In the new e10s multiprocess model, is that possible to calling XPCOM in the client process?

I want full xpcom access in client process such as do IMAP sync for thunderbird So we would gain performance improvement on the thunderbird. -- 此致 礼 罗勇刚 Yours sincerely, Yonggang Luo ___ dev-platform mailing list dev-platform@lists.mozilla

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

Emma is correct that this is the solution for your problem and we are aware that it's important for the adoption of HTTPS. We already implemented the first half to support the upgrade of the form @action from HTTP to HTTPS in Firefox 41 but bug 667233 is needed to handle the form's origin being

Re: Dan Stillman's concerns about Extension Signing

On 11/25/15 11:16 AM, Jeff Gilbert wrote: I doubt anyone is going to switch to Firefox because our extension signing is safe. (though I do think we should have some form of signing) But they will gladly switch away when anything breaks, particularly when we reduce the activation energy needed to

Re: Dan Stillman's concerns about Extension Signing

On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 3:16 AM, Till Schneidereit wrote: > FWIW, I received questions about this via private email and phone calls > from two people working on extensions that support their products. Their > extensions sit in the review queue with not chance of getting through it > before the sig

Re: TIFU by using Math.random()

On 11/25/15 5:51 AM, Xidorn Quan wrote: According to the article, SpiderMonkey's PRNG is not much better than V8's. It seems we are using a even older algorithm, although ironically have a better result. After reading this article as well as some introduction from the wikipedia, it seems to me t

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

I've been reviewing Password Manager bugs the past few days, and the https/http issue has been bugged: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=667233 and has recent activity. It has an owner, and a priority. On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Thomas Schäfer wrote: > Am Mittwoch, 25. November

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

Am Mittwoch, 25. November 2015 19:51:11 UTC+2 schrieb Philipp Wagner: > Am 25.11.2015 um 18:33 schrieb Boris Zbarsky: > > On 11/25/15 12:24 PM, Thomas Schäfer wrote: > >> No, the are stored using the mechanism firefox offers for storing > >> credentials (Settings -> Security). > > > > So these are

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

Am 25.11.2015 um 18:33 schrieb Boris Zbarsky: > On 11/25/15 12:24 PM, Thomas Schäfer wrote: >> No, the are stored using the mechanism firefox offers for storing >> credentials (Settings -> Security). > > So these are HTTP Auth credentials (based on 401 responses from your > server)? I guess the O

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

On 11/25/15 12:24 PM, Thomas Schäfer wrote: No, the are stored using the mechanism firefox offers for storing credentials (Settings -> Security). So these are HTTP Auth credentials (based on 401 responses from your server)? -Boris ___ dev-platfor

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

> > After testing this, we realized that many of our customers stored their > > credential in the browser and by switching from non-ssl to ssl, they lost > > the possibility to use them also on the ssl-version of the portal page. > > Are these stored as cookies? Something else? > > -Boris No,

Re: Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

On 11/25/15 12:08 PM, Thomas Schäfer wrote: After testing this, we realized that many of our customers stored their credential in the browser and by switching from non-ssl to ssl, they lost the possibility to use them also on the ssl-version of the portal page. Are these stored as cookies? S

Using browser stored credentials for http://mywebsi.de also on https://mywebsi.de

Hi, I am working for a webside which currently offers a portal page with ssl and non-ssl version having a login form posting to a ssl-only login server and providing the authenticated content ssl-only. Still most of our users use the non-ssl version of that page. In order to increase to level

Re: TIFU by using Math.random()

On 11/25/15 9:59 AM, Mike Hoye wrote: Doing the wrong thing really fast is not hard. You have now discovered the key optimization secret of web browsers. -Boris ___ dev-platform mailing list dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/l

Re: TIFU by using Math.random()

On 2015-11-25 9:33 AM, Frederik Braun wrote: On 25.11.2015 12:42, Philip Chee wrote: Hopefully Spidermonkey's Math.random() is better. Phil There have been multiple insightful responses on HN and reddit/netsec. T

Re: TIFU by using Math.random()

On 25.11.2015 12:42, Philip Chee wrote: > > > Hopefully Spidermonkey's Math.random() is better. > > Phil > There have been multiple insightful responses on HN and reddit/netsec. The short version is, that Math.rando

Re: Web APIs documentation/evangelism/dev team meeting Thursday at 8 AM PST

> Eric Shepherd > November 25, 2015 at 8:14 AM > The Web API documentation community meeting, with representatives from > the technical evangelism and the API development teams, will take > place on Thursday at 8 AM Pacific Time (see http://bit.ly/1GghwBR for > your t

Web APIs documentation/evangelism/dev team meeting Thursday at 8 AM PST

The Web API documentation community meeting, with representatives from the technical evangelism and the API development teams, will take place on Thursday at 8 AM Pacific Time (see http://bit.ly/1GghwBR for your time zone). Typical meetings include news about recent API development progress and fu

Re: TIFU by using Math.random()

According to the article, SpiderMonkey's PRNG is not much better than V8's. It seems we are using a even older algorithm, although ironically have a better result. After reading this article as well as some introduction from the wikipedia, it seems to me that "xorshift+" is probably the best algor

Re: Question: "Chrome file doesn't exist: ..." in |make mozmill| log by running DEBUG versions of C-C TB

ISHIKAWA,chiaki wrote: Does anybody have an idea of the issue of > 113 Chrome file doesn't exist: /NREF-COMM-CENTRAL/objdir-tb3/dist/bin/chrome/messenger/content/messenger/messengercompose/null "null" can't be right. A test is probably trying to set the src of an image to null instea

TIFU by using Math.random()

Hopefully Spidermonkey's Math.random() is better. Phil -- Philip Chee , http://flashblock.mozdev.org/ http://xsidebar.mozdev.org Guard us from the she-wolf and the wolf, and guard us from the thief, oh Night, and s

Re: Dan Stillman's concerns about Extension Signing

FWIW, I received questions about this via private email and phone calls from two people working on extensions that support their products. Their extensions sit in the review queue with not chance of getting through it before the signing requirement kicks in. This puts them into a situation where th

Re: Dan Stillman's concerns about Extension Signing

And didn't receive any reply, afaict. On 25/11/15 10:30, Mike Hommey wrote: > On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 10:14:09AM +0100, David Rajchenbach-Teller wrote: >> I admit I have followed extension signing/scanning only very remotely, >> but Dan Stillman has a number of good points: >> >> http://danstillma

Re: Dan Stillman's concerns about Extension Signing

On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 10:14:09AM +0100, David Rajchenbach-Teller wrote: > I admit I have followed extension signing/scanning only very remotely, > but Dan Stillman has a number of good points: > > http://danstillman.com/2015/11/23/firefox-extension-scanning-is-security-theater > > Could someone

Dan Stillman's concerns about Extension Signing

I admit I have followed extension signing/scanning only very remotely, but Dan Stillman has a number of good points: http://danstillman.com/2015/11/23/firefox-extension-scanning-is-security-theater Could someone who's actually involved in this feature provide an answer? Cheers, David __

Re: [RFC] Cleaning up sessionstore.js

torstai 28. marraskuuta 2013 13.56.13 UTC+2 David Rajchenbach-Teller kirjoitti: > As many of you know, Session Restore is something of a performance hog, > for many reasons - we have reports of. One of the reasons is that we > store so very many things in sessionstore.js and sometimes keep stuff >