On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 9:48 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 6:07 AM, krishna e bera wrote:
>> On 13-07-30 12:47 AM, Thomas Asta wrote:
>>> http://bitmail.sourceforge.net/
>>
>> No design, no specs, no discussion, no docs.
>> A feature list that looks remarkably like GoldBug,
>> Combined with IPsec on those miles, or a vetted path if it's short
>> enough, you can reduce the amount of cable that personally-identifying
>> IP headers are sniffable on, from a few thousand miles, to perhaps a
>> couple of feet
According to the speed of light, anything under a certain maximu
> On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Kyle Maxwell wrote:
...by top posting.
> http://boingboing.net/2013/07/12/so-apparently-edward-snowden.html
>> On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 2:30 PM, Trigger Happy
>> wrote:
>>
>> what I saw today lavabit.com
>>> quote: lavabit.com
>>>
>>> I cannot share my experi
>> There's still plenty of room, need, and reason for people to make stands
>> with traditional mail services too.
> On lavabit.com:
> Defending the constitution is expensive! Help us by donating to the Lavabit
> Legal Defense Fund here.
> https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hoste
> On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 10:10 PM, coderman wrote:
>> my contempt for email should be evident by provider; ... ;)
Gmail seems intent on refusing signups via Tor without
supplying other linkable and not rationally expendable
data such as phone. I expect they'll bleed off users who
need this to ot
>> i don't quite get why everyone purportedly loves webmail clients so much?
>
> Ease of access as opposed to setting up a client like
> Thunderbird/Outlook/mutt etc.
I can tell you gmail's interface completely sucks now.
Every change they make is a whole new world of ruin.
Webmail dates back to
>> since data is encrypted
>> server-side and Google manages the keys ( although the fact that they
>> think they won't be obligated to hand the keys over to the gov't is
>> bullshit). However, what I think is important to see in this story, is
>> that Google is responding to pressure from the publ
> T word
The word is TERRORIST aka: criminal.
A shame that some words cannot be said or
that some cannot say them.
>> They use XMPP and they allow connections from outside their network.
>> ...
>> In most ways they are way ahead of the competition.
> How gracious of them!
No, that is old model. Yet how ahead and gracious are the punks?
imap4[s only], submission[starttls only], transport smtp[s preferred,
an
On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:43 AM, rysiek wrote:
> Dnia środa, 21 sierpnia 2013 10:39:50 Ruben Pollan pisze:
>> Quoting Matej Kovacic (2013-08-21 09:49:13)
>>
>> > All mail sent to the list should then be encrypted (recipient is mailing
>> > list address and user has it's public GPG key). Mailing li
>> This is so very true. Decentralisation is the only way to go, IMVHO. And
>> the lower network level we can decentralise, the better.
I like the decentral model. But I wonder about how to affirmatively
deny an influx of attacking nodes overtaking the network. It surely
cannot be relegated to the
> T word
The word is TERRORIST aka: criminal.
A shame that some words cannot be said or
that some cannot say them.
[thread continued forwards...]
And equally shameful that some use humour as excuse to utter
them under false guise of safety rather than actually discuss them
On 8/26/13, rysiek wrote:
> It's a seemingly unsolvable conundrum:
> - start with a clean slate and create a new, "perfect" solution;
> - start with something people already use and improve it as much as
> possible.
>
> The former approach has the risk of the solution not being adopted; the
> la
On 8/26/13, coderman wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 10:52 PM, Bill Stewart
>> Datagrams don't give you any useful anonymity,
> ...
> usability for example to support UDP traffic and applications which
Are we necessarily even speaking strictly of UDP 'datagrams'
or applications? For example, I
On 8/29/13, grarpamp wrote:
> On 8/26/13, coderman wrote:
>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 10:52 PM, Bill Stewart
>>> Datagrams don't give you any useful anonymity,
>> ...
>> usability for example to support UDP traffic and applications which
>
> Are we
On 8/30/13, Jan-Frode Myklebust wrote:
>> > On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 2:46 PM, Nathan Suchy
>> >> I don't want this for piracy as I have a paid VPN account that is much
>> >> faster for that if I decide to pirate. I think we need BitTorrent
>> >> though
>> >> to
>> >> work on Tor so Tor Users can se
> On 8/30/13, Jon Callas wrote:
> What we're learning from Snowden is that they're doing traffic analysis --
> analyzing movements, social graphs, and so on and so forth. The irony here
> is that this tells us that the crypto works.
