On Fri, Jul 09, 2004 at 06:38:49PM -0500, Brad Sims wrote:
If you want postscript back; simply grab the source deb and roll your own;
just edit rules under the debian folder. Delete the '--with-xprint' and
'--disable-postscript' lines and do 'dpkg-buildpackage -rfakeroot'. However
I did give
On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 10:47:08AM +0100, Dale Amon wrote:
On Fri, Jul 09, 2004 at 06:38:49PM -0500, Brad Sims wrote:
If you want postscript back; simply grab the source deb and roll your own;
just edit rules under the debian folder. Delete the '--with-xprint' and
'--disable-postscript' lines
On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 12:47:18PM +0200, Magnus Therning wrote:
Yes. Printing PS to a file is still possible.
Thanks. I had visions of all sorts of extra work in
order to just stand still. Now I can forget about this
and go back to writing my mail address verify
daemon...
--
Excuse the cross posting, but many are discussing on all of these
lists.
On Sat, 2004-07-10 at 06:47, Magnus Therning wrote:
If I were to dselect today, would I still
be able to print to file a website page
as ps? [Y/N]
Yes. Printing PS to a file is still possible.
On Saturday 10 July 2004 5:47 am, Magnus Therning wrote:
I'd like a black and white clarification of the impact
of the change so I know for certain whether to be
incredibly pissed off at the packager or not:
If I were to dselect today, would I still
be able to print to file
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 11:19:03 -0400
Greg Folkert [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Excuse the cross posting, but many are discussing on all of these
lists.
On Sat, 2004-07-10 at 06:47, Magnus Therning wrote:
If I were to dselect today, would I still
be able to print to file a website
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004, Michael B Allen wrote:
My impression was that the PostScript generator had the security
issue
Can someone please state, for the record, definitively and precisely
what this security issue is?
The fact that PS is a turing complete language isn't a security issue,
beyond the
* Don Armstrong:
Perhaps I've missed something, but everything that I've read in the
threads so far amounts to people either assuming that there's an issue
and not defining it, or attempting to figure out where the issue is.
This summary is correct as far as I can see. No real security issue
Has anyone invited our Mozilla packager to participate in this
discussion?
--
Carl Fink [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jabootu's Minister of Proofreading
http://www.jabootu.com
--
To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 12:00:07 +0200, Dale Amon wrote:
I'd like a black and white clarification of the impact
of the change so I know for certain whether to be
incredibly pissed off at the packager or not:
If I were to dselect today, would I still
be able to print to file a
On Thursday 08 July 2004 7:18 pm, Reid Priedhorsky wrote:
Googling and searching the bug database only yielded a vague claim about a
remote exploit (bug #247585). I also asked over on debian-user and while
the flurry of replies showed that the removal decision was controversial
if not
Hello all,
I have just discovered that the old-style printing option
PostScript/default is gone from Firefox and probably Mozilla (I don't
use Mozilla). Apparently a major reason for this is that the PostScript
printing engine that was removed has security problems.
Does anyone have any solid
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.03.07.1054 +0100]:
Debian could provide, with only some effort from package
maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This
however, might break Policy (IMHO).
how would it break policy?
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.03.07.1054
+0100]:
Debian could provide, with only some effort from package
maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This
however, might break Policy (IMHO).
how would it break policy?
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote:
Debian could provide, with only some effort from package
maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This
however, might break Policy (IMHO).
how would it break policy?
(sorry, catching up with
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote:
Debian could provide, with only some effort from package
maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This
however, might break Policy (IMHO).
how would
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote:
Debian could provide, with only some effort from package
maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This
however, might break Policy (IMHO).
how would it break policy?
(sorry, catching up with
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote:
Debian could provide, with only some effort from package
maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This
however, might break Policy (IMHO).
how would
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:16:12PM +0100, Javier Fern?ndez-Sanguino Pe?a wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote:
[snip]
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the
debian bind package should not be chroot as the default
instalation?
RTFM. That is:
I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot
bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind
package should not be chroot as the default instalation?
One thing that might be a
I'd agree with your comments. I being looking at
OpenBSD (for various reasons) and the default setup is
reasonable secure (there are still some things left on
, which supprised me). Not sure if Debian needs to go
as far as OpenBSD but I think that it is a good
referance base
Jon
--- Tarjei
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote:
I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot
bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind
package should not be
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote:
I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot
bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is
Debian being what it is, are
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.15.1316 +0100]:
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind
package should not be chroot as the default instalation?
RTFM. That is:
Tarjei [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Hmm. Here's a suggestion.
- This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need
good security.
*All* installed boxes need adequate securing. Linux worms would not
propagate if it weren't for a critical mass of idiots running unpatched
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:16:12PM +0100, Javier Fern?ndez-Sanguino Pe?a wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote:
[snip]
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the
debian bind package should not be chroot as the default
instalation?
RTFM. That is:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote:
I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot
bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind
package should not be
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote:
I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot
bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is
Debian being what it is, are
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.15.1316
+0100]:
Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind
package should not be chroot as the default instalation?
RTFM. That is:
Hmm. Here's a suggestion.
- This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need
good security.
1. Make a votingpage and anounce it on debian-users asking what are the
main servers people are running on their debian systems.
2. Go through the 10 highest and make sure they
Tarjei [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Hmm. Here's a suggestion.
- This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need
good security.
*All* installed boxes need adequate securing. Linux worms would not
propagate if it weren't for a critical mass of idiots running unpatched
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