. Been tried. Doesn't work.
:-)
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting
At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove
somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel?
Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has worked pretty
well.
If you're good you don't even leave marks.
Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 01:13:48AM +0100, Dave Howe wrote:
No, it is a terrible situation.
It establishes a legal requirement that communications *not* be
private from the feds. from there, it is just a small step to
defining encryption as a deliberate attempt to circumvent
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 12:09 PM +0200 4/22/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption?
It's like expecting a worldwide ban on finance. Been tried. Doesn't
work.
There isn't a worldwide ban on breaking CSS - doesn't stop the film
industry trying to enforce it
At 4:32 PM +0100 4/22/04, Dave Howe wrote:
There isn't a worldwide ban on breaking CSS - doesn't stop the film
industry trying to enforce it in the US courts.
Carl Ellison tells the story about how, with the advent of the longbow, all
these peasants had to get absolution from their local priests
On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you prove
somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel?
Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has worked
At 05:56 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you
prove
somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel?
Torture, of the
At 12:09 PM +0200 4/22/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption?
Amen.
It's like expecting a worldwide ban on finance. Been tried. Doesn't work.
But the goal isn't to ban it; just marginalize it enough to be able to tar
it as a terrorist action.
True,
communications and crypto in Nazi Germany...would the
holocaust have happened?)
-TD
From: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap
push
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 12:43:51 -0400
At 4:32 PM +0100 4/22/04, Dave Howe
On Thu, 2004-04-22 at 14:53, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
help.
The first thing that popped into my mind is a USB key with a small cake
of potassium
At 4:00 PM -0400 4/22/04, Pete Capelli wrote:
But the goal isn't to ban it; just marginalize it enough to be able to tar
it as a terrorist action.
True, there is no worldwide ban on finance. But there is the delightful
'know your customer' law.
That's just a monster in the closet.
Fact is, the
On Thu, Apr 22, 2004 at 11:53:07AM -0700, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
help.
Smallish lithium battery has enough oomph to heat a NiCr filament (or charge an
On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
However, it's not entirely reliable. At some point, the suspect tells
you what you want to hear, whether or not it is the truth, just so you
leave him alone. It can even happen that the suspect convinces himself
that what he really did what he
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