Are we sure? This seems to tell us they are doing traffic analys
On 8/31/13, Jon Callas wrote:
> Thus with a large budget, you do both. With one hand, you crack the crypto
> by cracking the software. When it works it works. When it doesn't, it
> doesn't. Stop stressing. With the other hand, you revel in the glory of
> silence. In silence you can think. You watc
No exit is really safe... some say pick an underdeveloped
clueless state, perhaps. But those states are fed from cables
that are monitored on the other end. As such, and since you
can do no better, your best bet is to limit your exposure by
picking an exit within the same jurisdiction as your targe
>> - Given the huge amount of material classified these days, SECRET doesn't
>> seem to be a very high level any more, ... really important stuff is
>> compartmented (SCI), and Suite B is not approved for it - it has to be
>> protected by unpublished Suite A algorithms.
SCI is an access control, n
On 9/5/13, coderman wrote:
> of all the no such agency disclosures, this one fuels the most wild
> speculation.
> """
> James Bamford, a veteran chronicler of the NSA, describes the agency
> """
Links to links to source quotes...
http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/2013-June/004477.
On 9/5/13, Gregory Foster wrote:
> http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
Partly how providers claim they don't provide any info:
###
To help secure an insider advantage, GCHQ also established a Humint
Operations Team (HOT). Humint, short for "human intel
On 9/5/13, coderman wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 11:38 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>> ...
>>> however, the crypto breakthrough discussed is more mundane:
>>
>> Source? Sure, non-PFS can be exploited.
>
> i asked Snowden for an authoritative copy... ;P
Didn't
On 9/6/13, CypherPunk wrote:
> On 09/06/2013 06:17 AM, John Preston wrote:
>> I'm having trouble finding the list archives going back into the 90's;
>> they're not on cpunks.org. Anyone got them?
>
> http://cypherpunks.venona.com/
cryptome has a partial zip archive you can search for.
For those
On 9/6/13, John Young wrote:
> An understated response to the NSA and unidentifed friends treachery:
>
> http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html
>
> More of these expected, many. But who knows, as Green says,
> all could go back to swell comsec business as usual.
Linked from s
On 9/6/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> - Forwarded message from Andy Isaacson -
>
> From: Andy Isaacson
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced -
> rumors
>
> On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 10:45:46AM -0700, Joe Szilagyi wrote:
>> Does anyone put any stock into the ru
On 9/6/13, Carsten N. wrote:
> An analysis of Truecrypt was done by the Privacy-CD team:
>
> en: https://www.privacy-cd.org/downloads/truecrypt_7.0a-analysis-en.pdf
> de: https://www.privacy-cd.org/downloads/truecrypt_7.0a-analysis-de.pdf
Just taking a moment to thank anyone reviewing the code
of
On 9/25/13, John Young wrote:
> Now that it appears the Internet is compromised what other
> means can rapidly deliver tiny fragments of an encrypted
> message, each unique for transmission, then reassembled
> upon receipt, kind of like packets but much smaller and less
> predictable, dare say ran
On 9/25/13, Rich Jones wrote:
> That kind of technology is already widely deployed in walkie talkies - I
> think I remember at HOPE a speaker mentioning that the NYPD used this
> technique until they abandoned it due to its inconvenience.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency-hopping_spread_s
On 9/25/13, Greg Rose wrote:
> Even under the much-relaxed export laws of the US, deriving spreading
> information cryptographically is a prohibited export. Which isn't to say it
> is not a good idea.
The US only applies to itself. Further, over the air, it's noise, the crypto
is undetectable and
On 9/27/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I don't see how a ham running a repeater backbone can
> prevent end to end encryption other than sniffing for
> traffic and actively disrupting it. I'm not sure tampering
> with transport is within ham ethics, though they definitely
> don't understand the actual us
On 9/27/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 01:12:19PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
>>
>> The mentioned tech has nothing to do with traditional 'ham'.
>> And without the crypto key they can't see it and can't disrupt
>
> HamNet/AMPRNet ...
>
Some have said...
