On Wed, 2008-01-23 at 22:19 +, Giovanni Donelli wrote:
Are you talking about a JS lib or a code that does what I need, support for
.pac proxy chaning?
The later.
Sorry, that library wasn't linked to from your original post, but it can
be found on the wikipedia page. Here's a direct link:
Great. Thanks! This solve 50% of the problem.
The other problem is to actually plug this into mod_proxy. Is there a hook a
can use to override the connection to the remote server?
What do you guys suggest?
thanks!
On Jan 24, 2008 12:50 PM, Ralf Mattes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed,
On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 03:53:38PM -0800, William Rowe wrote:
security/vulnerabilities-oval.xml
I'm ending up with deltas such as these...
-httpd_state
xmlns=http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5#apache;
id=oval:org.apache.httpd:ste:131 version=1 comment=the version of
Hello,
As some may now, ModSecurity adds a very easy and effective way to put
Apache in jail, but chrooting the process after its initialisation, thus
putting all listening processes in jail.
You specify one directive, and the only thing you have to put in the
jail is your htdocs and logs
On Thu, Jan 24, 2008 at 01:10:23PM +0100, Nick Gearls wrote:
You specify one directive, and the only thing you have to put in the
jail is your htdocs and logs directories; all other files (conf,
modules, httpd, libraries, etc.) are outside of the jail. This is really
top security - it's
-Original Message-
From: Colm MacCarthaigh [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Donnerstag, 24. Januar 2008 13:16
To: dev@httpd.apache.org
Subject: Re: High security
On Thu, Jan 24, 2008 at 01:10:23PM +0100, Nick Gearls wrote:
You specify one directive, and the only thing you have
On 1/23/2008 at 7:25 PM, in message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Paul J.
Reder [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ruediger Pluem wrote:
On 01/23/2008 07:14 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Author: rederpj
Date: Wed Jan 23 10:14:41 2008
New Revision: 614605
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=614605view=rev
Yes, chroot could potentially be escaped.
Although, if you chroot the main process, then you spawn child processes
under another userid, like in standard Apache config under Unix, I
expect it to be really very difficult to escape if
1. you are not root
2. if the only files available are log
Hello,
The proposed patch generalizes a mechanism that currently exist, but is
incomplete.
It now allows to accept all SSL connections that fail for any reason
related to certificate verification or validation.
Could this be included in next release ?
This has a huge impact on the user, as
Joe Orton wrote:
On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 03:53:38PM -0800, William Rowe wrote:
security/vulnerabilities-oval.xml
I'm ending up with deltas such as these...
-httpd_state
xmlns=http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5#apache;
id=oval:org.apache.httpd:ste:131 version=1 comment=the
We were using normal worker MPM with keepalives for this test. The current
stable event would have helped with idle keepalive threads, but the system
didn't seem to care.
But when using mod_php, worker is not recommended, right?
I doubt prefork scales as well as worker.
Working on making a
On 01/24/2008 04:55 PM, Nick Gearls wrote:
Yes, chroot could potentially be escaped.
Although, if you chroot the main process, then you spawn child processes
under another userid, like in standard Apache config under Unix, I
expect it to be really very difficult to escape if
1. you are
The referral code is enabled via set_option calls and is currently
processed in relation to a newly created ldap connection. Any further
directory related processing would have to support changing the options
later, or provide extra criteria when selecting a connection to use. But I
agree that,
Paul J. Reder wrote:
Now that you ask that question it makes me realize that the better
question is
probably Should the directives be directory scoped or server scoped?
The rest
of the util_ldap directives are all server scoped.
The cache related ones are all server scoped, as the cache is
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