On 9/9/13 6:13 PM, Brian Smith wrote:
I assume by prevents people from tracking individual access points
means the following: Some people have a personal access point on them
(e.g. in their phone). If somebody knows the SSID and MAC of this
personal access point, then they could track this
On 10/09/13 00:58 AM, Chris Peterson wrote:
I'm looking for some feedback on crypto privacy protections for a
geolocation research project I'm working on with the Mozilla Services
team. If you have general questions or suggestions about the project,
I'm happy to answer them, but I'd like to
On 10/09/13 06:05, Chris Peterson wrote:
The device would scan for nearby APs and send the hash of each AP's MAC
and SSID to our location server. Our server would not need to worry
about the hash of hashes pairs because that would only be used for
published data. The server would return an
On 10/09/13 08:04, Henri Sivonen wrote:
1) Android has a mechanism for detecting when it is connecting to a
portable AP provided by another Android device. Can we use the same or
a similar detection mechanism to detect portable APs and filter them
out?
I suspect actually connecting to the
On 10/09/13 00:25, R. Jason Cronk wrote:
Is the data aged?
Not AFAIAA.
What happens if I move?
The raw database notes that you are now being detected in a new
location. What happens then is up for debate. I'd argue that if your
position was fixed for N months before, and it seems fixed again
On 09/09/13 22:58, Chris Peterson wrote:
Google's Location Service prevents people from tracking individual
access points by requiring requests to include at least 2-3 access
points that Google knows are near each other. This proves the
requester is near the access points.
Related question:
On 10/09/13 10:48, ianG wrote:
If that is the case, why not flip it around. Instead of trying to
interpolate the existing data that is broadcast out there, why not write
a protocol to broadcast the direct location from the wireless access point?
Because only a tiny, tiny fraction of devices
On 9/10/13 3:46 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
I believe the plan is to have a database of raw findings, then a
processed database used by the web service, and a published database
which may have even more data reduction.
Chris P: can we get permission to store the raw SSID in the
_unpublished_
Bug 646452 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=646452
We currently have a signon.autologin.proxy that is disabled by default.
When enabled, if a proxy needs a password and that password is saved,
Firefox will attempt to authenticate without prompting (and prompt if there
is a failure).
On 9/9/13 6:13 PM, Brian Smith wrote:
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 2:58 PM, Chris Peterson cpeter...@mozilla.com wrote:
Google's Location Service prevents people from tracking individual access
points by requiring requests to include at least 2-3 access points that
Google knows are near each other.
On 9/10/13 3:46 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
Related question: it would be great if there were some way to lift this
restriction, at least for the web service if not for the database, while
preserving the necessary privacy protections. My family's house, which
is in a rural area, has a single
On 10.09.2013, at 03:46 , Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote:
On 10/09/13 10:48, ianG wrote:
If that is the case, why not flip it around. Instead of trying to
interpolate the existing data that is broadcast out there, why not write
a protocol to broadcast the direct location from the
On 9/10/13 11:53 AM, Stefan Arentz wrote:
I wonder if it makes sense to ban specific MAC address ranges (vendors) from
appearing in this database. For example I think it would be possible to detect
specific chipsets as being mobile devices vs stationary access points.
Our stumbler does some
On 10.09.2013, at 03:39 , Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote:
BTW, how does the service figure out the lat/long of an AP? Do we do
anything at all with signal strengths? Could we?
This is a bit off-topic for the security discussion.
I suggest starting a new thread on dev-geolocation, if
On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:13 PM, Brian Smith br...@briansmith.org wrote:
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 2:58 PM, Chris Peterson cpeter...@mozilla.com wrote:
Google's Location Service prevents people from tracking individual access
points by requiring requests to include at least 2-3 access points that
On 9/10/2013 3:46 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 10/09/13 00:25, R. Jason Cronk wrote:
Does this give Mozilla the
ability to historically track me if I move my device?
Yes; this is why publishing the full raw stumbled data sets is sadly
going to be not possible.
Why would we have two
On 9/10/2013 10:09 AM, Hanno Schlichting wrote:
As of this moment, we filter out any AP that has been detected in two
different places (where different means more than ~1km away from each
other). This is very conservative approach and we'll relax that
later.
What do you mean by filtered out?
On 11/09/13 03:27 AM, Daniel Veditz wrote:
On 9/9/2013 11:21 PM, Chris Peterson wrote:
The primary motivation for hashing the MAC+SSID was to avoid uploading
the SSID (which is considered private data in some European countries)
private means we can't even /look/ at it, rather than merely
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