> this [Snowden meta arena] has been a subject of discussion on
> the [various] lists as well
> Congrats, torproject :-D
> "Tor Stinks" means you're doing it right; good job Tor devs :)
> good news everybody; defense in depth is effective and practical!
Yes, fine work all han
$5000 to just enter not guilty and likely pay an attorney to defend
it / accept dismissal may seem realistic. Thing is, that doesn't
leave much payout to defendant. And a fair number of those pleas
will be going to trial. That entails conviction risk, and regardless
of time dealt, that risk will ca
On Oct 7, 2013, at 1:43 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Given the recent debate about security levels for different key sizes, the
> following paper by Lenstra, Kleinjung, and Thome may be of interest:
>
> "Universal security from bits and mips to pools, lakes and beyond"
> http://eprint.iacr.org/201
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:20 PM, coderman wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 8:00 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
>> ... they are in large part why I have absolutely no confidence at all that
>> the ... system has any hope of being repaired, except
>> perhaps by AP or 'denial of disservice attack' methods.
>
>
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 7:42 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I think we need more hidden services to make the darknet more attractive,
> less exits. The open Internet has been dead for a while, time to accept it.
If you are referring to Tor, there are at least 700 such services that you
could find rathe
Please consider writing a whitepaper on the subject of
whatever it is you're trying to say and then posting a link
to it here with a one paragraph summary for readers.
And if you are, or rather than, using this list (as previously
surmised by others) as the rough equivalent of your own
numbers stat
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
> Recipe for a DoS.
>
> Subject: [liberationtech] NSA must be best informed entity regarding viagra
> market
>
> Since most email is spam, how productive is the NSA dragnet?
>
> the-nsas-giant-utah-data-center-will-probably-hold-a-bunch-of-spa
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:21 AM, John Young wrote:
> online usage is totally [...]
That's as it should be.
> about can there ever be reliable RNGs.
That topic gets trolled or at least thoroughly beaten around
the bush every year too. Some fodder is almost too perfect.
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 2:29 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> If we had good PRNGs everywhere, with lots of trustable physical entropy
> stirred in then nobody would care about talking about these.
> It would be boring, since a solved problem.
>
> Now show me a cryptographic quality PRNG with a few MBytes
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:02 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:47:08PM -0500, brian carroll wrote:
>
>> so you're saying the person is reading this
>> on a two-line 80s electronic pager then?
>
> You can assume that people who care know this, so
> text-only correlates with old
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 4:22 PM, John Young wrote:
>
>> perhaps the proceedings were better; Schneier was there after all,..
>
> Schneier is a leader of the monetizing pack, never
> crosses the line, sits among the stellars of institutional
> control, incessantly promotes his wares, spoon-feds
> f
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:40 PM, Mob wrote:
> Also, if you don't want to miss anything, you are probably subscribing to
> the cypherpunks, cryptography@randombits, cryptography@metzdowd and
> cryptopolitics (low volume at the moment) lists, often receiving a hundred
> postings every day, or more.
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:10 PM, brian carroll
wrote:
> from one platform into Gmail, where formatting errors and
> line wrap issues exist, thus unreliable rendering of emails.
Gmail's support for those things is poor at best.
> since the list does not send me a copy of my own posts,
Gmail
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, coderman wrote:
> i'm as frustrated as anyone at the glacial pace of disclosure, and the
> limited scope of disclosure, and the arbitrary censorship in the
> disclosures, and ...
>
> yet still what has been released is far from "negligable"!
> part of me wonder i
> http://help.cs.umn.edu/email/procmail
http://www.courier-mta.org/maildrop/
http://www.courier-mta.org/maildrop/documentation.html
http://www.courier-mta.org/maildrop/maildroptips.html
http://www.wonkity.com/~wblock/docs/html/maildrop.html#_filtering_duplicate_messages
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> He raised the questions of whether we could make a Prism-proof Internet.
>
> That's a big problem, and we've been debating small pieces of it ever since.
> I'd like to suggest a smaller problem, just as a kind of rallying point.
>
> So ..
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 6:39 AM, Devin Reade wrote:
> At the risk of stating the obvious, going to an anonymized list
> is not without its own problems. One big part of the usability of
> many mailing lists involves the reputation of the poster. Take
> this list for example: I am not a cryptogr
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 2:20 PM, Michael Kjörling wrote:
> On 21 Oct 2013 04:39 -0600, from g...@gno.org (Devin Reade):
>> I would be surprised if there is not software in existence that
>> could correlate poster's mannerisms against publicly available
>> non-anonymized postings to in effect de-an
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 1:37 PM, brian carroll
wrote:
> // this perhaps relates to the concept of Denial of Disservice in some way...
