Peter D. Junger wrote:
That isn't the reason why a click-through agreement isn't
enforceable---the agreement could, were it enforceable, validlly
forbid reverse engineering for any reason and that clause would
in most cases be upheld.
Not in Europe though. EU directive 91/250/EEC on the
On Wed, 26 Jun 2002, Donald Eastlake 3rd wrote:
Privacy, according to the usual definitions, involve controlling the
spread of information by persons autorized to have it. Contrast with
secrecy which primarily has to do with stopping the spread of
information through the actions of those not
Privacy abuse is first and foremost the failure
of a digital rights management system. A broken
safe is not evidence that banks shouldn't use
safes. It is only an argument that they shouldn't
use the safe than was broken.
I'm hard pressed to imagine what privacy without
DRM looks like.
On Wed, Jun 26, 2002 at 10:01:00AM -0700, bear wrote:
As I see it, we can get either privacy or DRM,
but there is no way on Earth to get both.
[...]
Hear, hear! First post on this long thread that got it right.
Not sure what the rest of the usually clueful posters were thinking!
DRM
Eric Cordian [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote :
It was my understanding that libraries destroy records of patrons'
activity as soon as the books are returned. Nonetheless, this is an
interesting Federal fishing expedition, with warrants issued by secret
courts, and criminal penalties for librarians
On Tue, 25 Jun 2002, Dan Geer wrote:
the problem statements for privacy and for digital rights management
were identical
Hmm, so:
privacy : DRM :: wiretapping : fair use
- RL Bob
Dan Geer wrote:
Over the last six months, I'd discovered that Carl Ellison (Intel),
Joan Feigenbaum (Yale) and I agreed on at least one thing: that the
problem statements for privacy and for digital rights management
were identical,
...
... YMMV.
Uhhh, my mileage varies rather
Towards the bottom of this article its mentioned that Mitnick submitted
a list of Nortel's
[1] 'security' barriers to r00t [2] on a widely used piece of telco
switching equiptment.
One wonders how many copies of this info circulate in TLA's technical
intercept depts?
[1] (presumably obsolete :-)
I'm slightly confused about this. My understanding of contract law is
that five things are required to form a valid contract: offer and
acceptance, mutual intent, consideration, capacity, and lawful
intent. It seems to me that a click-through agreement is likely to
fail on at least one, and
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html
Ross
Interesting QA paper and list comments. Three
additional comments:
1. DRM and privacy look like apple and speedboats.
Privacy includes the option of not telling, which DRM
does not have.
2. Palladium looks like just another vaporware from
Microsoft, to preempt a market like when MS promised
On Wed, Jun 26, 2002 at 09:51:58AM -0400, Donald Eastlake 3rd wrote:
| Privacy, according to the usual definitions, involve controlling the
| spread of information by persons autorized to have it. Contrast with
| secrecy which primarily has to do with stopping the spread of
| information through
On Wed, Jun 26, 2002 at 03:57:15PM -0400, C Wegrzyn wrote:
If a DRM system is based on X.509, according to Brand I thought you could
get anonymity in the transaction. Wouldn't this accomplish the same thing?
I don't mean that you would necessarily have to correlate your viewing
habits with
On Wed, 26 Jun 2002, Barney Wolff wrote:
Do you really mean that if I'm a business, you can force me to deal with
you even though you refuse to supply your real name? Not acceptable.
I won't give up the right NOT to do business with anonymous customers,
or anyone else with whom I choose not to
Scott Guthery wrote:
Perhaps somebody can describe
a non-DRM privacy management system.
Uhh, anonymous remailers? I never disclose my identity, hence there is
no need for parties I don't trust to manage it.
Come on, folks. This ought to be cypherpunks 101. DRM might be one
way to achieve
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