Bonsoir,
Le mercredi 28 octobre 2015 14:53:39 UTC+1, raf...@gmail.com a écrit :
> > However, https://crt.sh/?id=8983568 shows a TLS server certificate valid
> > for 4 years and delivered in 2015.
> As already it has been commented, this subCA was developed for a private and
> restricted environ
On 10/28/15 2:14 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Google has blogged about this:
https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html
All,
We should discuss what actions Mozilla should require of Symantec, and
what would be the penalty of not completing t
Google has blogged about this:
https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html
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On 10/19/15 4:34 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Therefore, I also propose that we don't separate out the audit criteria
according to trust bit in version 2.3 of the policy. Rather, the
separation will be part of another effort to create a separate S/MIME
policy in 2016.
This means that the followin
On Wed, October 28, 2015 1:55 am, mycho...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> Dear Sleevi
>
> First of all, I appreciate your detailed opinios and suggestions
>
> In terms of option B (application to only be for that of your SSL/website
> CA rather than your root CA)
> All CAs in CA hierarchy (including Roo
On 9/21/15 4:02 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
The next item on our list to discuss is:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:CertificatePolicyV2.3
(D2) CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements version 1.1.6 added a
requirement regarding technically constraining subordinate CA
certificates, so item #9 of the I
The CA/Browser Forum should create a public log of instances where a CA has
notified the CA/Browser Forum of conflicts between the Guidelines and local law.
-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+ben=digicert@lists.mozilla.org] On
Behalf Of
On 10/28/15 8:41 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 26/10/15 23:46, Richard Barnes wrote:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1204656
I'm surprised it's taken LE as long as a month to review whether the
info-gathering document has been correctly transcribed...
Gerv
I doubt that's what
On 27/10/2015 8:55 πμ, mycho...@gmail.com wrote:
Korea has e-signature Act, Decree and Ordinance. E-Signature act also contains
several administration rules and one of administration rules is a ‘guideline
for CPS’. Root CA/Sub-CAs controlled by government has to follow the 'guideline
for CPS'
On 26/10/15 23:46, Richard Barnes wrote:
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1204656
I'm surprised it's taken LE as long as a month to review whether the
info-gathering document has been correctly transcribed...
Gerv
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Thanks Erwann.
I'll try to answer to your questions.
> However, https://crt.sh/?id=8983568 shows a TLS server certificate valid for
> 4 years and delivered in 2015.
As already it has been commented, this subCA was developed for a private and
restricted environment and it was considered that ISA
Dear Sleevi
First of all, I appreciate your detailed opinios and suggestions
In terms of option B (application to only be for that of your SSL/website CA
rather than your root CA)
All CAs in CA hierarchy (including Root CA) has to follow a government law. So,
it's not easy to adapt
option B i
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