>
> previously i had planned to explore illuminated juggling and
> eventually move into a signaling context with it, via display of
> various LED colored balls and
Voluntary shutdown beforehand...
https://privacy.cryptoseal.com/
http://cryptoseal.com/team/
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6585649
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/10/cryptoseal-vpn-shuts-down-rather-than-risk-nsa-demands-for-crypto-keys/
http://it.slashdot.org/story/13/10
http://pressthink.org/2013/10/why-pierre-omidyar-decided-to-join-forces-with-glenn-greenwald-for-a-new-venture-in-news/
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 4:51 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> Just got word, Enigmabox has published source and
> put up first documentation on http://wiki.enigmabox.net/
This is cjdns. Last I checked (and will again) I'm pretty sure they
were using an IPv6 address scheme that would conflict with
other p
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Trigger Happy wrote:
> Check out new Tor distro - Linux Kodachi
> http://www.digi77.com/linux-kodachi/
> http://sourceforge.net/projects/linuxkodachi/
> jabber: triggerha...@jabber.ccc.de
> torchat: xruq34bnhbqlkjtn
https://www.facebook.com/oitseeds
https://www.fac
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 10:49 PM, Jim Bell wrote:
> My (Bell's) comments follow:
>A phone company which announces that it WILL NOT record phone metadata
Would get my business.
Of course many such policies are full of holes and drift anyway.
> Why not x-out the last 3-4-7 digits...
There's
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 11:57 PM, coderman wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 8:09 PM, Kyle Maxwell wrote:
>> ...
>> So how do you propose that a provider perform SSL without keeping
>> their private cert?
// Kelly John Rose wrote:
// Put the server into the hands of a third party outside of the U
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 12:42 AM, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 2013-10-22 13:54, Jim Bell wrote:
>>
>> They should respond by saying, "You, Federal Judge, do not have the
>> legal authority to order me/the company to ASSIST in the task, at most
>> you can require me to ALLOW it; Further, you do not
On Oct 22, 2013 Joshua Datko TOP POSTED!!!
> Also, and I think this was discussed on this list before, offering payment
> may actually decrease the number of volunteers [2].
>
> I was initially interested in researching a technical way to offer payments
> to relays by the clients joining a mining
On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 7:24 AM, Andrea Shepard
wrote:
> Geez, sounds like things have taken a turn for the worse at LL since I worked
> there. :/
> ...
> to it, the SL server logged the full text of all chat even in its production
> ...
> I think it's clear that the current management
> of are v
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 5:55 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 05:23:45AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
>> This is cjdns. Last I checked (and will again) I'm pretty sure they
>
> Yes. If people are not familiar with cjdns, here's a good
> intro https://git
Someone misdirected this top post of theirs to me instead of the list.
--
Either way. Companies like cryptoseal and lavabit are closing so that the
users can't participate in a class action suit against them. Decreasing the
chances of justice by making the next available court room a more
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> - Forwarded message from Caleb James DeLisle -
> I'm not really worried about what the IETF has to say
Nor am I really, even to the point of stealing an unused external
IPv6/3 since it is unlikely all of them will ever be allocated.
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 1:53 PM, coderman wrote:
> this had the convenient effect of masking the origin of a caller
> through our network. needless to say, we were strongly encouraged to
> keep all CDR records for years, precisely because some many months
> later a request would come in asking fo
And will these sorts of rulings be used to support cases brought
to stop the recently disclosed spy programs...
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/warrant-required-gps-trackers/
Regarding the subthread about examining sources...
http://ask.slashdot.org/story/13/10/22/1416201/ask-slashdot-can-bruce-schneier-be-trusted
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:50 PM, R.R. D. wrote:
> fwd fyi
> -- Forwarded message --
> Subject: GoldBug Secure Messenger V 06 released
> http://goldbug.sf.net
Forwarded eh? From who, or where? ... 'mikeweber', 'berndhs'?
Public mailing list, forum, website, bugtracker, IRC?
You kee
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 3:29 PM, Dan White wrote:
> there are a few scenarios where we "give up" information:
> * Customer billing dispute, in which case we'll provide or confirm
> information that a customer already has printed on their bill, perhaps in
That's common sense before a bill is paid
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 3:57 PM, coderman wrote:
> the stick was contracts/monies externally
Sure, there's that, especially if smallco wants to do business with bigco.
Two entities on equal footing could certainly negotiate things.
> and legal counsel internally.
Yeah, seems it's always about t
Forwarded with permission.
--
On 10/24/2013 02:35 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> - Forwarded message from Caleb James DeLisle -
>
>> I'm not really worried about what the IETF has to say
>
> Nor am I
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 11:01 AM, John Young wrote:
> Brian Carroll has been exploring these possibilities since 1999:
>
> http://cryptome.org/jya/arch-elec.htm
>
> http://org.noemalab.eu/sections/ideas/ideas_articles/pdf/b_carroll_seeing_cyberspace.pdf
I owe a bit of an apology to Brian... I did
On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 7:59 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
> Let us call such entities, entities that collect and curate reputational
> information, reputational servers, ebay being the big example of a
> reputational server.
So long as you don't label scores as 1=bad up through 5=good.
Sites that d
On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:30 PM, coderman wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 8:14 PM, brian carroll
> wrote:
>> ... lo and behold i uncover an undocumented secret military program
>> based both in encoded sound and electromagnetic data transmission,
>
> damnit Brian!!!
>
> you've just killed our
> SCIF's are acoustically shielded, but as we know, bass carries ;P
This has been demonstrated critically...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtIj1Sndcc8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pthHmI5e7eU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJnU9YKoLWA
Unlikely the average laptop would adequately cover
the a
A few links...
http://neo900.org/
http://projects.goldelico.com/p/gta04-main/
https://jolla.com/
http://www.fairphone.com/
http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/13/11/02/1637236/openphoenux-neo900-bills-itself-as-successor-to-nokias-n900
More interesting platforms for even Guardian or
other OS than
On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 10:55 PM, coderman wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Gregory Foster
> wrote:
>> ... According to a top secret accounting dated Jan. 9, 2013,
>> NSA’s acquisitions directorate sends millions of records
>> every day from Yahoo and Google internal networks ...
>> The
On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 3:50 AM, Alexey Zakhlestin wrote:
> GSM firmware is still not open-source though (as that would make phone not
> suitable for legal usage in USA)
I'd like to see a law link that says you cannot legally
use your own open source GSM compliant stack to
communicate over a GSM
This thread reminds me of something...
There were (may still be?) a couple software defined modem
packages for wardialing. Instead of watching the usual AT
set and sending data over serial, you'd tell the modem to
send you the raw PCM stream from the DSP. Then you could
run FFT etc on it and make
On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 2:38 AM, wrote:
> Hello,
>
> can BitMail.sf.net as a p2p email tool for encrypted Email (and hybrid with
> IMAP-Email) be regarded as a reference model for research to create a secure
> Email Client? as it uses both, gnupg and openssl!
>
> http://bitmail.sourceforge.net/
> I don't think that's possible at the moment. There are no
> deterministically built operating systems yet.
This is rather sad. I think FreeBSD has
a project somewhere trying to move that way.
Hopefully all of the unix-likes are at least aware of
the concept, if not having an actual project for i
On Sun, Nov 17, 2013 at 10:02 PM, coderman wrote:
> the Omidyar buyout of Greenwald and Poitras apparently to shield the
> willful, disgraceful corporate role in pervasive privacy destruction
>
> effective disclosure dies.
But with the open disclosure ideas seeded by WikiLeaks, Manning,
Snowden,
Curiously, US law enforcement feels it already has the general laws it
needs. Yet it needs the talent base to use them, aka: SS is hiring.
The US is behind in its guidance to business... US companies
large and small very much want to play and lead just as soon as a
compliance/certification framewo
On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 1:01 AM, ianG wrote:
> On 23/11/13 15:30 PM, Ralf Senderek wrote:
>> On Sat, 23 Nov 2013, David Mercer wrote:
>>
>>> But of course you're right about actual current usage, encrypted email
>>> is an
>>> epic fail on that measure regardless of format/protocol.
>>
>> Yes, but
> this is pretty amusing :P
Perfect :) Wonder if the panel talk is online?
On Sat, Dec 14, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Juan Garofalo wrote:
> --On Friday, December 13, 2013 7:31 PM -0800 Tom Ritter
> So, I tried to create an account at bitcointalk.org and got this
>"Due to abuse, registration through Tor is not permitted. "
> That's got to be a joke, right? right?
I
> Phillip H-B, et al have been saying...
> [email encryption, etc]
> What is the gap we have to close to turn this on by default?
How many times has this been rehashed the last six months?
You can't fix email as we know it today using todays bolt-ons,
protocols and corporate stakeholders/services
>> Phillip H-B, et al have been saying...
>> [email encryption, etc]
>> What is the gap we have to close to turn this on by default?
>
> How many times has this been rehashed the last six months?
> You can't fix email as we know it today using todays bolt-ons,
> protocols and corporate stakeholders
Moving the last couple days talk to this thread seems fine.
On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 3:19 PM, Ralf Senderek wrote:
> On Sun, 15 Dec 2013 grarpamp wrote:
>
>> The only way to have any real global seamless success is to go
>> ground up with a completely new model. IMO, that will
> So if you are communicating with one of these new fangled email addresses,
> you have to have the software that encrypts, and your message is secure -
> because you are not using the old email protocol, though there may something
> on your computer that pretends to use old email protocol for the
> You may have a look of "I2P Bote" it is severless, encrypted mail
> system, address is the public key, P2P based... nice tool.
As in another post of mine, I'll be looking at that again.
My first take was that it stores the messages in the DHT,
which didn't seem scalable or reliable at all. I may
Everyone knows there are active attacks against
'Tor' users... ie: the apps they attach to it. Those are
cheap wins for the adversary and unrelated to Tor.
There are attempts to exploit Tor daemon and other various
access to 0wn or run the relays themselves to get at the
plaintext or the service r
> They want this, if it can be made to work, and they'll try
> it if they don't know. That's what they said in the goals revelations, and
> I believe them.
This probably can't be mentioned enough. Millions to billions
of gates on a die, lots of room there. Multiplied out to the
millions to billio
Highly doubt Ryan, Avi or any cpunks are involved, or
that much of anything will actually be in SeaLand.
Seems like a news driven oppurtunistic biz to cover
tower operation and maintenance costs.
Anyone have any facts?
Such as who's behind it and why?
http://www.sealandgov.org/sealand-news-1/Have
> They are being pretty clever to make up for terribly endpoint security.
Yeah, all that might work for non brick and mortar stuff you maybe care about,
say email [1], and your fave pornsite. But really... you need to be able to
demand a hardware OTP token from your bank and brokerage... plenty of
Send things to the list, not me.
On Mon, Dec 23, 2013 at 5:50 PM, Bill Broadley wrote:
> On 12/16/2013 12:01 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>>> You may have a look of "I2P Bote" it is severless, encrypted mail
>>> system, address is the public key, P2P based... nice tool.
&
g and finally a user facing daemon that
moves messages into and out of local spools for use by normal
user/system tools.
Pasting in a very rough and unflowing thread summary to date
for interested people to pick up and discuss, draft, etc.
=
grarpamp...
> [pgp/smime email encryption, etc]
>
More summary pasting...
/ Someone...
/ There are people I know who do not mind the extra steps for pgp. I
/ certainly want to get the roll out to use and test and enjoy. Sign me
/ up.
grarpamp...
Encryption is only part of it. There's transport, elimination of
central storage, anonymity
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:09 AM, danimoth wrote:
> A problem which could rise is the 'incentive' for peers to continuosly
> providing bandwidth and disk space to store messages. I'm a simple dude,
> with a mailflow of ~5 email per day. Why I should work for you, with
> your ~1 mail per day for
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Natanael wrote:
> Somebody in there mentioned allowing IPv6 addressing on top of I2P/Tor. That
> would be Garlicat/Onioncat. It creates a local virtual IPv6 network
> interface for your software to use, so that you can map key based addresses
> to routable local ad
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 5:01 AM, danimoth wrote:
> In these months there was a lot of talking about "metadata", which SMTP
> exposes regardless of encryption or authentication. In the design of
> this p2p system, should metadata's problem kept in consideration or not?
> IMHO exposing danimoth@cryp
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